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Abstract  
 
Background: The study explored the relationship between moral reasoning, distorted 
cognitions and problem solving in male offenders and non-offenders with intellectual 
disabilities (IDs). The psychometric properties for an adapted measure of distorted cognitions 
for people with IDs were explored. The difference in cognitive distortions, moral reasoning 
and problem solving between offenders and non-offenders were explored. Very few 
published studies explored these constructs in this way. Methods: A between-groups design 
and additional correlations were used to explore the hypotheses. Two groups were recruited: 
ID offenders (n=34) and ID non-offenders (n=38). Both groups completed the Socio-Moral 
Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF), How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) and the Social 
Problem Solving Inventory Short-Form (SPSI-R-SF). Results: The results indicated that 
offenders with IDs demonstrated Stage 2(3) reasoning when compared to non-offenders with 
IDs who demonstrated Stage 2 reasoning. The difference in some of the moral reasoning 
constructs was significant. A modified version of the HIT demonstrated good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability. Significant positive relationships were identified 
between moral reasoning and problem solving, and moral reasoning and cognitive distortions 
for men with IDs. Conclusions: There was a relationship between moral development, 
cognitive distortions and problem solving and that these constructs were interdependent. The 
results supported Gibbs Sociomoral Stages and tentative support for Garrigan and Langdon’s 
Developmental Social Information Processing Model of Moral Judgement and Behaviour. An 
adequately powered sample size was used. Social desirability, recruitment and treatment 
implications were limitations. Further studies should replicate the findings, using a 
longitudinal design along with the adapted measures.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
This study aimed to investigate whether there was a relationship between moral 
reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving in adult male offenders with intellectual 
disabilities (ID).  There were very few published studies that explored this relationship in 
detail. 
1.1 Overview of the Chapter 
Initially, a definition of IDs using the diagnostic criteria within the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-V; APA 2013) and the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; WHO, 2010) is presented. A review of the 
current literature relating to offenders with IDs is undertaken. The key studies that are 
reviewed focused on studies that explored moral development, problem solving or distorted 
cognitions. A theoretical framework that integrated moral reasoning, problem solving and 
cognitive distortions is presented, and the key theoretical constructs and limitations are 
highlighted and discussed. This chapter concludes with a proposal for the current study, 
supported by a theoretical, clinical and methodological rationale. The specific hypotheses are 
presented. 
1.2 Intellectual Disabilities  
1.2.1 Definition. According to the DSM-V (APA, 2013), three criteria must be met 
for a diagnosis of ID: 
 A Full Scale Intelligence Quotient that is below 70. 
 Significant limitations in two or more areas or domains of adaptive 
behaviour: 
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 Domain 1: Conceptual or cognitive skills such as language, reading, 
writing, mathematical ability, reasoning, memory and knowledge;  
 Domain 2: Social skills such as empathy, interpersonal 
communication, social judgments and the ability to make and retain 
relationships;  
 Domain 3: Practical skills such as autonomy in personal care, 
employment, personal financial management, recreation and social 
tasks. 
 And evidence that the limitations were present before the age of 18. 
The DSM-V (APA, 2013) identified three categories of IDs that were dependent upon 
the Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (IQ). An individual with an IQ between 50 and 70 would 
be classified with a mild ID. An individual with an IQ between 35 and 50 would be classified 
with a moderate ID. An individual with an IQ between 25 and 35 would be classified with a 
severe ID. An individual with an IQ below 25 would be classified with a profound ID. 
Individuals with an IQ between 71 and 84 would be classified with a borderline ID. 
According to the ICD-10 (WHO, 2010) an ID was described as “mental retardation.” 
The ICD-10 criteria for mental retardation was characterised by an impairment of skills that 
manifested during the developmental period and that could be present with or without a 
physical disability. These skills affected cognitive functioning, language, motor and social 
abilities. The severity of mental retardation was coded from F70 to F79. For F70 there was a 
mild mental retardation with an approximate IQ range of 50 to 69; for F71 there was a 
moderate mental retardation with an approximate IQ range of 35 to 49; for F72 there was a 
severe mental retardation with an approximate IQ range of 20 to 34; for F73 there was a 
profound mental retardation with an IQ that was below 20. For F78 the classification was 
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“other mental retardation.” For F79, the classification was “unspecified mental retardation.” 
There were no classifications for F74 to F77. 
There were minor differences in the severity levels between the DSM-V and the ICD-
10. Notably, the DSM-V would refer to someone with an IQ of 50 as ‘moderate’ while the 
ICD-10 would indicate that this was ‘mild.’  For the purposes of this study, the DSM-V 
(APA, 2013) criteria was applied throughout as this was consistently used in other studies 
with offenders with IDs (Hockley & Langdon, 2014; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). It was 
also useful for comparative purposes with these studies. 
In the UK, the term ‘learning disability’ has been used to describe these diagnostic 
criteria (British Psychological Society, 2001). Similarly, in the USA and Canada the term ID 
was used. The terms ‘intellectual disabilities’ and ‘learning disabilities’ were essentially 
referring to the same condition. In Valuing People (Department of Health, 2001), a socially 
accessible definition of learning disability was referred to as a significantly reduced ability to 
understand new or complex information; and a reduced ability to cope independently with an 
onset before the age of 18. In the current study, ‘intellectual disabilities’ was used, as this was 
reflected in the literature. 
 1.2.2 Prevalence. The precise number of people with IDs in the UK was unknown. 
According to a report that was endorsed by the Department of Health, it was estimated that 
1,191,000 people in England had IDs (Improving Health and Lives, 2011). It was also 
estimated that 530,000 of these were men and 375,000 were women, but of these, only 
189,000 were known to ID services.  
Notably, the Department of Health estimated that in 2001 there were approximately 
1.4 million people with IDs living in England (Department of Health, 2001). However, 
Emerson and Hatton (2004) collated census and local authority data and they estimated that 
there were approximately 985,000 people with IDs living in England. 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
4 
The three reports highlighted discrepancies in the estimated prevalence of people with 
IDs that were living in the UK. Taking the reports into consideration, the estimated 
prevalence of people with IDs in England appears to range from just below 1 million to 1.4 
million people. This equated to approximately 2% of the population. 
1.3 Intellectual Disabilities and Criminal Offending 
1.3.1 Current context. In 2009, Lord Bradley (Department of Health, 2009) 
conducted a review to explore the effectiveness of court liaison and court diversion schemes 
for people with mental illness or IDs. In his findings many offenders, with IDs or a mental 
illness, had been unsuitably held in custody. For offenders with IDs, he recommended early 
identification and assessment of an ID as soon as possible after the arrest. He proposed that 
the responsibility for screening for IDs should be shared between the judiciary, police 
officers, national offender management officials and other relevant caseworkers.  
Lord Bradley’s conclusions were also echoed in a review of unmet mental health 
needs in prisons where Edgar and Rickford (2009) suggested that all prisons should have ID 
specialists and that IDs should be identified at the point of arrest, rather than after an 
individual has been remanded or sentenced. Notably, this was a complex task and prisons 
were currently not offering the detailed ID assessments that were highlighted by Edgar and 
Rickford (2009).  
1.3.2 Prisons and psychological interventions. Even though offenders were not 
being assessed for IDs, prisons appeared to be supporting offenders depending on their 
offence, ID or mental illness. Some of these developments have focused on psychological 
interventions.  For example, the Enhanced Thinking Skills Programme  (ETSP) was a 
cognitive behavioural group intervention that focused on cognitive deficits, reasoning and 
problem solving and was developed for use in prisons (Clarke, 2000). A major criticism of 
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Clarke’s study is that they excluded people with IDs and all participants had a Full Scale IQ 
that was above 80.  
Notably, psychological interventions such as the ETSP were promising. However, 
they appeared to completely exclude offenders with IDs and this was problematic.  Therefore, 
the validity and efficacy of such programmes with offenders with IDs was still to be 
explored. An adapted version of the ETSP was developed for offenders with IDs. Kelly 
(2014) conducted an evaluation of this adapted ETSP over a 3-year period. The findings 
indicated a significant improvement in empathy and perspective taking, while there were no 
significant improvements for impulsivity and locus of control. Other studies have also 
investigated adapted interventions with sex offenders with IDs. The Sex Offender Treatment 
Services Collaborative – Intellectual Disability (SOTSEC-ID) is a treatment programme for 
intellectually disabled sex offenders (Hayes, Murphy, Langdon, Rose, & Reed, 2007; 
Langdon et al., 2007). Murphy, Powell, Guzman and Hayes (2007) also used cogntivie 
behavioural therapy (CBT) for 8 male sex offenders with IDs. They concluded that they had 
adapted the CBT and that there were significant positive changes in sexual knowledge and 
victim empathy after treatment. 
In summary, it was promising to see intervention programmes being adapted for 
offenders with IDs. However, these adapted programmes were not available for all offenders 
with IDs, especially given that offenders were not being assessed for IDs. Therefore, there 
was still a great need to validate adapted programmes for offenders with IDs (Kelly, 2014).  
1.3.3 Legislation and secure forensic hospitals.  In some instances treatment 
programmes were offered in secure forensic hospitals. The legislation permitted offenders 
with IDs to be detained under the Mental Health Act (2007), under civil and criminal 
sections. In certain situations offenders with IDs could be diverted from a crown court to low, 
medium or high secure forensic hospitals for treatment. This diversion was permitted under 
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Section 37 of the Mental Health Act (2007). For convicted offenders with IDs there was a 
sentencing discretion for judges. This sentencing discretion was not applied for crown court 
convictions where offences included murder, sexual or violence (Holland, 2004).  
If an offender was not diverted from court then they could be transferred to a secure 
forensic hospital for treatment under Section 47/49 (Mental Health Act, 2007); assessment 
under Section 35, Section 36 and Section 38; or treatment with restrictions under Section 
37/41. However, a major criticism of the Mental Health Act (2007) was that the provisions 
were mostly for people with mental health difficulties. This suggested that offenders with IDs 
were at risk of being excluded or overlooked within the legal context, especially if they were 
not formally assessed for an ID. 
1.3.4 Prevalence for offenders with intellectual disabilities. According to the 
Ministry of Justice (2014), there are approximately 81,492 male prisoners in the UK. 
However, the exact number of offenders with IDs within the prison and criminal justice 
system is currently unknown (K. Hopkins, personal communication, September 23, 2013). 
There are two reasons for this. First, not all offenders were screened for IDs. Second, when 
offenders entered the criminal justice system a screening process collected data for a 
disability as an ‘umbrella term.’  This meant that having a disability could refer to an ID, 
mental illness or physical disabilities. The data collection did not specify the nature of the 
disability and it was not possible to extract the precise number of offenders with IDs 
Lindsay, Law and McLeod (2002) suggested that the prevalence for offenders with 
IDs in prisons was excessively high. According to the Prison Reform Trust (2007), it was 
estimated that approximately 20% to 30% of all current incarcerated offenders had an ID. In 
1988, Coid identified a diagnosable ID in 5.1% (n=334) of prisoners at HMP Winchester in 
the UK. According to the Bradley Report (Department of Health, 2009), it was estimated that 
the prevalence of prisoners with IDs ranged from 0.5% to 9%. However, part of this estimate 
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was based on self-report rather than formal testing and is potentially unreliable. A second 
study, which explored the prevalence of offenders with IDs using custody record forms (n= 
9,014) found a prevalence rate of approximately 8.7% (Scott, McGilloway, & Donnelly, 
2006). 
A systematic review explored surveys of ID prevalence in a general prison 
population, between 1988 and 2004 (Fazel, Xenitidis, & Powell, 2008). Data from 10 surveys 
involving five countries (UK, USA, Australia, Dubai and New Zealand) were included. The 
findings suggested that the prevalence rate for a diagnosis of ID was between 0.5% and 1.5% 
of the prison population based on a sample consisting mostly of male prisoners. This 
prevalence rate appeared to be lower than a study in the UK, where a 7.1% prevalence was 
reported in a sample of 140 prisoners at HMP Liverpool (Hayes, Shackell, Mottram, & 
Lancaster, 2007). 
Based on the varied prevalence data, studies in the UK, USA and Australia have 
suggested that offenders with IDs are over-represented in their respective criminal justice 
systems (Holland, Clare, & Mukhopadhyay, 2002). The actual figures should be interpreted 
with caution given the possibility of whether or not the offenders in these studies would meet 
the criteria for a diagnosis of an ID or a learning difficulty. Again, this raised the issue of 
accurately identifying ID offenders in the criminal justice system and that assessment using 
the DSM-V (APA, 2013) would be required to determine whether an offender had an ID. In 
contrast to some of the previous studies, Murphy, Harnett and Holland (1995) conducted a 
prevalence study at HMP Belmarsh and they found a 0% prevalence rate for offenders with 
IDs. The variability in prevalence suggested that there was an overestimate for prevalence 
rates depending on the definition of ID. Ultimately, this means that prevalence rates should 
be interpreted with the definition of ID for a particular study. 
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Another issue that was considered with prevalence rates was whether offenders with 
IDs had a guilty state of mind. The judicial system would not be applied if a guilty state of 
mind (‘Mens Rea’) could not be proved or if a victim with an ID provided evidence (Holland, 
2004). It could be argued that definitions of crime are socially constructed as they varied 
from country to country. As a consequence, people with severe or profound IDs could not be 
an offender by definition. Furthermore, high rates of traumatic brain injury and substance 
misuse in prison populations have also contributed to deficits in memory, learning and 
cognition, which are often difficult to differentiate when considering a diagnosis of ID 
(Barnfield & Leathem, 1998).  
In summary, the prevalence for offenders with IDs in the UK was estimated, at its 
highest point, to be approximately 9% of a British offender population (Department of 
Health, 2009; Scott et al., 2006). These estimations were helpful but they also appeared to be 
an inconsistent because low prevalence rates were also reported (Murphy et al., 1995). 
Furthermore, they were potentially misleading as they were based on retrospective case 
reviews, self-reports and estimations of a diagnosis of ID. These studies highlighted the 
variability of prevalence rates and the challenge of assessing prisoners for IDs. This problem 
required ongoing exploration (Holland, 2004).  
1.3.5 Cost implications for offenders with intellectual disabilities. The current 
climate of financial austerity within the National Health Service (NHS) does not appear to 
support hefty investment into areas of healthcare, unless they are a major priority. Therefore, 
the issue of cost is an important one (Hayes, 2004).  
At present, the cost for treatment and rehabilitation for ID offenders was 
approximately £320 million (or £128,000 per bed) across approximately 2500 beds in secure 
hospitals in England (Emerson et al., 2011). In the UK, it cost approximately £29,092 to 
house a single male offender for 1 year in a category B prison (Ministry of Justice, 2013a). 
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According to the HM Chief of Prisons, it cost approximately £52,000 to house a single male 
offender for 1 year in a category A prison (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, 2000).  
Seemingly, secure hospitals were more costly that prisons. Therefore, the issue of 
screening offenders for IDs could potentially be understood in the context of great cost 
implications to the criminal justice system. Fiscally speaking, this was a great dilemma 
because screening offenders would most likely increase costs that were associated with 
diversion into secure hospitals.  Despite this, there was a need to ensure that offenders with 
IDs were appropriately diverted given that they would struggle to settle into a prison without 
suitable support.  
1.3.6 Factors related to risk and comorbidity. In addition to cost factors, there are 
several factors that needed to be considered for offenders with IDs. These included risk 
factors, comorbidity, offence type and IQ.   
Several studies have explored risk factors for offenders with IDs. Some studies 
identified mental illness in offenders with IDs as a contributing factor to offending (Barron, 
Hassiotis, & Banes, 2004). This suggested that offenders with IDs and a mental illness had 
higher levels of complexity, which made the provision of adequate interventions a challenge 
(Chan, Hudson, & Vulic, 2004). A review conducted by Hudson and Chan (2002) highlighted 
how adults with IDs demonstrated higher levels of challenging behaviour, which made them 
vulnerable to exclusion from services. In this context, access to appropriate interventions and 
services was an obstacle for ID offenders. Mohr, Curran, Coutts and Dennis (2002) 
highlighted the importance of collaborative multi-agency interventions, which included an 
integrated formulation of IDs, mental health and offending behaviour in order to manage the 
complexity of offenders with IDs that also had a mental illness.  
Taylor (2002) found that aggression was the main reason offenders with IDs were 
admitted to hospital. Violent offences were the most frequently reported crimes for offenders 
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with IDs (Barron et al., 2004). This supported earlier studies, which identified aggressive 
behaviour as the most common reason for hospital admissions (Lakin, Hill, Hauber, 
Brunicks, & Heal, 1983). Novaco and Taylor (2004) suggested that offenders with IDs faced 
challenges and further criminal charges once they were admitted to a secure service. In their 
study, with male ID offenders (n=129), 46.5% of patients had assaulted another person post 
admission.  
McGillivray and Moore (2001) also found that substance abuse was a risk factor for 
offenders with mild IDs. Similarly, Lindsay et al. (2013) highlighted alcohol was a risk factor 
for offenders with IDs. Klimecki, Jenkinson and Wilson (1994) found high recidivism rates 
with poor coping skills, while other studies linked personality and mood disorders with high 
risk and reoffending (Barron, et al., 2004; Lindsay et al., 2006a). 
Offence types were highlighted in several studies and suggested that some offences 
were a higher priority than others. For example, sex offending and IDs was a large focus area 
(Hockley & Langdon, 2014; Lindsay, Steptoe, & Quinn, 2012; Thompson & Brown, 1997). 
In a retrospective case note survey (n=47) using male sex offenders with IDs, the occurrence 
of sex offences was approximately four to six times higher when compared to the offenders 
without IDs (Day, 1994). A major critique of Day’s (1994) study was that they used the ICD-
9 (WHO, 1978) classification system, which is currently out-dated, and that they recruited 
participants that were admitted between 1970 to 1988. Notably the ICD-9 was suitable at the 
time. However their sample was obtained by scrutinising case notes which they did not 
explain. Therefore, they appeared to select participants that were well documented with 
statements from victims, witnesses and offenders. This suggested that they excluded 
participants where this information was not available, and may indicate sampling bias. They 
also only reviewed sex offenders and their findings could not be generalised to a general ID 
offender population.  
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Simpson & Hogg (2001) conducted a systematic review, which explored offence 
types for offenders with IDs. They identified sex offences, theft and criminal damage to be 
higher for offenders within borderline IDs, when compared to the general offender 
population. They also highlighted that offenders with mild IDs and IDs below 50 would be 
less likely to drive or successfully plan and follow through with criminal behaviours. They 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence, based on the 15 papers they reviewed, to 
support the hypothesis that offender rates were higher for offenders with IDs, when compared 
to offenders without IDs. In another study, arson was highlighted as a focus area for 
offenders with IDs (Taylor, Thorne, Robertson, & Avery, 2002). The authors suggested that 
very little was known about ID offenders and fire-setting. They concluded that cognitive 
behavioural interventions showed significant improvements at reducing fire interest. While 
their study was convincing their small sample size (n=14) limited the findings. This finding 
highlighted the need for further research with a clear focus on intervention for offenders with 
IDs.  
Another risk factor for offending was IQ. Farrington (1973) conducted a study, which 
compared boys with an IQ above 110 and boys with an IQ of less than 90, over a 10-year 
period. He concluded that one in five of the boys with an IQ of less than 90 had reoffended 
while one in 50 of the boys with an IQ over 110 had reoffended. These results suggested that 
there was a relationship between low IQ and reoffending and these findings have been 
replicated in later studies (Farrington, 2000; Goodman, Simonhoff, & Stevenson, 1995).  
Farrington (2000) also found that offenders with low IQs were most likely to be from 
economically disadvantaged families with high levels of parental conflict and this would 
have effected their ability to engage in schooling and ultimately result in low general ability. 
Farringdon (2005) suggested that there was a relationship between cognitive development 
and criminal behaviour where low IQ and antisocial behaviour were associated. 
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In summary, sex offences were the most studied offence types for ID offenders. It is 
possible that sex offences were a priority due to the traumatic nature of the effect on the 
victim. Further studies with sex offenders suggested the need for further research with an 
emphasis on cognitive distortions (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson, & Palmer, 2011b; 
Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & Marshall, 1997), cognitive behavioural interventions (Falshaw, 
Friendship, & Bates, 2003), social problem solving (Barnett & Wood, 2008; Lindsay et al., 
2011a) and risk management (Beech & Fisher, 2004; Hanson & Harris, 2000; Kemshall, 
2003). The majority of the studies appeared to focus on sex offenders with IDs. Other offence 
types were less studied. This highlighted the need for studies with offenders with IDs that had 
committed other types of offences. 
1.4 Review of the Literature 
Lindsay (2002) conducted a meta-review on systematic reviews that had focused on 
ID offenders. The aim of the review was to explore the link between IDs and offending. The 
method included a keyword search across 11 electronic databases. This search returned 2 
results. In addition, 9 papers were obtained through personal contacts and ‘low impact 
journals.’ In total, 11 papers were included. Lindsay (2002) did not specify which search 
terms were used and this made it impossible to replicate this review and validate its findings.  
Lindsay (2002) highlighted ethical and consent considerations when recruiting 
offenders with IDs because participants may have difficulty understanding information; 
methodological variability across the studies which weakened the generalisability of the 
findings; and intervention and assessment as the focus areas for further studies. Lindsay’s 
(2002) review was brief and a detailed account of each study was not provided. Sample sizes 
were not mentioned and it was unclear whether these results could be generalised or whether 
this suggested reporting bias. Lindsay (2002) did not highlight any theoretical foundations. 
Therefore, the review did not provide any insight into moral development, problem solving or 
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cognition. It was possible that these limitations were present because the review did not 
intend on providing an in-depth analysis. However, given the limited number of studies that 
have been published in this area, it would make sense to provide as much detail as possible.  
As a final point, the majority of the papers were book chapters. This suggested that more 
empirical studies were required with offenders with IDs. 
1.4.1 Key studies for offenders with intellectual disabilities. In order to address the 
limitations of Lindsay’s (2002) review, a literature review was attempted for the current 
study. The aim of this literature review was to identify and evaluate studies that were 
conducted with a focus on moral reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving with 
male offenders with IDs. An electronic systematic search was conducted using multiple 
databases: PsychINFO (1806 - present), MEDLINE (1950 - present), AMED (1985 - present) 
and EMBASE (1980 - present) on 14th August 2013. Phrase searching, Boolean terms and 
truncation operators (Veale, 2012) were used with the following search terms: 
1. “cognitive distortions” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
2. “cognitive errors” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
3. “thinking errors” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
4. “faulty thinking” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
5. Search terms 1 OR 2 OR 3 OR 4 (Combined) 
6. “moral reason*” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
7. “social problem solving” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
8. “problem solving” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
9. Search terms 7 OR 8 (Combined) 
10. “intellectual disabil*” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
11. “learning disability” (Title, abstract and keyword) 
12. Search terms 10 OR 11 (Combined) 
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13. Search terms 9 AND 12 (Combined) 
14. Search terms 5 AND 12 (Combined) 
15. Search terms 6 AND 12 (Combined) 
16. Search terms 13 OR 14 OR 15 (Combined) 
The search returned a total of 577 articles (PsycINFO - 38; MEDLINE - 349; AMED 
- 60; EMBASE -130). An additional search, using key authors, was also conducted using 
MEDLINE (1950-present). This search was conducted using two key authors (“Langdon, P” 
and “Lindsay, W”). This search returned 102 articles, which were also included in the review. 
Key authors were contacted for access to any articles in print or under peer review (n=1). One 
article was currently in print. In total 680 articles were returned using the combined search. 
The titles and abstracts of the remaining articles (n=680) were then screened. Only 14 articles 
were selected for further reading. A total of 666 articles were not suitable. Unsuitable articles 
focused on children, parents, health professionals and females (n=339); mathematical ability, 
therapy or interventions, neurological conditions, personality disorders and memory (n=202); 
and duplicates (n=125). The key word “problem solving” appeared to be the cause for 
returning articles that were not relevant. It was noted that similar difficulties were found in 
Lindsay’s (2002) review and this highlighted that very few published articles had explored 
this area of research.  
For this reason only 3 of the 14 articles were deemed to be relevant. The remainder of 
the studies were hand selected on the basis that they focused on ID offenders and moral 
development, problem solving or cognitive distortions. In addition, library databases were 
thoroughly searched. Extensive reading and discussions with an expert in the field concluded 
that this was an under researched area. Limitations of this method are discussed in the final 
chapter. The following inclusion criteria were applied when selecting articles. 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
15 
 Articles that focused on moral development, problem solving or cognitive 
distortions 
 Studies that recruited adult male ID offenders with a mild to moderate IQ 
using the DSM-V criteria (APA, 2013) 
 Peer reviewed quantitative journal articles  
 Articles in English language 
The following exclusion  criteria were applied: 
 Randomised controlled trials were excluded as they reported on treatment 
efficacy, which was not a focus area of the present study 
 Studies with female, child or adolescent ID offenders because they could not 
be used for comparative purposes
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1.4.1.1 Results of review. A total of 13 studies were identified in Table 1. 
Table 1 consisted of articles from the UK (n=10), USA (n=1) and Australia (n=2). 
There were 3 articles for PS (Lindsay et al., 2011a; MacMahon et al., 2006; 
O’Connor, 1996), 3 articles for MR (Langdon et al., 2011b, 2013; McDermott & 
Langdon, 2014) and 9 articles for CD (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Gannon & Polaschek, 
2005; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon et al., 2007, 2011b, 2013; Middleton et al., 
2009; Lee et al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 2011a). There were 12 quantitative studies and 
1 single case design. There were 6 between-groups, 3 repeated-measure-within-
groups, 1 mixed, 1 single case series, 1 single case and 1 study where no design was 
clearly defined. A total of 8 studies focused on sex offenders (Blumenthal et al., 1999; 
Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon et al., 2007; Lee et 
al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 2011a; Middleton et al., 2009; O’Connor, 1996) and 5 
studies focused on mixed groups of offenders (Langdon et al., 2011b, 2013; Lindsay 
et al., 2011a; MacMahon et al., 2006; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). There were 17 
different measures. For CD, there were 9 measures. For PS there were 7 measures. 
For MR there was 1 measure. Validity and reliability of the measures were explicitly 
reported in 9 of the studies (Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon et al., 2007, 2011b, 
2013; Lee et al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 2006b, 2011; McDermott & Langdon, 2014; 
Middleton et al., 2009) and 7 studies reported formal permission from an appropriate 
ethics committee (Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon et al., 2007, 2011b, 2013; 
Lindsay et al., 2006b, 2011; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). 
1.4.1.2 Moral reasoning. Only 3 studies focused on moral reasoning. This 
suggested the moral reasoning was an under-researched area for offenders with IDs. 
All of the studies used Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992), which will 
be discussed in detail in the next section that will explore the theoretical framework. 
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For the purpose of reading ease, Gibbs et al. (1992) developed the Sociomoral Stage 
theory, which consisted of 4 stages of reasoning and transitional stages, which were 
when stages overlapped. Stage 1 and Stage 2 were considered to be immature 
reasoning, while Stage 3 and Stage 4 were considered to be mature reasoning. 
The studies in the current literature review identified that offenders with IDs 
showed higher levels of moral maturity when compared to non-offenders with IDs 
(Langdon et al., 2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). Secondly, ID offenders 
demonstrated Stage 2(3) reasoning and non-offenders with IDs demonstrated Stage 2 
reasoning using Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory (Langdon et al., 2011b; McDermott 
& Langdon, 2014). According to Gibbs, Stage 2 reasoning suggested that ID 
offenders were making moral judgment decisions based on exchanges, superficial 
justifications and instrumental needs (Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013). The implications of 
this were highlighted by Palmer (2003) where offending at Stage 2 reasoning was 
justifiable if the offender perceived the rewards to be greater than the risks associated 
with the offending behaviour.  
The SRM-SF was used in all three studies. Validity and reliability for the 
SRM-SF was accurately reported in all three studies. The SRM-SF appeared to be a 
good measure of moral reasoning for ID populations. These studies proposed that 
further research should focus on moral reasoning and offenders with IDs. Notably 
there were some moral reasoning measures that were not identified in the studies. For 
example the Moral Judgment Interview (Kohlberg, 1958; MJI) was developed in 1958 
and sparked the development of other similar and related measures such as the 
Objective Moral Judgment Scale (Maitland & Goldman, 1974; OMJS) and the 
Maturity of Moral Judgment scale (Hogan & Dickstein, 1972; MMJ). However, these 
instruments were over four decades old and required a demanding scoring procedure, 
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which involved several hours of interviewing. These measures were followed by the 
development of the Defining Issues Test (Rest, 1979; DIT), which received criticism 
for being a moral reasoning recognition instrument and may be vulnerable to socially 
desirable responses. In 1982, Gibbs and Widaman developed the first version of 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM), which demonstrated good reliability, and 
concurrent and construct validity with the MJI (Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby, 1982). 
Despite having good psychometric properties, the SRM was criticised for being a 
recognition measure and the SRM-SF was later developed in 1992 (Gibbs et al., 
1992). 
While these studies contributed to the literature base, there were also 
limitations. Power and sample sizes were not reported in McDermott and Langdon, 
(2014). However, contact with the authors indicated that the study was adequately 
powered. One of the studies used a small sample size, which limits generalisability of 
the findings (Langdon et al., 2013). All of the studies used convenience samples 
(Langdon et al., 2011b, 2013; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). This highlighted the 
difficulties of recruiting ID offenders and raised concerns about socially desirable 
responding. Some participants were paid (Langdon et al., 2011b) and again this raised 
the potential for confounding (i.e. payment as a motivator for participation).  
1.4.1.3 Cognitive distortions. A total of 9 studies focused on cognitive 
distortions (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Langdon & Talbot, 
2006; Langdon et al., 2007, 2011b, 2013; Middleton et al., 2009; Lee et al., 1996; 
Lindsay et al., 2006b). This highlighted that the majority of studies with ID offenders 
appeared to focus on cognitive distortions. The findings highlighted the presence of 
cognitive distortions that included pro-offending attitudes (Gannon & Polaschek, 
2005; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay et al., 2006b; Middleton et al., 2009); 
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minimisation (Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Langdon et al., 2007, 2013; Middleton et 
al., 2009); blame (Langdon et al., 2007); denial and justification (Blumenthal et al., 
1999; Langdon et al., 2007); entitlement (Gannon & Polaschek, 2005); self-centred 
and assuming the worst (Langdon et al., 2013); and harmful attitudes towards woman 
and children (Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay et al., 2006b). Empathy deficits were 
also reported (Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Middleton et al., 2009). The findings 
supported Gibbs typology of self-serving cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; 
Gibbs et al., 1995).  
Undoubtedly, these studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of 
ID offenders. However there are some limitations. Small sample sizes were used and 
this limits the generalisability of the results (Langdon et al., 2007, 2013; Lee et al., 
1996; Lindsay et al., 2006b). There were as many measures of cognitive distortions as 
there were studies.  Some of the measures were not supported by validity and 
reliability data (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Gannon & Polaschek, 2005). One study did 
not mention the measure (Gannon & Polaschek, 2005) and the name of the measure 
could only be found in the reference list. Some measures were out-dated given that 
the studies took place within the last few years when more reliable measures were 
potentially available (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Middleton 
et al., 2009; Lee et al., 1996). The HIT was used with ID offenders (Langdon et al., 
2011b, 2013) but no reliability or validity data has been generated for its use with ID 
populations. This highlighted the need for reliability and validity data for the HIT for 
people with IDs.  
Notably there were several measures that were not in the studies and that 
could have been considered to identify cognitive distortions. For example, Ball’s 
Neutralisation Scale (Ball, 1973) was developed for use with adolescent offenders and 
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was criticised for being too difficult to read. The Measure of Automatic Thinking 
Errors (MATE; Garvin, 1990) was criticised for having poor discriminant validity 
when a group of offenders was compared with a group of non-offenders. The 
Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS: Walters, 1995) was 
criticised for being a behavioural measure (Barriga et al., 2001). The problem with 
these measures was that they were not designed for use with ID populations. In 2001, 
the How I Think Questionnaire was developed (HIT; Barriga et al., 2001) to address 
some of these limitations and appeared to be a more suitable measure for cognitive 
distortions with offenders with IDs. 
Given the limitations that were identified, the recommendations for future 
studies suggested that there was a need for reliable measures and the efficacy of 
interventions that focused on cognitive distortions (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Langdon 
& Talbot, 2006). 
1.4.1.4 Problem solving. A total of 3 studies focused on problem solving 
(Lindsay et al., 2011a; McMahon et al., 2006; O’Connor, 1996). This suggested that 
problem solving was an under-researched area for ID offenders. Lindsay et al. (2011) 
identified a consistent four-factor solution for the adapted SPSI-R when used with 
offenders with IDs. They also identified improvements in Impulsivity / Careless 
Problem Solving Style, Positive Problem Orientation and Avoidant Problem Solving 
Style following a 7 week problem solving intervention for offenders with IDs. 
MacMahon et al. (2006) identified equivalent solutions being generated when anger 
levels were high and low using a single case study. O’Connor (1996) reported a 
clinical observation of reductions in offending behaviour following a problem solving 
intervention (n=13). 
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All of the problem solving studies had small sample sizes. As previously 
mentioned, this made interpretation of the results challenging. One of the problems 
with small sample sizes is that they could produce false positive results or they could 
overestimate the magnitude of effects. However, the small sample sizes appeared to 
highlight the difficulty in recruiting offenders with IDs. The designs for the studies 
were are all different. One was a single case study (MacMahon et al., 2006), which is 
susceptible to confounding, as results may be influenced by previous interventions. 
Single case studies are also problematic because they rely on one participant, which 
brings in other dilemmas of coercion and good ethical practice if the single participant 
wishes to drop out. 
Lindsay et al. (2011) reported on two studies. The second study used a 
repeated-measures design (n=10), which explored changes in problem solving 
following the SPORT programme. The design for the second study was suitable (de 
Vaus, 2001). However, the sample size was small and not adequately powered for 
their hypotheses. O’Connor (1996) did not provide a clear description of the design 
and no graphs or statistical data were presented. During their study “occasionally 
offending behaviour was reported” (O’Connor, 1996, p.224). No indication of what 
the offence was and how any risks were managed were mentioned.  
Between the three studies, the SPSI-R was the only psychometrically valid 
and reliable problem solving measure. The NAS, PI, SSKAT, ABCS and WSFQ were 
not considered to be ‘pure’ measures of problem solving. Notably very few valid and 
reliable problem-solving measures for adults ID populations appeared to exist. Some 
measures had also not been identified in the studies. For example, the Problem 
Solving Inventory (Heppner & Peterson, 1982; PSI) was designed to assess decision-
making and problem-solving ability using a 35-item Likert scale with 6-point ratings 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
28 
from “strongly disagrees” to “strongly agree.” The PSI demonstrated good test-retest 
reliability (r=0.89) and internal consistency (α=0.90) for the total score (Heppner, 
1988). However, it was criticised for its vulnerability to socially desirable answers 
because it was a self-report measure. The Problem Solving Task (PST; Nezu et al., 
1991) was developed to measure the course and outcome of interpersonal problem 
solving and demonstrated good inter-rater reliability (r=0.83) and test-retest reliability 
(r=0.79). However, this measure was designed to assess interpersonal problem 
solving (e.g marital conflicts and family disputes; D’Zurilla, et al., 2002) and was 
therefore limited in its ability to assess problem solving in other areas (i.e. everyday 
situations). At the time of this study, the authors were aware of a study that had used a 
modified version of the PST for offenders with IDs. However, this study was still 
under review and the findings were not available. 
In summary, the studies suggested that high levels of anger exacerbated the 
probability of hostile attribution bias; a simplified version of the SPSI-R could be 
used with offenders with IDs; problem-solving interventions showed improvements in 
problem solving; and that clinician observations reported decreases in minimisation 
and denial following a problem solving intervention. These findings were interpreted 
with caution given the small sample sizes that were used. 
1.4.1.5 Methodological issues. A number of methodological issues were 
identified in this review. Appropriate methodological and statistical techniques were 
demonstrated in several studies (Field, 2009, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996): 
(Blumenthal et al., 1999; Gannon & Polaschek, 2005; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; 
Langdon et al., 2007, 2011b, 2013; MacMahon et al., 2006; McDermott & Langdon, 
2014; Middleton et al., 2009; Lee et al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 2011a). However, many 
of these were affected by small sample sizes (Langdon et al., 2007, 2013; MacMahon 
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et al., 2006; Lee et al., 1996; Lindsay et al., 2006b, 2011; O’Connor, 1996). 
Furthermore, the majority of the studies did not report sample size calculations. The 
larger the sample size, the more powerful the results would be. Therefore, the benefit 
of calculating the power and sample size before a study was to reduce the possibility 
of a Type II error. Given the small sample sizes, the risk of Type II errors with 
offenders was potentially unsafe, as some of these studies involved treatment. 
Ultimately, small sample sizes limited the validity and reliability of some of these 
studies, despite having suitable designs.  
Notably, there were several measures, but some measures were out-dated. The 
measures that appeared to be the most suitable for moral reasoning was the SRM-SF; 
for problem solving this appeared to be the SPSI-R (simplified version for ID). The 
HIT was used with a small sample size  (n=7; Langdon at el., 2013) in one study and 
a suitable sample size in another (n=80; Langdon at el., 2011b). This suggests that the 
HIT was a measure that could be understood with ID populations. However there was 
no psychometric data for its use with ID populations. 
As a final point, it was promising to see that 7 studies reported formal 
permission from an appropriate ethics committee (Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon 
et al., 2007, 2011b, 2013; Lindsay et al., 2006b, 2011; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). 
It was assumed that the remaining studies obtained permission to conduct their 
research. However, according to the British Psychological Society (2009), all research 
involving human participants required ethics approval and researchers should indicate 
where approval has been obtained.  
1.4.1.6 Conclusion. A number of conclusions were drawn from this review. 
First, it several studies focused on sexual offenders with IDs. There was a need to 
explore other types of offending behaviours amongst offenders with IDs.  Second, 
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few studies focused on moral reasoning or moral development with offenders with 
IDs. Some studies have taken this forward more recently. However, empirical studies 
with offenders with IDs were still lacking. The evidence suggested that offenders with 
IDs would fall into Stage 2(3) of Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992). 
However, these findings needed to be replicated. 
Third, in terms of cognitive distortions, reliable measures are required for use 
with ID populations. The HIT was used with offenders with IDs. However, there was 
no psychometric data for its use with an ID population. Therefore the HIT needed to 
be validated for use with an ID population. The review showed evidence that specific 
cognitive distortions were present and that these cognitive distortions were consistent 
with Gibbs typology (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995).  
Fourth, few studies focused on problem solving with ID offenders. The studies 
that were reviewed had very small sample sizes apart from the first study in Lindsay 
et al. (2011). This highlighted the need to continue with research that focused on 
problem solving for offenders with IDs. Lastly, a simplified version of SPSI-R was 
identified as a good measure for use with an ID population. 
This review demonstrated that moral reasoning, problem solving and cognitive 
distortions were all found with offenders with IDs. However, no studies appeared to 
explore these constructs in a single study. Theoretically, these constructs were 
important. However, the review did not provide a clear picture of how moral 
reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving were connected. Therefore, the 
next section explored how these constructs were related in a theoretical context. 
1.5 Theories of Offending  
Several theories have attempted to explain why people commit crimes. The 
scope of the current study was not to review all of these theories in detail. Lindsay, 
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Sturmey and Taylor (2004d) highlighted some of these theories. They suggested that 
genetic theories determined the extent to which biological mechanisms contributed to 
offending behaviour. In support of genetic theories, Kandel et al. (1988) conducted a 
study where they compared the sons of fathers who had a minimum of one prison 
sentence (n=92) with sons of fathers who had no criminal history (n=513). They 
concluded that the risk of offending was 5.6 times higher for the sons of fathers that 
had a criminal history. Similar results were identified by Mednick, Moffitt, Gabrielli 
and Hutchings (1986) where they concluded that sons who had no contact with their 
biological father were more likely to engage in criminal behaviour if their biological 
father had a criminal history. Genetic theories were criticised by Lindsay et al. 
(2004d). They suggested that genetic theories highlighted the relationship between 
offending and genetics. However, genetic theories did not clarify what specifically 
was inherited (i.e. thrill seeking or faulty learning). They also suggested that genetic 
theories did not consider the impact of the external environment on behaviour. In this 
context behavioural theories suggested that offending behaviour was learnt 
behaviours (Bandura, 1977). However, behavioural theories could not explain why 
some offenders with adverse childhood experiences did not commit crimes. Another 
critique of behavioural theories was that learning was an inherent component of 
offending and this limited its scope for use with an ID population because it is well 
evidenced that ID populations experience difficulties with learning.  
According to Langdon, Clare and Murphy (2010a; 2011a) moral reasoning 
theory has improved our understanding of offenders with IDs. Meta analytic studies 
have shown that there is a strong relationship between moral reasoning and criminal 
behaviour for young offenders (Blasi, 1980; Stams et al., 2006). However, these meta-
analytic studies appeared to have excluded offenders with IDs. As a result little, in the 
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form of empirical evidence, was known about moral reasoning for offenders with IDs. 
Recent studies have started to take this forward (McDermott & Langdon, 2014) and 
the findings suggested that there was a relationship between moral reasoning and 
offending behaviour for offenders with IDs.  
1.5.1 Moral development. Moral reasoning was broadly defined as the 
process or ability of determining what was right and what was wrong (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007). However, the definition of moral reasoning has evolved over the last 
century. Moral development was described as the maturation of moral reasoning as a 
result of social perspective taking and increasing cognitive ability (Hoffman, 1977; 
Langdon et al., 2010a). This sub-section covered theories of moral development.  
1.5.1.1 Piaget’s theory of moral reasoning. Piaget viewed moral reasoning as 
a developmental process where judgments between right and wrong were made based 
on social experiences. According to Piaget (1932) moral development developed 
gradually over time and was dependent upon moral reasoning. He suggested that 
young children made decisions based on rigid rules and consequences or punishments 
from a figure of authority. In other words, they engaged in heteronomous or 
autonomous moral reasoning. Heteronomous reasoning was based on decisions that 
were influenced by authority and punishment, while autonomous reasoning was based 
on laws and rules that were developed for society. Therefore, the factors that affected 
moral development were conscience, social attitudes and behaviour.  
Piaget (1932) proposed that moral development developed in four stages, 
which he called the stages of development. Each stage was based upon biological 
maturation and the concept of readiness. Readiness referred to an active attempt to 
learn new information in order to move upwards from one stage to the next. Out of 
the four stages, the final stage was called the formal operations stage where abstract 
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thinking and solution generating were identified as strategies that were used to make 
moral decisions. Piaget (1932) concluded that a child’s development was only 
complete if they passed through all the stages. Therefore, autonomous moral 
reasoning could only occur in the formal operational stage. Ultimately this meant that 
moral development could only take place if children engaged in autonomous moral 
reasoning and the ability use abstract thinking, which would be challenging for people 
with IDs. 
There were some fundamental flaws in Piaget’s theory. First, very few studies 
took place before 1960 (Landon et al., 2010a). There were no longitudinal or 
qualitative studies that examined Piagetian theory with ID populations. Edwards, 
Hopgood, Rosenberg and Rush (2000) suggested that Piaget underestimated 
children’s abilities and that children were more able than he had thought. In other 
words children developed skills earlier than he had expected. This may have been 
influenced further by the samples in his studies, where he used small samples with 
children from a higher socio-demographic group. Edwards et al. (2000) suggested that 
Piaget’s theory did not include the effects of social and cultural factors and this 
suggested that other factors might play a role in moral development. Piaget was also 
criticised for focusing on children and his findings could not be generalised to an 
adult population (Kohlberg, 1969). 
1.5.1.2 Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. In order to address these 
limitations, Kohlberg (1969; 1976) explored moral development over the life cycle. 
Kohlberg’s main criticism of Piaget’s theory was that it excluded moral development 
into adolescence and adulthood. It was in this context that Kohlberg introduced a 
developmental theory of moral reasoning. In Kohlberg’s theory, there were three 
levels of moral reasoning with two sub stages in each level (Table 2). Kohlberg 
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suggested that individuals’ passed through each stage until they reached the final 
stage where they developed a clear set of moral and ethical guidelines. According to 
Kohlberg (1969; 1976), moral development developed over the lifetime. Therefore, he 
was able to build upon Piaget’s theory, which confined to moral development in 
children. Kohlberg’s key findings also suggested that social perspective taking was a 
prerequisite for moral development as it naturally led to the need to engage in 
decision making (Kohlberg, 1976). Therefore, the ability to take someone else into 
consideration was critical to moral development.  
There were some limitations for Kohlberg’s theory of moral development 
(Gilligan, 1982; Rest, 1979; Snarey, 1994).  In terms of cultural factors, religion was 
identified as a factor that influenced moral decision-making (Dirks, 1988; Rest, 
1979). Specifically, individuals within an evangelical belief system showed less 
likelihood of entering the postconventional stages, while individuals with a liberal 
belief system were more likely to enter the higher stages of moral development. This 
suggested that religion, as a cultural factor, played a role in moral development and 
appeared to be absent in Kohlberg’s model. A second cultural factor related to the 
difference between Western and non-Western cultures and how their value systems 
varied in relation to Kohlberg’s model (Miller & Bersoff, 1992).  It was hypothesised 
that community orientated non-Western cultures were more engaged in community 
related behaviours while individualised Western cultures were more engaged in 
individual responsibility to exhibit morally correct behaviours. 
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Table 2 
Kohlberg's stages of moral development (1969, 1976) 
Level Stage Description  
Preconventional 1 Obedience and Punishment Orientation: Behaviour 
follows rules in order to avoid punishment 
 2 Individualism and Exchange:  Egocentric behaviour 
but also starting to identify that other viewpoints are 
valid 
Conventional 3 Good interpersonal relationships: Behaviour in order 
to gain approval from others 
 4 Maintaining social order: Insight into broader 
societal rules and norms that need to be followed 
Postconventional 5 Social contract and individual rights: Understanding 
the relationship between individuals and society 
  6 Universal principles: A clear set of moral and ethical 
guidelines that are used to guide behaviour 
Kohlberg’s theory was heavily criticised for being biased against women. 
Gilligan (1982) highlighted that Kohlberg used male participants to support his model 
of moral reasoning. Gilligan argued that men and women would be different in the 
way they make moral judgments. Gilligan (1982) highlighted that men were more 
justice orientated and women were more care orientated and postulated that this 
would influence the way they made moral judgments. This finding was identified in 
studies that explored moral reasoning with adolescents (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Thoma, 
Rest, & Davidson, 1991). Some studies confirmed this hypothesis (Baumrind, 1986; 
Lyons, 1983; Rest, 1979; Rothbart, Hanley, & Albert, 1986; Yacker & Weinberg, 
1990) while other studies disconfirmed the hypothesis (Gregg, Gibbs, & Bassigner, 
1994). These studies identified limitations in Kohlberg’s model and as a result moral 
reasoning research continued. Later studies also identified similar inconsistences with 
the validity of some of the measures. For example, Walker (1984) identified no 
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difference between men and women in a study using the Moral Judgment Interview 
(MJI: Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Ultimately, these limitations and lack of scientific 
rigor led others to re-visit and revise moral developmental theory. 
1.5.1.3 Gibbs’ Sociomoral Stages. Gibbs, Basinger and Fuller (1992; Gibbs, 
1979, 2003, 2010, 2013) built upon Kohlberg’s work and developed a Sociomoral 
Stage theory of moral development, which generally represented the first four stages 
in Kohlberg’s original theory. Gibbs argued that the higher stages occurred 
infrequently across different cultures and were associated with education. As a 
consequence, they could not be considered as universal moral development stages.  
The Sociomoral Stage theory consisted of four stages (Table 3).  
Stage 1 and Stage 2 formed the immature reasoning level and Stage 3 and 
Stage 4 formed the mature reasoning level (Gibbs et al., 1992). Stage 1 was concrete 
and superficial and moral judgments were based upon power and authority. The 
aspects that were incorporated into this stage appealed to a single authority, physical 
status, coercive rules, labels and physical aspects. The characteristics for Stage 2 were 
instrumental and with a focus on an individual needs. Therefore an individual could 
help someone with the expectation that the person would ‘return the favour.’ The 
aspects within Stage 2 were related to exchanges, equalities, rights, preferences, needs 
and advantages, although egocentricity remained apparent.  
Mature reasoning incorporated cognitive decentration and social role taking. 
According to Gibbs et al. (1992) mature reasoning reflected an understanding of 
interpersonal relationships and society. Therefore, the characteristics for Stage 3 
related to mutual relationships and prosocial behaviour. The aspects for Stage 3 
related to relationships, empathetic role-taking, normative expectations, prosocial 
intentions, generalised caring and interpersonal approval. For Stage 4, the 
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characteristics were related to reasoning, which extended to a complex social system. 
The aspects that were considered were societal requirements, rights and values, 
responsibility, character, consistent practices, procedural equity and standards of 
conscience. 
Table 3 
Sociomoral Stages (Gibbs et al., 1992) 
Level Stage Description  
Immature 
1: Unilateral and 
Physicalistic 
Represents a morality of autarchic authority, 
physical power and rule-based consequences. 
 
2: Exchanging 
and Instrumental 
Represents a morality based upon understanding 
and perspectives that develop through social 
interaction with some rigidity. 
Mature 3: Mutual and 
Prosocial 
Represents a morality based upon prosocial 
feeling (empathy), caring and conduct (role 
taking). 
  4: Systemic and 
Standard 
Maturity is represented through understanding 
and interaction of complex social structures with 
a focus on basic rights or values, societal 
responsibility, integrity, consistent practices and 
standards of conscience. 
Gibbs also highlighted transition stages. A transition stage occurred where 
there was an overlap between aspects from 2 different stages. Individuals were 
positioned into transition stages depending on their responses and the scoring 
procedure within the manual. There were 2 transition stages that fell between each of 
4 stages.  According to Gibbs et al. (1992) the highest level of moral reasoning, called 
moral maturity, was attained when an individual based moral decisions on mutual and 
prosocial exchanges, which supported societal norms. A key strength for Gibbs’ 
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theory was that it referenced criminal behaviour. Therefore, it was likely to relate to 
offenders, unlike Piaget or Kohlberg. Gibbs (2003, 2010, 2013) described criminal 
behaviour in the context of a moral developmental delay, which encompassed self-
serving cognitive distortions and social skills deficiencies. Ultimately this suggested 
that immature moral development was causal with respect to self-serving cognitive 
distortions, which would increase the probability of criminal behaviour.  
1.5.1.4 Moral reasoning and offenders with intellectual disabilities. Gibbs 
(2003, 2010, 2013) and Palmer (2003) argued that offenders demonstrated an 
immature moral schema and this lead to distorted cognitions and lower levels of 
empathy, thus increasing the risk of criminal offending. Palmer (2003) also suggested 
that adolescent offenders would reason at Stage 2 where they engaged in justifications 
that support offending behaviours. Earlier studies found significant relationships 
between IQ and levels of moral development in children (Hoffman, 1977). Gibbs 
(2003) suggested that adolescents demonstrated Stage 2 reasoning regarding justice 
and the law (Blasi, 1980; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs, 1983; Gregg et al., 1994). 
Therefore, because Stage 2 reasoning was characterised by egocentric thinking and 
meeting one’s needs, the likelihood of making moral decisions that were unlawful or 
antisocial were higher. These studies were important, however they focused on 
children and adolescents and could not be generalised to adult offenders with IDs.  
In two papers, Langdon et al. (2010a, 2011a) described the links between 
moral reasoning theory and criminal offending for adults. Within these two papers a 
number of points were highlighted. First, the majority of moral reasoning studies were 
conducted with children and adolescents with IDs. Secondly these studies took place 
almost 2 decades ago and they were out-dated. Thirdly, the methodological 
approaches that were used in these studies were flawed. These flaws related to 
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sampling bias as some of the studies used convenience samples, which suggested that 
might not produce representative results (Field, 2009, 2013). Studies did not describe 
their sample adequately, which made drawing definite conclusions complex. Another 
methodological issue has been previously mentioned and related to the definition of 
ID in some of these studies. Several of these studies included participants in the 
‘borderline’ range and would not meet the current criteria for an ID using the DSM-V 
(APA, 2013). Therefore, the results in these studies could not be generalised to an ID 
population (Langdon et al., 2010a, 2011a). 
In terms of moral reasoning, Langdon et al. (2010a, 2011a) suggested that 
non-offenders with IDs were more likely to demonstrate immature reasoning, which 
was based on rules and authority. This also suggested that lower stages of moral 
reasoning appeared to be a protective factor. In contrast, they suggested that offenders 
with IDs would have a higher IQ and that they would demonstrate Stage 2 reasoning, 
which was based on egocentric decision making and getting their needs met. Going 
further up the moral reasoning stages, they proposed that people without IDs would 
demonstrate mature moral reasoning (i.e. Stage 3 and Stage 4). This meant that they 
would be less egocentric and more focused on mutual and prosocial relationships, 
resulting in minimal offending behaviour. They concluded that further research was 
required with a focus on the development and design of tools for measuring moral 
reasoning and the related constructs for people with IDs. They highlighted the 
importance of the relationship between moral reasoning and criminal behaviour. 
Langdon et al. (2011b) were able to explore this relationship with a group of male 
offenders and non-offenders with and without IDs. Their study found that offenders 
with IDs demonstrated Stage 2(3) reasoning. This finding concurred with McDermott  
and Langdon (2014) where they identified offenders with IDs in Stage 2(3) reasoning 
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and non-offenders with IDs in Stage 2 reasoning. Their findings supported the link 
between ID offenders and immature moral reasoning. However, non-offenders with 
IDs had greater immaturity as they were in Stage 1 reasoning on some of the moral 
reasoning constructs. 
In summary, moral reasoning studies have been in existence for a very long 
time. There was a large focus on children and adolescents. This prompted moral 
reasoning studies with non-intellectually disabled adults, offenders and more recently, 
ID populations. Given the present position of moral reasoning studies, there was a 
need to explore and develop an understanding of moral reasoning and suitable 
measures with an ID population. In this context Gibbs (2003) suggested that a delay 
in moral judgement was coupled with cognitive distortions and problem solving 
deficits. 
1.5.2 Moral reasoning and cognitive distortions. Gibbs (2003, 2010, 2013) 
suggested that cognitive distortions were the drivers behind criminal behaviour in 
young offenders because information was inaccurately perceived. In other words, 
antisocial behaviour developed based on perceptions that were structured by moral 
schemas of self-serving cognitive distortions. Over time, the moral schemas reflected 
the young offenders moral stage. This implied that there was a link between cognitive 
distortions and moral development in young offenders (Hoffman, 2000).  
Cognitive distortions have been described as persistent and systematic errors 
in reasoning (Barriga et al., 2001). As a consequence, they produced biased ways of 
interpreting experiences and lead to problematic emotional and behavioural 
responses. Gibbs (2003, 2010) and Palmer (2003) have argued that offenders 
demonstrated an immature moral schema and this has led to distorted cognitions and 
lower levels of empathy, thus increasing the risk of criminal offending. According to 
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Gibbs et al. (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995) a typology of self-serving 
cognitive distortions existed in the context of offending (Table 4). According to 
Gibbs, self-serving cognitive distortions were divided into two categories, called 
primary (i.e. self-centered) and secondary (i.e. blaming others, minimising / 
mislabeling and assuming the worst).  Gibbs (1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995) 
suggested that primary self-serving cognitive distortions were related to egocentric 
bias and the prevention of damage to self-image. Secondary self-serving cognitive 
distortions were related to rationalising, neutralising empathy, guilt and diminishing 
cognitive dissonance between offending behaviour and self-image. 
Table 4 
Typology of cognitive distortions for offenders (Gibbs, 1991; 1993) 
Cognitive Distortion Description  
Self-centered Cognitions that relate to individual status, needs, 
rights and feelings. Others views and desires are not 
considered. 
Blaming Attribute blame to others, a group or momentary 
aberration, or victim  
Minimising / mislabeling Interpret antisocial behaviours as causing no harm, 
acceptable or reasonable. Absence of responsibility 
for behaviour.  
Assuming the worst Attributing hostile intentions to situations; 
considering the worst case scenario as the only 
interpretation of a situation; assuming no resolution 
is possible 
Gibbs (1993, 2010) suggested that cognitive dissonance was when a cognitive 
distortion distanced an offender from blame and the consequences of their behaviour. 
Therefore, the cognitive distortions in Table 4 protected the offender against 
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psychological stress that was generated by their harm to others, and they were able to 
engage in offending behaviour.  
1.5.2.1 Cognitive distortions and offending. Several studies explored 
cognitive distortions and offending behaviour. Many of these studies focused on men 
that have committed intimate partner violence offences (Cavanagh, et al., 2001; 
Goodrum, et al., 2001; Hearn, 1998; Presser, 2003; Reitz, 1999; Wood, 2004) and 
men that have committed sex offences (Abel et al., 1989; Blumenthal, Gudjonsson, & 
Burns, 1999; Ward, 2000). These studies concluded that cognitive distortions played a 
role in initiating and maintaining offending behaviour. For example, Ward (2000) 
identified how sex offenders used blame as a way of constructing causal explanations 
for their offending behaviour. In their study, some of the sex offenders blamed their 
victims for ‘luring’ them into committing their offences. Therefore, blame was a form 
of external causality where the reason for offending was attributed to external factors, 
such as the victims’ behaviour. Minimisation was when an offender acknowledged 
their offence but did not recognise the severity of their offence and therefore avoided 
responsibility for their offence. The studies above identified cognitive distortions that 
were related to offending behaviour. However, they were related to specific offending 
behaviour (i.e. sex offending and domestic violence) and this suggested that other 
offending behaviours might be related to other specific cognitive distortions.  
In order to explore this further, Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau and Gibbs 
(2000) introduced the terms self-serving and self-debasing cognitive distortions. They 
suggested that self-serving cognitive distortions were associated with externalising 
behaviours, such as aggression or antisocial behaviour, and that self-debasing 
cognitive distortions were associated with internalizing behaviours, such as anxiety or 
depression. Their findings were identified in earlier studies where Dodge (1993) 
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identified self-serving cognitive distortions as a bias form of social information 
processing; and Gibbs et al. (1995) used self-serving cognitive distortions as a central 
theme for the EQUIP programme, which was a treatment programme for adolescent 
offenders. These studies offered a good grounding for understanding cognitive 
distortions and offending behaviour. However, they excluded offenders with IDs and 
their findings cannot be generalised to ID populations. 
1.5.2.2 Cognitive distortions, offending and intellectual disabilities. It has 
been well established that people with IDs have deficits in attention, memory, 
concentration, language and executive functioning (Carr et al., 2007). Therefore, their 
ability to interpret situations would inherently be different to those without IDs.  Few 
studies have attempted to investigate how adult offenders with IDs interpret and 
respond to situations in which they have committed offences (Langdon et al., 2011a; 
2011b).  
Barriga et al. (2000) attempted to explore this conundrum in a sample of 
young offenders. They proposed that self-centered, blaming, minimising and 
assuming the worst were types of self-serving cognitive distortions that were related 
to offending or anti-social behaviour. However, their study was limited because it 
focused on adolescent offenders and a recent study addressed this gap. 
 Langdon et al. (2011b) explored the relationship between cognitive 
distortions and empathy amongst a sample of offenders and non-offenders, with and 
without IDs. The findings indicated that male offenders with IDs experienced the 
highest levels of cognitive distortions. The mean scores for minimising, opposition 
defiance, blame and assuming the worst were the highest for offenders with IDs in 
their study. Langdon at el. (2011b) indicated that high levels of cognitive distortions 
in offenders with IDs were also identified in other studies that have focused on sex 
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offenders with IDs (Broxholme & Lindsay, 2003; Lambrick & Glaser, 2004; 
Langdon, et al., 2007; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay & Michie, 2013). Langdon 
et al. (2011b) concluded that men with IDs scored higher on cognitive distortions than 
men without IDs; that offenders scored higher on cognitive distortions than non-
offenders; and that offenders with IDs reported the most cognitive distortions. They 
suggested that their study was the first to endorse cognitive distortions in offenders 
with IDs that were convicted of other offences, as opposed to sex offences. Their 
findings paved the way for further research, which would explore cognitive 
distortions in male ID offenders with mixed offences.  
1.5.2.3 Summary. A number of studies identified different types of cognitive 
distortions. Self-serving cognitive distortions were recognised as central to offending 
behaviour in offenders with IDs (Barriga et al., 2000; Langdon et al., 2011b, 2013). 
While this was significant, some of these studies were limited. Firstly, they focused 
on exploring cognitive distortions with young offenders (Barriga et al., 2000; Gibbs et 
al., 1995; Hoffman, 1977) and sex offenders (Ward, 2000). This limited the 
generalisability of their results to a wider ID population. Furthermore, this highlighted 
the need for further research, which explored cognitive distortions with offenders with 
IDs. Some studies addressed this gap (Langdon et al., 2011b, 2013). One study in 
particular explored cognition and problem solving (Lindsay et al., 2011a). According 
to Palmer (2003), moral development was mediated through poor cognitive skills and 
decision-making.  Mediation variables explained the relationship between variables 
(Field, 2009, 2013). Therefore, poor cognitive skills and poor decision-making were 
likely to affect moral development negatively. Given this link the next section will 
explore the role of problem solving with offenders with IDs.   
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1.5.3 Moral reasoning and problem solving. Problem solving was described 
as a self-directed cognitive behavioural process where an individual generated 
effective solutions for a specific problem (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 1990; D’Zurilla et al., 
2002). McMurran and McGuire (2005) suggested that problem solving was a goal 
directed behaviour, which activated an individuals’ reasoning ability. This suggested 
that problem solving was linked to reasoning ability. According to D’Zurilla and 
Nezu (2001) the process involved a problem and a conscious effort to develop a 
solution. A problem was defined as a problematic every day situation (D’Zurilla & 
Nezu, 2010). A problem could be time limited, acute, chronic or linked to a series of 
events. A solution was a response that was the outcome of the problem solving 
process (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010).  
McMurran and McGuire (2005) argued that the ability to solve a problem was 
a skill that needed to be learnt, implying that there was a learning component to 
D’Zurilla and Nezu’s (2001) definition of problem solving. It was well established 
that people with IDs experienced problems with attention, memory, perception and 
reasoning which will affect their ability to learn (Davey, 2008). Therefore, individuals 
with learning deficits would inherently struggle to solve problems. In this context, it 
was assumed that adults with IDs would experience difficulties with problem solving 
given their known difficulties with learning.  
In the previous section, moral development was linked with poor cognitive 
skills and decision-making (Palmer, 2003; Palmer & Hollin, 1998); and self-serving 
cognitive distortions and immature moral reasoning stages were identified for 
offenders with IDs (McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Langdon et al., 2011b). These 
studies suggest that there was an overlap between cognitive distortions and the 
cognitive process of approaching solving problems. Approaching problems required a 
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goal directed manipulation of information (McMurran & McGuire, 2005). The 
information processing approach (IPA; Figure 1) is a cognitive model of how 
information was stored and used. According to Miller (2001), information was 
received using our senses, encoded into brief episodic memory, transformed, stored 
into autobiographical memory, and retrieved for relevant behavioural responses.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1. The information processing approach which includes data input, 
transformation and behavioural output. 
In the context of the IPA, people with IDs would have difficulties with 
information processing which could lead to misinterpretations of their experiences. As 
a consequence of repeated misinterpretations, cognitive distortions developed and 
shaped their responses to situations or future problems. Another factor that might 
affect problem solving is cognitive dissonance. Lindsay, Marshall, Neilson, Quinn 
and Smith (1998) conducted a study with sex offenders with IDs (n=4). In their study 
they highlighted how cognitive dissonance between pro-offending cognitions and 
non-offending cognitions contributed to difficulties in ‘choosing the right solution.’ In 
their study, cognitive dissonance was related to accepting or defending two 
contradictory cognitions, which resulted in problem avoidance. It was argued that 
cognitive dissonance influenced the outcome of problem solving. While Lindsay et al. 
(1998)’s study was useful, it was based on a small sample size and the issue of 
cognitive dissonance needed to be explored further with an adequate sample size.  
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In this context, Dodge (1986) described a social information-processing model 
that incorporated four cognitive stages before an individual could select a socially 
suitable behaviour. Notably, Dodge’s model used the term social information 
processing. They suggested that social information processing referred to problem 
solving within a social or interpersonal context (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). Given that 
violent or sex offences occurred in social contexts, this was important as it connected 
into Gibbs Stage 2 reasoning where social exchanges were associated with offending 
behaviour (McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Langdon et al., 2011b). 
Table 5 
Dodge’s social information processing stages (1986) 
Stage Description  
Stage 1 Encoding situational cues 
Stage 2 Mental representation and interpretation of cues 
Stage 3 Selecting possible responses for the situation 
Stage 4 Evaluation and response selection 
In Table 5, the cognitive stages illustrated that information processing started 
with encoding, which was followed by mental representation and interpretation. This 
provided the basis for response selection and an evaluation of the response selection. 
Dodge concluded that cognitive skills were related to problem solving. Crick and 
Dodge (1994; 1996; Dodge, 1986; Dodge & Price, 1994) built on the social 
information-processing model. Therefore, distortions in information processing were 
likely to lead to maladaptive behaviours. In Table 6, Crick and Dodge (1994) 
suggested that individuals approached a situation with existing social knowledge and 
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a selection of memories of how to interact, based on their previous experiences. 
Information was received through social cues and their response was a consequence 
of how the cues were interpreted.  
Table 6 
Six-stage social information processing model (Crick & Dodge, 1994; 1996) 
Stage Description  
Stage 1 Encoding of internal and external cues 
Stage 2 Interpretation of the cues 
Stage 3 Selection of goals 
Stage 4 Response access 
Stage 5 Response decision 
Stage 6 Behaviour enactment 
Notably, the model was developed for use with children that demonstrated 
aggressive behaviours. It was hypothesised that ID populations might experience 
similar difficulties or cognitive skills deficits, which could lead to poor problem 
solving ability. Therefore, when individuals had cognitive skills deficits they were 
likely to demonstrate ‘faulty’ information processing and poor problem solving 
behaviours. It was hypothesised that adults with IDs would have similar information 
processing shortfalls because of their cognitive deficits. As a result, they would be 
limited in their ability to develop sound problem solving behaviours.  
1.5.3.1 Problem solving and offenders with intellectual disabilities. 
According to D’Zurilla and Goldfried (1971) the reason that offenders developed 
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maladaptive problem solving styles was because they did not progress through the 
five problem solving stages, which were illustrated in Table 7.  
Table 7 
D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s five-stage model of social problem solving (1971) 
Stage Skills Needed  
Stage 1: Problem orientation Attention; concentration; memory; impulse 
control 
Stage 2: Problem definition   Ability to manipulate and analyse information 
Stage 3: Generating alternative 
solutions 
Consequential thinking; generating alterative 
solutions; perspective taking 
Stage 4: Decision making Ability to communicate and resolve the 
problem based on the chosen solution 
Stage 5: Solution implementation 
and verification 
Reflection to determine whether the problem 
was solved effectively; storage of the problem 
solving mechanism into memory 
Alongside each stage were the skills that were required in order to progress 
successfully to the next stage. Spivack, Platt and Shure (1976) refered to these skills 
as the interpersonal cognitive problem solving skills and they have aligned them with 
D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s problem solving model (1971). This suggested that well-
developed cognitive skills were required to solve problems and it also raised 
questions about ID populations and their ability to develop and apply cognitive skills.  
Stage 1 and Stage 2 were considered to be a metacognitive process that served 
as the motivation to identify and address the problem (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010). 
These two stages were referred to as problem solving proper (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
50 
1999). Stage 3 and Stage 4 were considered to be problem solving skills and they 
illustrated the process of generating alternative solutions, and making decisions to 
implement the most effective solution. Based on this five-stage model, D’Zurilla and 
Nezu (1990) developed a measure of social problem solving, called the Social 
Problem-Solving Inventory (SPSI). The SPSI comprised of two major scales: Problem 
Orientation Scale (POS) and the Problem-Solving Skills Scale (PSSI). However, there 
were problems with the validity of the scales (D’Zurilla & Nezu, 2010) and D’Zurilla 
et al. (2002) developed a revised five-dimensional scale that consisted of two problem 
orientation categories and three problem solving styles. 
In Table 8, Positive Problem Orientation was a constructive problem solving 
approach, which appraised the problem as a challenge rather than a threat and 
conveyed the belief that the problem could be solved. Negative Problem Orientation 
was a dysfunctional approach where the problem was seen as a threat and conveyed 
the belief that the problem could not be solved. These orientations were accompanied 
by frustration whenever a problem was encountered. A Rational Problem Solving 
style was a constructive approach, which was coherent with deliberate attempts to 
seek out effective solutions. An Impulsive/Careless Style was a dysfunctional style, 
which was characterised by impulsive, hurried and incomplete attempts to resolve 
problems. For this style, fewer alternative solutions were generated and the end result 
was often unhelpful. The Avoidance style was also a dysfunctional approach, which 
was characterised by avoidance, inaction or dependence. This culminated into waiting 
for the problem to dissipate, which reinforced problem avoidance.  
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Table 8 
Problem-solving styles (D’Zurilla et al., 2002) 
Problem-Solving Style Description 
Positive Problem Orientation 
(PPO) 
Identifies constructive problem solving and 
cognitions. 
Negative Problem Orientation 
(NPO) 
Identifies dysfunctional and inhibitive problem-
solving strategies. 
Rational Problem Solving 
(RPS) 
Identifies rational, thoughtful and methodical use of 
effective problem-solving strategies. 
Impulsivity / Carelessness  
Style (ICS) 
Identifies poor problem-solving strategies that are 
limited, impulsive, careless and partial. 
Avoidance Style (AS) Identifies poor problem-solving strategies that are passive, delayed or greatly dependent on others. 
The problem solving styles in Table 8 were central to psychological 
interventions with offenders. Subsequently, problem-solving therapy (PST) was 
developed as a clinical intervention that focused on problem-solving attitudes and 
developing problem-solving skills. According to D’Zurilla and Nezu (2010), PST was 
designed to identify problematic problem solving styles, reduce psychopathology and 
improve psychological functioning through improved problem solving. According to 
McMurran and McGuire (2005) problem solving interventions were used to treat 
offenders in the criminal justice systems across the world. McMurran, Egan, 
Richardson and Ahmadi (1999) assessed problem-solving skills before and after 
treatment for offenders in a secure forensic unit. Their findings showed significant 
improvements in the ability to solve problems after treatment. Notably, PST was a 
cognitive behavioural psychological intervention and was found to be effective for a 
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range of populations (Nezu, 2004), including people with IDs (Nezu et al.,1991), 
along with anger problems (Feindler, Marriot, & Iwata, 1984). 
Other studies explored problem solving with offenders (Ireland, 2001; 
McMurran, Fyffe, McCarthy, Duggan, & Latham, 2001). Zamble and Quinsey (1997) 
identified deficits in problem solving skills for offenders. McMurran et al. (1999) 
suggested that problem solving deficits resulted in offending behaviour because of 
maladaptive problem solving styles. This research was extended to studies with ID 
offenders (Barnett & Wood, 2008; Langdon et al., 2013; Lindsay et al., 2011a). In 
another study, attributional bias and problem solving deficits were compared using a 
group of ID males with aggression and a group of ID males without aggression 
(Basquill, Nezu, Nezu, & Klein, 2004). Two key findings were highlighted in their 
study. First, participants in the aggressive group presented with significantly higher 
cognitive distortions when compared to the non-aggressive group. Second, overall 
deficits in problem solving were identified in the aggressive group. Deficits in the 
ability to generate a range of solutions to a defined problem were identified in the 
aggressive group.  
In summary there was some evidence that problem solving was an important 
consideration for offenders and offenders with IDs. Some treatment programmes 
showed that problem-solving interventions for offenders with IDs were effective 
(Lindsay et al., 2011a). Despite these studies, the focus on offenders with IDs is still 
minimal and further studies were required using integrated models of problem solving 
and related measures (Basquill et al., 2004; Lindsay et al., 2011a). 
1.5.4 Connecting theories: A developmental social information processing 
model of moral judgement and behaviour. The previous section was related to 
moral development, cognitive distortions and problem solving as individual 
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theoretical frameworks. Garrigan and Langdon (in press) have integrated these 
theories by building on the work of Arsenoio and Lemerise (2004). They argued that a 
model, which integrated moral development theory, neuroscience, neuropsychology 
and problem-solving theory was missing. They proposed a developmental theory that 
was dynamic and would have the ability to predict behaviour. Arsenio and Lemerise 
(2004) argued that moral domain theory and social information processing models 
(SIP) could be integrated. Moral domain theory suggested that moral concepts were 
learnt during childhood and adolescence. Concepts of fairness and rights of others 
were learnt as themes rather than within global stages, that were identified by Piaget 
and Kohlberg. Their rationale for integrating these theories was because they shared 
the following assumptions: 
 Children’s interpretation of their social environment was related to 
their behaviour; 
 A focus on behaviour which involves intentional harm and 
victimisation; 
 Interests in aspects of social functioning 
According to Arsenio and Lemerise (2004), the SIP model represented the 
‘real-time’ processing and decision-making. This included encoding and interpreting 
social cues, which then guide behaviour (i.e. response selection from a list of possible 
responses in a particular situation). Similarly, the domain model guided behaviour and 
was dependent on how social situations were interpreted. However, the domain model 
suggested that social situations could either be interpreted on moral (i.e. issues of 
fairness or justice) or conventional (i.e. rules and prosocial behaviours) grounds. A 
major criticism of Arsenio and Lemerise (2004)’s model was that they focused on 
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children and adolescents. This was problematic as it excluded adults and ID 
populations.  
As a direct response, Garrigan and Langdon (in press) produced a 
developmental theory, which suggested that changes occurred with maturation and 
was consistent with Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992). Garrigan and 
Langdon (in press) said that: “One of the difficulties within this area is that moral 
development theory, neuroscience and neuropsychology, along with social problem-
solving theory have not been integrated effectively into a developmental theory that is 
dynamic and recursive, and context-dependent, such that it should effectively predict 
behaviour” (Garrigan & Langdon, in press, p.11). They proposed an integrated model 
of moral development which included moral developmental theories, social 
information processing, perspective taking and aspects of neuroscience.  
Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s Developmental Social Information 
Processing Model of Moral Judgement and Behaviour is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Within their model there was an ‘inner’ and an ‘outer’ circle.’ The outer circle 
reflected the processes that occurred in vivo within a situation, such as responding to 
problems in the moment they occur. The outer circle was heavily influenced by 
situational cues. Therefore, problem-solving styles were biased by how individuals 
interpreted cues. The outer circle incorporated empathy and emotion recognition 
using components in Hoffman (2000) and Lemerise and Arsenio’s (2000) models of 
moral development, and was heavily based upon social information processing (Crick 
& Dodge, 1994).  
The inner circle reflected the distal developmental and social constructs that 
effect proximal social information processing, both developmentally over time, and 
while decisions are activey being made. However, it is important to recognise that 
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there is makred overlap between the two. As these distal higher order constructs 
change and evolve, the process of social problem solving and moral reasoning 
becomes more mature (i.e. the outer circle). The inner circle comprised deficits in 
abstract reasoning, attention, inhibition and processing speed which were highlighted 
as areas of difficulty for people with IDs (Carr et al., 2007; Davey, 2008; Spivack et 
al., 1976). It was hypothesised that social information processing became more 
effective through ongoing social experiences in which moral judgements could be 
made along with increased cognitive and emotional capacity.  
Turning back to the outer circle, in Step 1, they hypothesised that situational 
cues regulated what was encoded and that deficits in attention biased the encoding of 
situational cues, resulting in limited information on which to develop a response. Step 
2 of the outer circle was aligned to Crick and Dodge’s (1994) social information 
processing model, which involved perspective taking and attributions of intent. 
Garrigan and Langdon (in press) linked this with Theory of Mind (ToM) and the 
ability to mentalise (Frith & Frith, 2006). They suggested that memory and attention 
were also connected with ToM skills which if underdeveloped, would result in 
egocentric decision-making and poor moral judgement. Step 3 and Step 4 of the outer 
circle related to goal selection and response access. These stages also use ideas from 
Crick and Dodge’s (1994) social information processing model. During these stages, 
antisocial behaviour was associated with deviant information processing (Fontaine, 
2008) and reduced empathic arousal (Hoffman, 2000).  According to Damasio (1994) 
somatic markers referred to emotions that corresponded with bodily (somatic) 
sensations through repeated experiences. Therefore, if an individual associated a 
somatic marker with a negative outcome the end result would be a negative emotion 
such as anger, which resulted in an aggressive response. In Step 3 and Step 4, it was 
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hypothesised that deficits in empathic arousal, abstract cognitive ability, emotion 
regulation and somatic markers will reduce the possibility of success in the next step. 
Step 5 and Step 6 related to moral reasoning, moral judgement and behaviour 
enactment. During these steps, moral judgement was the actual response and moral 
reasoning was the process of using emotional and cognitive skills to determine the 
response. These skills included decision-making and evaluation, which relied on 
working memory. It was hypothesised that deficits in these abilities would have a 
negative impact on moral judgement and behaviour enactment.  
A key strength of Garrigan and Langdon’s (in press) model was that it 
specifically referred to people with IDs. Notably, this was not on the forefront of 
other moral developmental theories. Their model reflected some of the inherent 
difficulties that were present for people with IDs. For example, deficits in memory, 
attention, abstract thinking, cognitive inflexibility and brain development. 
Their model was supported by evidence that children with IDs and 
behavioural problems tended to encode more negative cues when compared to their 
non ID counterparts (van Nieuwenhuijzen, Orobio de Castro, Wijnroks, Vermeer, & 
Matthys, 2004) and that social information processing and social problem solving 
deficits were identified in children with IDs (Jacobs, Turner, Faust, & Stewart, 2002; 
Leffert & Siperstein, 1996). Furthermore, their model was also supported by studies 
where individuals with IDs and aggressive behaviours appeared to have a hostile 
attributional bias (Basquill et al., 2004; Jahoda, Pert, & Trower, 2006) and offenders 
with IDs endorsed distorted and antisocial cognitions (Broxholme & Lindsay, 2003; 
Langdon et al., 2011b; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay & Michie, 2004c; Lindsay 
et al., 2006b).  
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Figure 2. Garrigan and Langdon (in press) proposed a Developmental Social 
Information Processing Model of Moral Judgement and Behaviour. 
In sum, Garrigan and Langdon’s (in press) model supported findings where 
moral reasoning in adult offenders with IDs was different to their non-offending 
counterparts (Langdon et al., 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Langdon, Murphy, Clare, & 
Palmer, 2010b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). Their model hypothesised that moral 
reasoning for adult offenders with IDs was related to self-serving cognitive distortions 
which leads to negative responses within the context of the law, legal justice and 
stealing. This integrated model attempted to connect existing theories in a coherent 
structure. To the author’s knowledge, this model was not presented in previous 
studies and was a novel method of incorporating existing theories of moral 
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development. As with all new theories, there were limitations to Garrigan and 
Langdon’s model. First, their model needed to be tested for validity and robustness. 
Second, they connected complex factors with hypotheses of how these elements could 
interact. These hypotheses needed to be tested further. These limitations were seen as 
an opportunity to investigate this theory further. Because this was a developmental 
model, the current study used Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory as the main theoretical 
framework and references were made where connections were identified in Garrigan 
and Langdon’s (in press) model. However, it was not within the scope of the current 
study to explicitly test Garrigan and Langdon’s (in press) model. 
1.6 Development of the Research Study 
The current study was designed to explore moral reasoning, cognitive 
distortions and problem solving for offenders with IDs.  
1.6.1 Theoretical and clinical rationale. A number of factors were 
considered for the theoretical and clinical rationale. Firstly, there appeared to be few 
studies that focused on moral reasoning with ID populations (Langdon, 2010a, 
2011a). Seemingly, there were even fewer studies with offenders with IDs ( Langdon, 
2010a, 2011a; Lindsay, Hastings, Griffiths, & Hayes, 2007a). The studies that 
included offenders with IDs have focused on rehabilitation programmes in prisons 
(Lindsay, Hastings, & Beech, 2011b), sex offenders with IDs (Boer, et al., 2004; 
Lambrick & Glaser, 2004; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Lindsay, Elliot, & Astell, 
2004b), risk assessment (Lindsay & Beail, 2004a; McMillan, Hastings, & Coldwell, 
2004), empathy for offenders with IDs (Proctor & Beail, 2007) and youth with IDs 
(Campagne & Harter, 1975). These studies did not focus on moral development. 
Secondly, the current study included a literature review for studies relating to 
moral development with offenders with IDs. The findings indicated that offenders 
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with IDs had higher levels of moral maturity than their non-offender counterparts and 
that moral reasoning for ID offenders would fall into Stage 2(3) of Gibbs Sociomoral 
Stage theory (Gibbs, 2013). These findings were replicated in other studies (Langdon 
et al., 2011b; Langdon et al., 2013; McDermott & Langdon, 2014) and it was 
hypothesised that similar results should be found in studies with ID populations. One 
of the reasons that offenders were more mature was related to aspects within Stage 
2(3) where they were more likely to struggle with perspective taking and at the same 
time engage in more social experiences than their non-offender counterparts. They 
were also more likely to endorse cognitive distortions in social situations, which made 
them more susceptible to engaging in antisocial or criminal behaviours. Notably, there 
were only a few studies, which explicitly explored moral development with ID 
populations. This implied that further research should be done to explore moral 
development and offending behaviour with adult male ID offenders.    
Third, the literature review found 3 studies that focused on problem solving 
with offenders with IDs. Not many studies explored the connection between moral 
development and problem solving with offenders with IDs, with the exclusion of 
McMurran et al. (2001). Some theoretical frameworks suggested that offending was 
related to poor problem solving (D’Zurilla et al., 2004) or cognitive distortions and 
information processing (Crick & Dodge, 1994, 1996). Garrigan and Langdon (in 
press) also connected problem solving and cognitive distortions in a theoretical 
context. This provided the basis for exploring the connection between moral 
development and problem solving.  
Fourth, the literature review highlighted that there were a number of cognitive 
distortions measures that had been used with offenders with IDs. Of these measures, 
the HIT was used with offenders and non-offenders with IDs (Langdon et al., 2011b, 
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2013). However, there was no psychometric data for the HIT with ID populations. 
This suggested that an investigation of the psychometric properties for the HIT was 
required to see if it could be used in future studies with ID populations. 
Fifth, in the literature review, the majority of studies with offenders with IDs 
were conducted with sex offenders. Few studies were conducted with offenders with 
IDs and multiple offences (i.e. assault, theft). This suggested that further studies with 
offenders with IDs and multiple offence types were required. 
Sixth, the issue of cost was highlighted. Complexity, prevalence and costs of 
incarcerating offenders with IDs were highlighted (Hayes, 2004; Holland et al., 2002; 
Langdon et al., 2010b; Lindsay, 2002; Murphy et al., 1995; Simpson & Hogg, 2001). 
It was expensive to place offenders with IDs into secure forensic hospitals. Given the 
high costs and the current economic climate, research with ID populations was 
essential so that treatment in secure settings can be improved and evidence-based.   
Seventh, offenders with IDs are a complex group with equally complex risk 
factors. For example, aggression and risk to others (Novaco & Taylor, 2004; Taylor, 
2002; Taylor et al., 2002), personality disorders (Lindsay et al., 2006), alcohol and 
increased offending patterns (Lindsay et al., 2013; Lindsay, Steptoe, & Quinn, 2012; 
McGillivray & Moore, 2001) and poor coping skills were identified (Klimecki et al., 
1994; Holland, 2004; Lindsay et al., 2011a).  Offenders with IDs were also at risk of 
mental health difficulties (Murphy, Holland, Fowler, & Reep, 1991), which had a 
negative effect on mental health services. These studies highlighted the potential for 
high levels of comorbidity and crossovers between services that provided 
psychological interventions. Because of this, research with ID populations was 
essential. 
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Lastly, it was envisaged that future studies addressing the issues above would 
support the development of intervention programmes for offenders with IDs.  
Therefore, the clinical implications of future studies could influence intervention 
programmes that focused on moral reasoning and other related factors such as 
problem solving and cognitive distortions. Some moral reasoning based interventions 
were effective in reducing offending (Schlaefi, Rest, & Thoma, 1985) while others 
showed limited effects (Copeland & Parish, 1979). More recent studies found that 
offence related deficits were an important focus for interventions that attempted to 
improve moral reasoning abilities (Ashkar & Kenny, 2007). For offenders with IDs 
the EQUIP programme showed improved perspective taking and reduced levels of 
cognitive distortions (Langdon et al., 2013). More of these studies were required. 
1.6.2 Methodological rationale. Methodological limitations were identified 
in previous studies with ID populations (Langdon et al., 2010a, 2011a). A review of 
current studies highlighted similar limitations. For example, the use of unstandardised 
measures, poor designs and small sample sizes (de Vaus, 2001). 
This suggested that there was a need for further studies with sound 
methodological approaches and valid measures. The issue of using measures that 
were adapted for use with ID populations was raised (Lindsay et al., 2006). An 
adapted version of the SPSI-R (D’Zurilla et al., 2002) was used with offenders with 
IDs and appeared to be a psychometrically valid and reliable problem solving 
measure. The SRM-SF was a reliable measure of moral reasoning for use with ID 
offenders (McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Langdon et al., 2010b). Langdon at el. 
(2011b) used the HIT (Barriga et al., 2001) to identify cognitive distortions for 
offenders with IDs. However, they indicated that the HIT had not been validated for 
use with offenders with IDs. 
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1.6.3 Summary. There appears to be a shortage of empirical studies, which 
explored the relationship between moral reasoning, distorted cognitions and problem 
solving in adult male offenders and non-offenders with IDs. Some studies that used 
unstandardised measures and were subject to methodological flaws. Furthermore, 
early studies used theories of moral development that were out-dated. Gibbs’ 
Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992; Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013) included 
information processing and cognitive distortions while Crick and Dodge focused on 
problem solving (1994; 1996; Dodge, 1986; Dodge & Price, 1994). Garrigan and 
Langdon (in press) proposed a Developmental Social Information Processing Model 
of Moral Judgement and Behaviour, which required further research to assess its 
validity. 
The current study provided a response by exploring the relationship between 
moral reasoning, distorted cognitions and problem solving in male offenders and non-
offenders with IDs. Second, the differences in cognitive distortions, moral 
development and problem solving between offenders and non-offenders were 
explored. Third, the aim was to validate an adapted a measure of distorted cognitions 
for people with IDs. Lastly, the study aimed to provide useful insights into clinical 
interventions for offenders with IDs. It was envisaged that the findings from this 
study would contribute to current clinical practice.  
1.6.4 Hypotheses. The current study aimed to investigate the relationship 
between moral reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving in male offenders 
with IDs. In order to explore this a group of offenders with IDs was compared with a 
group of non-offenders with IDs. The research hypotheses were highlighted below. 
 Hypothesis 1: It was hypothesised that offenders with IDs would have 
significantly higher moral reasoning abilities than non-offenders with 
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IDs (Langdon et al., 2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Palmer, 
2003). This was a one-tailed hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 2: Moral reasoning was linked with problem solving and it 
was hypothesised that there would be a significant difference in 
problem solving between offenders and non-offenders with IDs 
(Barnett & Wood, 2008; D’Zurilla et al., 2002; Garrigan & Langdon, 
in press; Lindsay et al., 2011a; McMurran & McGuire, 2005; Palmer, 
2003). This was a two-tailed hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3a: It was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
correlation between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men 
with IDs (Garrigan & Langdon, in press; Gibbs et al., 1995; Langdon 
et al., 2011b). This was a one-tailed hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 3b: It was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
positive correlation between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions 
for offenders with IDs (Garrigan & Langdon, in press; Gibbs et al., 
1995; Langdon et al., 2011b).  
 Hypothesis 4a: It was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
correlation between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with 
IDs (Basquill et al., 2004; Ireland, 2001; Lindsay et al., 1998, 2011a; 
McMurran et al., 1999, 2001). This was a one-tailed hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 4b: It was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
positive correlation between moral reasoning and problem solving for 
offenders with IDs (Basquill et al., 2004; Ireland, 2001; Lindsay et al., 
1998, 2011a; McMurran et al., 1999, 2001). This was a two-tailed 
hypothesis. 
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In addition to the hypotheses, the basic psychometric properties were explored for the 
adapted version of the HIT.  
 Psychometric Question 1a: Test-retest reliability and internal 
consistency was calcualated for the amnedend version of the HIT for 
men with IDs. 
 Psychometric Question 1b: The amended version of the HIT should 
discriminate between offenders and non-offenders. Therefore, it was 
hypothesised that offenders with IDs would have significantly higher 
cognitive distortions than non-offenders with IDs (Barriga et al., 2001; 
Dodge, 1993; Langdon et al., 2011b; Gibbs et al., 1995).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Methodology 
This chapter is divided into sections. The first describes the design of the 
study, followed by collaboration details, participants, measures, procedure, ethical 
considerations and a description of the data analysis. The chapter concludes with 
inter-rater reliability calculations and a description of the statistical analysis. 
2.1 Study Design 
The design for this study is a between-groups design with additional 
correlation and analyses to examine the basic psychometric properties of an adapted 
measure. The benefits of using a between-groups design and correlations were to 
investigate each hypothesis and the basic psychometric properties of one measure. 
To address Hypothesis 1, the difference between moral reasoning was 
examined between offenders and non-offenders with IDs. This was repeated for 
problem solving (Hypothesis 2). To address Hypothes 3 and 4, a correlational design 
was used. The relationship between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions, and 
moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs were examined. A correlation 
co-efficient (r) was used to identify relationships, which could range from +1.00 to -
1.00, where +1.00 is a perfect positive correlation between variables and  -1.00 is a 
perfect negative correlation between variables (Coolican, 2009). It was generally 
accepted that r<0.4 is a weak correlation, while 0.4<r<0.7 is a moderate correlation, 
and r>0.7 is a strong correlation. To explore the basic psychometric properties, a 
within-subjects design was used. 
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2.2 Collaboration 
This study was conducted in collaboration with another trainee clinical 
psychologist and a clinical senior lecturer at the University of East Anglia. The 
reasons for conducting collaborative research was to ensure that a sufficient sample 
size, related to the research hypotheses, could be obtained; to increase the power of 
the findings through recruiting a large sample size; to address the difficulties in 
recruiting from an ID population (Lennox et al., 2005); and to increase 
generalisability through recruiting from a number of different research sites with 
different researchers. Furthermore, Blacker (2009) and others (Hayes, Murphy, & 
Sinclair, 2003) highlighted consent issues and permission to access secure facilities as 
obstacles when recruiting from people with IDs who have a history of criminal 
offending. This study was also part of a larger study, which received funding from the 
National Institute for Health Research. 
2.3 Participants 
The participants for this study were adult male ID offenders and adult male ID 
non-offenders. Therefore, a clinical sample consisting of two groups was recruited. 
The first group included male ID offenders (IDO). The IDO Group were recruited 
from medium and low-secure NHS and private forensic hospitals. Participants in this 
group were detained under the Mental Health Act (2007). Participants in the IDO 
Group had committed an offence, for which they were dealt with by the Crown Court 
in England. Consequently they were sentenced to custody within a secure hospital 
under Section 37 of the Mental Health Act (2007). No participants were seen in 
prisons. 
The second group included male ID non-offenders (IDN). These participants 
had no known history of offending behaviour. Participants in the IDN Group were 
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recruited from council community learning disability teams, community day centres, 
NHS learning disability teams and private learning disability residential care homes. 
The majority of the IDN group were seen in their homes while some were seen in 
community centres. Specific data was not recorded and is discussed in the limitations.  
2.3.1 Inclusion criteria. For the IDO Group the following criteria were 
applied:  
 Males with a FSIQ between 50-70 and difficulties with adaptive behaviour 
with an onset below the age of 18. FSIQ was measured in the study. However, 
adaptive behaviour difficulties were assumed given that participants were 
currently in ID service; 
 An indictable offence dealt with by a Crown Court. This criterion was also 
used in previous studies with ID offenders (McDermott, & Langdon, 2014; 
Langdon et al., 2010a); 
 Ability to communicate in English language and ability to complete measures 
that were verbally read out aloud; 
 Age between 18 – 65; 
 Capacity to provide consent. 
For the IDN Group the following criteria were applied:  
 Males with a FSIQ between 50-70 and impaired adaptive behaviour with an 
onset below the age of 18.   
 No known offence history; 
 Ability to communicate in English language and ability to complete measures 
that were verbally read out aloud; 
 Age between 18 – 65; 
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 Capacity to provide consent. 
The study recruited male offenders and non-offenders because it was 
convenient and because recent studies using standardised measures suggested that no 
differences would be present (McDermott & Langdon, 2014).  
2.3.2 Power and sample size. The sample size for this study was calculated 
using G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) which has undergone rigorous 
testing to ensure that its accuracy was equivalent to power charts and power tables 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  
To determine a sample size, numerous two-tailed hypotheses driven power 
analyses were undertaken (Black, 2009; Clarke-Carter, 2010). Means and standard 
deviations were based on a previous study that has used the same measures (Langdon 
et al., 2011b). An effect size of d=0.69 was obtained using the mean and standard 
deviations from Langdon et al. (2011b). The largest sample size was based on an 
independent samples t-test to determine significant differences between groups 
(Hypothesis 1; Hypothesis 2) and produced a sample size of N=52, or 26 participants 
per group. This was assuming a large effect size (f=0.8), power (1-β=0.80) and alpha 
level (α=0.05) using G*Power. According to Clarke-Carter (2010), in order to 
conduct Mann Whitney U tests, a sample size of N=50, or 25 per group, was required 
assuming a large effect size (f=0.6), power (1-β=0.80) and alpha level (α=0.05).  For 
the correlational design, an effect size of d=0.76 was obtained from a meta-analysis 
which explored moral judgement (Stams et al., 2006) and equates to r=0.36. To 
achieve a power of 0.80 at the 5% significance level (using G*Power) a sample of 47 
participants was required.  
Because the study was a collaborative study a larger sample was required for 
hypotheses that were part of the other trainees study. Therefore 72 participants were 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
69 
recruited and included in the data analysis, which is also 36 participants per group. 
The study was adequately powered for Hypothesis 1, 2, 3a, 4a and Psychometric 
Question 1a and 1b. Hypotheses 3b and 4b were underpowered. 
2.3.3 Participant demographics. Seventy-two male participants with a 
diagnosis of a mild ID, based on the DSM-V criteria (APA, 2013), and an average age 
of 38.58 (14.66) years participated in this study. The total number of participants was 
split into two groups that were very close to being equal. The first group consisted of 
38 non-offenders with IDs and the second group consisted of 34 offenders with IDs. 
Table 9 provides an overview of the age and FSIQ demographic information.  
Table 9 
Demographic information for total participant sample (mean and range scores) 
Demographic Information Range 
 
Mean (SD) 
Age for total sample (N=72) 18 - 68  38.58 (14.66) 
Age IDN (n=38) 19 - 68  43.47 (14.17) 
Age IDO (n=34) 18 - 59  33.12 (13.39) 
FSIQ for total sample (N=72) 50 - 70 
 
62.53   (4.93) 
FSIQ IDN (n=38) 55 - 70 
 
61.63 (4.96) 
FSIQ IDO (n=34) 50 - 70 
 
63.53 (4.78) 
 
2.3.3.1 Age and Full Scale IQ. Demographic information was explored to 
investigate whether there were significant differences between the two groups. 
Levene’s test indicated equal variances across the two groups and homogeneity of 
variance was assumed (F=0.006, p=0.940). Age scores were normally distributed. An 
independent samples t test was used to compare the mean age of each group. The IDO 
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Group was significantly younger than the IDN Group t(71)=-3.177, p=0.001 (Table 
9).  
For FSIQ, Levene’s test indicated equal variances across the two groups and 
homogeneity of variance was assumed (F=0.596, p=0.443). FSIQ scores were 
normally distributed. An independent samples t test was used to compare the mean 
FSIQ of each participant group. The IDO Group did not have significantly higher 
FSIQ than the IDN Group, t(71)=1.649, p=0.052..  
2.3.3.2 Demographic profile. Additional demographic data was collected and 
included ethnicity, marital status, dependents, level of education, physical health 
problems and mental health problems (Table 10).  
In Table 10, the majority of the sample was White British (93%).  A high 
proportion of the sample was single (81.9%). Very few participants had children 
(11.1%). The majority of the sample attended a special needs school (72.2%) and only 
a few attended a mainstream school (12.5%). A large proportion of the sample (49%) 
reported having physical health problems. The types of physical health problems that 
were reported included Asthma, Diabetes, Epilepsy, difficulty breathing and 
hypertension.   
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Similarly, a large proportion of the sample reported to have a mental health problem 
(54%). The types of mental health problems that were reported included anxiety, depression, 
borderline personality disorder, schizophrenia and ADHD. In addition, a small number of 
participants had a diagnosis of Autism (10%). Physical and mental health problems were 
reported differently between the groups. In the IDN Group, 57.9% (n=38) reported a physical 
health problem compared with 38.2% in the IDO Group (n=34). This indicated a higher 
percentage of physical health problems in the IDN Group. In the IDO Group, 67.7% (n=34) 
reported a mental health problem compared with 42.1% in the IDN Group (n=38). This 
indicated a higher percentage of mental health problems in the IDO Group. For physical and 
mental health, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to assess whether the distribution was 
significantly different from a normal distribution.  Participants were asked to report if they 
had a mental or physical health problem (i.e. yes or no). The data for physical health was 
significantly non-normal for the IDO, D (34)=.399, p=.000, and the IDN group, D(37)= .379, 
p=.000. The data for mental health was significantly non-normal for the IDO, D(34)= .429, 
p=.000, and the IDN, D (37)=.379, p=.000. A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to 
explore the difference between the groups on physical and mental health. There was a 
significant difference between the two groups for mental health, U = 481.00, z = -2.156, p = 
.031. No significant differences were found for physical health, U = 519.00, z = -1.655, p = 
.098.  
2.3.3.3 Offence profile. All participants in the IDN Group (n=38) were based in the 
community with supported living arrangements or in residential accommodation. All 
participants in the IDO Group (n=34) were based in secure forensic services (i.e. hospitals).  
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Table 11 
Offence types for offenders with intellectual disabilities (frequencies and proportions) 
Offence Type N(%) 
Sexual offending and indecent assault 17 (50.0)  
Murder 1   (0.03)  
Manslaughter 1   (0.03) 
Grievous bodily harm (GBH) and assault 10 (29.0) 
Arson 3   (0.08) 
Armed robbery 1   (0.03) 
Theft 1   (0.03)   
In Table 11, half of the IDO Group were sex offenders (50%). In terms of frequency, 
the next most frequent offence type was GBH and assault (29%). The remainder of the 
offence types were small in comparison and included murder, manslaughter, arson, armed 
robbery and theft. The sample was recruited from October 2013 to April 2014. 
2.3.4 Drop out. Five participants dropped out of the study because they found the 
questions too difficult or they were too anxious. A further 3 participants were excluded 
because they had a FSIQ score that was above 70. One participant in the IDO Group became 
aggressive and distressed during the screening procedure and they were excluded. 
In total, 9 participants were not included, over and above of the 72 participants that 
were included. For all the excluded participants, questionnaires were retained but not 
included in the data analysis. 
2.4 Measures 
One screening measure, three outcome measures and a demographics questionnaire 
were used in this study. The measures that were used in this study were selected based on 
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their suitability to explore the variables of interest within the context of conducting research 
with people that have IDs. Measure selection was discussed with experts in the field of ID 
offenders (Langdon, personal communication, October 17, 2012; January 18, 2013; Lindsay, 
personal communication, September 08, 2012). All of the measures were purchased from the 
respective publishers and permission was obtained where measures were adapted for use with 
ID populations.  
2.4.1 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. Where possible, FSIQ scores 
were recorded from participants’ files if they were conducted after 2010, and were 
determined using either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Third Edition (WAIS-III; 
Wechsler, 1997) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV; 
Wechsler, 2008). 
However, not all participants were seen in settings where files were kept (i.e. 
community day centres). Therefore, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; 
Wechsler, 1999) was administered. The WASI was an abbreviated version of the Wechsler 
WAIS-III. The WAIS-III consisted of 14 subtests that took approximately 90 minutes to 
conduct. The benefit of using the two-subtest version of the WASI was that it could be done 
in approximately 15 minutes. 
The WASI used either two or four of the subtests within the WAIS-III to estimate a 
FSIQ. The two-subtest version of the WASI could be used to estimate FSIQ using 
Vocabulary (verbal) and Matrix Reasoning (non-verbal) tasks.  The WASI was reported as a 
reliable measure with a mean reliability coefficient for the FSIQ (r=.98) and a test-retest 
reliability (r=.88) for the FSIQ two-subtest version (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2005). The 
two subtest version of the WASI also had good internal consistency, r=.89 (Kaufman & 
Lichtenberger, 2005), and good concurrent validity, r=.92, with the WAIS-III (Garland, 
2005).  
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2.4.2. The Sociomoral Reflection Measure Short-Form. The socio-moral reflection 
measure short form (SRM-SF) was a measure of moral reasoning production (Gibbs et al., 
1992). The SRM-SF consisted of eleven items that took approximately 20 minutes to 
complete (Appendix A). The items included structured questions about contracting and 
making promises with others and children, honesty, affiliation with parents and friends, life 
and living, property, law and legal justice. For example, participants were asked: “ How 
important is it to keep promises, if you can, to a friend?” or “How important is it for judges to 
send people that break the law to prison?” Participants were asked to indicate whether they 
think it is “very important”, “important” or “not important.” This was then followed with a 
question, depending on their initial response: “And why is it important?” Participants’ 
responses to items were recorded and a score was allocated.  
The scoring was manualised and participants were assigned to one of Gibbs’s 
Sociomoral stages (Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992). Using the manual, a rating 
was assigned to each item. These ratings were converted to scores per item. These scores 
were summed to produce a total score. The total score was divided by the number of 
completed items and then multiplied by 100. This generated a global stage score between 100 
and 400, which corresponded with a moral stage  (Table 12). 
The SRM-SF required researchers to be well versed with the content and scoring 
procedure. In order to achieve this, the authors (Gibbs et al., 1992) specified that a minimum 
of 30 hours of study and practice using the SRM-SF should be undertaken prior to its use. 
This included overall familiarisation with the items and scoring, scoring practice per question 
and scoring practice per questionnaire. The SRM-SF demonstrated good test-retest reliability 
(r=0.88) and internal consistency (α=0.92). Gibbs et al (1992) reported that the SRM-SF 
showed good convergent validity through positive correlations with age (r=0.66) and verbal 
intelligence (r=0.49).  
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Table 12 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure Short-Form and moral stages 
Score Moral Stage 
100 – 125 Stage 1 
126 – 149 Transition Stage 1(2) 
150 – 174 Transition Stage 2(1) 
175 – 225 Stage 2 
226 – 249 Transition Stage 2(3) 
250 – 274 Transition Stage 3(2) 
275 – 325 Stage 3 
326 – 349 Transition Stage 3(4) 
350 – 374 Transition Stage 4(3) 
375 – 400 Stage 4 
 
The SRM-SF has been shown to be a reliable measure for use with ID populations in 
the UK (Langdon, et al., 2010a). Therefore, it was a suitable outcome measure for this study. 
For this study, the scoring of the SRM-SF was completed and checked by two researchers 
and inter-rater reliability was reported at the end of this chapter. 
2.4.3 The How I Think Questionnaire. The HIT was initially developed for use with 
a youth population in the United States and was used to measure self-serving cognitive 
distortions (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga et al., 2001). The HIT contained 54 items on a 6-
point Likert scale and took approximately 20 minutes to complete. According to the manual, 
there were 6-point ratings from “strongly disagrees” to “strongly agree.” A score of 1 was 
allocated when a participant “strongly disagrees” and a score of 6 was allocated when a 
participant “strongly agrees.” Therefore, higher scores reflected higher levels of cognitive 
distortions. It required a fourth grade reading level, based on the Flesch-Kincaid Reading 
Index, which meant that it would be suitable for those with low literacy abilities (Wampler, 
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1988). Notably, a seventh-grade reading level was considered appropriate for professional 
audiences. A total score was calculated using the manual. The total scores were used to 
categorise responses into four categories: Self-Centred, Minimising-Mislabeling, Blaming 
Others and Assuming the Worst.  
These categories were linked with behavioural referents, which included Physical 
Aggression, Opposition Defiance, Lying and Stealing. Barriga et al. (2001) reported the 
internal consistency to range from α=0.93 to α=0.96, which suggested excellent internal 
consistency. More recently, Gini and Pozzoli (2012) conducted a meta-analysis of the 
psychometric properties of the HIT and found excellent reliability (r=0.93), strong 
convergent validity and the ability to discriminate between offenders and a control group 
(N=8186). However, there was limited psychometric information on its use with ID 
populations (Langdon et al., 2011b). An anomalous responding score was also calculated for 
the HIT. A score that was greater than ‘4’ was considered to be suspect and potentially 
unreliable. 
Given this predicament, this study modified the HIT for use with ID offenders, with 
permission from the authors and publisher. In order to modify the HIT, the Flesch Reading 
Ease score (Flesch, 1948; Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, & Chisson, 1975; FRE) was calculated 
for each item (Appendix B). The FRE was also used in other studies with sex offenders who 
have IDs, where an average FRE score of 88.21 for all the items provided high levels of 
reliability and validity (Lindsay, Whitefield, & Carson, 2007b). Words that were not British 
or seemingly complex for an individual with an ID were replaced with alternatives. A total of 
12 changes (Table 13) were made with an FRE mean for all 56 items of 87.31, which was 
consistent with a similar study (Lindsay et al., 2007b). These changes were undertaken in 
consultation with an expert working with offenders with IDs who has experience of using 
questionnaires with this population.    
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Therefore, a modified version of the HIT with a visual analogue scale (Appendix C) 
was used for this study and permission was obtained from the publishers (Appendix D). A 
visual analogue scale was used so that people with IDs could respond to the items without 
having to retain the options for responding on a Likert scale. In terms of scoring the modified 
version of the HIT, the scoring system was changed in order to accommodate its use with an 
ID population. The Likert scale was changed from a 6-point scale to a 4-point scale. A score 
of 1 was allocated if a participant “strongly disagrees” and a score of 4 was allocated if a 
participant “strongly agrees.” Therefore, high scores would still reflect higher levels of 
cognitive distortions and be consistent with the manual. 
Table 13 
Modifications to the How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) 
Original Item  
(Item Number) FRE (%) 
Rational for 
Change 
New Item  
(FRE; %) 
 
I can’t help losing my temper 
a lot (2) 
 
92.9 
 
Ambiguous 
sentence 
 
I lose my temper a lot 
(100.00) 
I am generous with my 
friends (9) 
87.9 Substituted 
‘Generous.’ 
I give a lot to my friends 
(100.00) 
When I get mad, I don’t care 
who gets hurt (10) 
100.00 Substituted 
‘mad.’ 
When I get angry, I don’t 
care who gets hurt 
(100.00) 
Sometimes I gossip about 
other people (13) 
31.5 Low FRE Sometimes I talk about 
other people when they 
don’t know (69.7) 
Everybody lies, it’s no big 
deal (14) 
59.7 Low FRE Everyone lies. It’s not a 
problem to lie (86.4) 
I have sometimes said 
something bad about a friend 
(20) 
66.1 Low FRE Sometimes I have said bad 
things about a friend 
(84.9) 
If a store or home owner gets 
robbed, it’s really their fault 
for not having better security 
(25) 
65.1 Low FRE and 
substituted 
‘store.’ 
If shops get robbed it’s 
their fault for not having 
good security (74.8) 
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People are always trying to 
hassle me (29) 
78.8 Substituted 
‘hassle.’ 
People are always trying to 
get on my nerves (94.3) 
Stores make enough money 
that it’s ok to just take the 
things you need (30) 
95.9 Changed 
‘stores’ to 
‘shops.’ 
Shops make enough 
money that it’s ok to just 
take the things you need 
(95.9) 
It’s important to think of 
other people’s feelings (34) 
61.2 Low FRE I should think about others 
feelings (73.8) 
If someone is careless enough 
to lose a wallet, they deserve 
to have it stolen (39)  
61.8 Ambiguous 
sentence 
It’s ok to steal a wallet if 
someone leaves it behind 
(80.3) 
When I lose my temper, it’s 
because people try to make 
me mad (46) 
89.5 Removed 
‘mad.’ 
When I lose my temper, 
it’s because people try to 
make me angry (83.0) 
2.4.4 The Social Problem Solving Inventory Revised Short-Form. The Social 
Problem Solving Inventory Revised Short-Form (SPSI-R-SF) was developed to identify 
problem orientation and problem solving abilities (D’Zurilla, et al., 2002). Notably the Social 
Problem Solving Inventory Revised has a long form (SPSI-R-L), with 52 items, and short 
form (SPSI-R-SF) with 25 items. D’Zurilla et al. (2002) suggested that when problem solving 
was being assessed alongside a larger test battery, it was advisable to use the SPSI-R-SF to 
avoid long testing sessions, participant fatigue and inaccurate responses. Because the SPSI-R-
SF was much shorter, it limited the potential for participants to become confused with 
lengthy questionnaires, and was therefore more suitable for ID populations. The SPSI-R-SF 
demonstrated strong test-retest reliability (r=0.79), internal consistency (α=0.85) and 
convergent validity with a self-report measure of distress (D’Zurilla et al., 2002).   
The SPSI-R-SF was used for males or females above the age of 13 years old and 
consists of 25 items taking approximately 20 minutes to complete. The authors recommend 
reading the measure out loud for participants with difficulties.  Each item consisted of a 
current problem or scenario. Participants were asked to respond to each item on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale, ranging from “not at all true of me” to “extremely true of me.” Using the 
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manual, a score was allocated to each item. Then, a grid sheet was used to assemble items 
into five scales and a total SPSI-R-SF raw score. The raw scores were plotted onto a grid to 
obtain standard scores, depending on the age group, which could be either young adults (17-
39 years), middle-aged adults (40-55 years) or elderly adults (60-80 years).  Standard scores 
for the SPSI-R-SF had a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15.  
The five scales in SPSI-R-SF were used to categorise responses into problem solving 
styles and problem solving strategies. The problem solving orientations and styles were 
illustrated and explained in Table 8 in the previous chapter. They included Positive Problem 
Orientation (PRO), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), Rational Problem Solving style 
(RPO), Impulsivity / Carelessness Problem Solving style (ICS) and Avoidance Problem 
Solving style (AS). High scores on the adaptive scales, which were the PPO and RPO, 
suggested a positive and effective problem solving style, while high scores on the 
dysfunctional scales, which are the NPO, ICS and AS, suggested the presence of defective 
problem-solving strategies. In order to interpret scores, the magnitude of “good” or “poor” 
problem solving ability was determined through observations of how far a standard score 
deviated from the mean score of 100, using the guidelines in Table 14. 
A simplified version of the SPSI-R-SF was used in a previous study with ID offenders 
(Lindsay et al., 2011a; Appendix E). The motive for using a simplified version was to 
improve the understanding of the questions for participants with IDs. Lindsay et al. (2011a) 
conducted an exploratory factor analysis on the simplified version of the SPSI-R-SF and 
reported a consistent four-factor solution with the original SPSI-R-SF questionnaire. For this 
reason, permission was obtained from the authors to use the simplified SPSI-R-SF (W. 
Lindsay, personal communication, September 2013) under the condition of first purchasing 
the original manual and obtaining permission from the distributors, Multi-Health Systems 
(Appendix F). A visual analogue scale was also used (Appendix E). 
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Table 14 
Guideline for interpreting SPSI-R-SF standard scores 
Standard Score Interpretative Guidelines  
145 and above Extremely above norm group average 
130 – 144 Very much above norm group average 
115 – 129 Above norm group average 
86 – 114 Norm group average 
71 – 85 Below norm group average 
56 –70 Very much below norm group average 
55 and below  Extremely below norm group average 
2.5 Procedure 
The procedure included two sections. The first was the recruitment procedure 
(Appendix G) and the second was the research procedure (Appendix H).  
2.5.1 Recruitment procedure.  NHS ethics approval was obtained. Each member of 
the research team contacted managers of day centres for the IDN Group and managers of 
secure units for the IDO Group. They discussed the study with the managers and asked them 
to share the information within their teams and identify any potential participants. 
Information sheets for staff were provided to facilitate this process (Appendix I). When 
potential participants provided consent to the team manager, a list of potential participants 
was obtained and a research team member contacted them. A copy of the participant 
information sheet (Appendix J) and participant consent form (Appendix K) was provided to 
each potential participant. A member of the research team contacted potential participants 
(i.e. telephone contact or appointments) to discuss the study; provided an opportunity to ask 
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questions; explained the risks of participating; confirmed participation; obtained signed 
consent forms and arranged two dates for data collection. 
2.5.2 Research procedure. A member of the research team met participants on the 
agreed date(s). They checked that the participant still wanted to participate and ensured that 
the consent form was signed. Participants were also asked if they wanted someone to be 
present during the session. The assessment took approximately 2 hours to complete (Table 
15). The time was reduced if the WASI was not required. The researcher then proceeded with 
data collection at Time 1: The researcher administered the first three measures, with a 15-
minute break before administering the second three measures that were part of the second 
trainee’s thesis. The researcher read the questionnaires to each participant. The researcher 
collected the paper questionnaires for secure storage. This was followed by data collection at 
Time 2 (2 weeks after Time 1): The researcher administered the HIT Questionnaire and paper 
questionnaires were securely stored. Because there were 3 researchers, the same researcher 
saw each participant twice. The first researcher recruited 11 participants; the second 
researcher recruited 32 participants; and the third researcher recruited 29 participants.
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Table 15 
Measures used in Time 1 and Time 2 
Time 1 Time 2 
Consent Forms HIT 
WASI   
Demographics Questionnaire  
HIT  
SPSI-R-SF   
SRM-SF     
At the end of Time 1 and Time 2, participants were given the opportunity to ask any 
questions. Each participant was given a shopping voucher to the value of £20.00 and thanked 
for their participation. Participants that completed the consent forms and were deemed 
ineligible were also reimbursed with a £5.00 voucher. Because this study formed part of a 
larger collaborative study that was still ongoing, the Chief Investigator was scheduled to 
respond to the relevant Ethics and R&D Departments once the study ended. 
2.6 Ethics and Consent 
This ethics procedure included ethics approval, consent, risk and storage plans for the 
data. Ethical research in mental health is essential as it ensures that research is safe and non-
harmful for participants (DuBois, 2008). 
2.6.1 Approval. A favourable ethical opinion was gained from the National Research 
Ethics Service Committee, South West Frenchay, (Research Ethics Committee Reference: 
13/SW/0084) on 15 May 2013 (Appendix L). Table 16 included a summary of the research 
sites that were included in this study.  
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For all NHS sites, Research and Development (R&D) approval was obtained. For 
some private hospitals, residential care homes and day centres, a letter of permission was 
obtained (Appendix M; Appendix N; Appendix O; Appendix P; Appendix Q; Appendix R; 
Appendix S; Appendix T). Some institutions did not issue the researcher with a letter. 
However, they consented to asking potential participants if they wanted to take part in the 
study. When such arrangements were made, a copy of the NHS ethics documentation was 
also provided to the relevant organisation, residential care home or day centre. 
Table 16 
Research sites 
Research Site Sample Target Recruited 
 
Hertfordshire Partnership University NHS 
Trust 
 
IDN 
 
Yes 
Norfolk Community Health Care NHS 
Trust & Day Centres in Norfolk IDN & IDO Yes 
Huntercombe Hospitals, UK IDO Yes 
St Andrews Healthcare, UK IDO Yes 
Day Centres across Peterborough, 
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire IDN Yes 
Private residential, supported living homes 
across Peterborough, Leicestershire and 
Northampton shire 
IDN Yes 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS 
Foundation Trust IDN No 
Leicestershire Partnership NHS Trust IDN No 
Milton Park Hospital, UK IDO No 
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2.6.2 Consent, information and coercion. Information sheets and informed consent 
forms were used in this study. These forms were reviewed using the Flesch Reading Ease 
(FRE) and a FRE score of 81.00 was obtained. A FRE score between 80.00 and 90.00 was 
desirable for research purposes (National Research Ethics Service, 2011). In addition to being 
written in easy language, information sheets and consent forms contained pictorial cues that 
could facilitate understanding. Consent forms were checked verbally with each participant. 
Participants received information on what they would be required to do for the study, 
in order to provide informed consent about participating (Elmes, Kantowitz & Roediger, 
1999). Participants were told that the study aimed to explore thinking patterns, how they 
understood a list of scenarios and how they solved problems using two data collection points, 
which lasted approximately 2 hours at Time 1 and 20 minutes at Time 2. They also had the 
opportunity to ask questions before participating in the study. Participants were told that they 
could drop out of the study at any time and this would not have an impact on the current 
service or treatment they received. The consent form asked participants for permission to 
speak to staff members or key workers that worked with them in order to obtain offence 
related information, risk information and previous FSIQ assessments. 
To minimise perceived coercion, participants could be accompanied by someone 
known to them, when consent was discussed. Some participants did not want someone 
present when consent was discussed. For these participants, the researcher checked whether 
they could understand the information about the study. If they could retain the information 
and repeat this back to the researcher (along with their understanding of what participation 
would involve) then they were deemed to have capacity to consent. The Mental Capacity Act 
(2005) was used to determine capacity. Participants were also told that the study would be 
written up in the form of a doctoral thesis, and published in a journal article. 
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2.6.3 Risks, confidentiality and benefits. Participants were informed of the potential 
risks of this study. For example, they could become distressed about a question that they 
could not understand. The study was not designed to cause distress. No immediate risks were 
envisaged and the study was considered to be a low risk study. Even with low risk studies, 
there was the possibility that participants could become distressed. Therefore, if a participant 
or staff member became distressed, the Chief Investigator was available to offer advice and 
support.  
There was also the possibility that participants, especially those with an offence, 
disclosed information about a crime that was not been reported and/or harm to others or 
themselves. In such situations, it was necessary to compromise confidentiality. The British 
Psychological Society Code of Ethics and Conduct (2009) suggested consulting a 
professional colleague to discuss the risk and the potential confidentiality breach. 
Furthermore, breaking confidentiality should be done, as far as possible, with the individual’s 
knowledge (Gale, 1995; Oliver, 2003). To address this risk, the process for breaking 
confidentiality was explained to all participants.  
For the IDO Group, participants were informed that any potential disclosure would be 
discussed with them first. The researcher would then discuss the risk with a staff member and 
the Chief Investigator in order to establish a risk management plan. The participant would be 
part of the risk management plan. Risk was described in the context of ‘keeping participants 
and other people safe.’ In order to manage the potential disclosure within the offender group, 
participants were asked to only provide information that was known by staff members, police 
officers, social workers or doctors. 
For the IDN Group, a lone-working policy was followed because some participants 
were seen in their home. All participants had a carer /parent that was informed of their 
participation. Any risk related concerns would be discussed with the carer / parent and a risk 
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management plan would be established. This included contact with the local LD team to 
provide support with risk management. In such situations, the Chief Investigator was also be 
contacted for advice. 
The data collection was conducted by a team of qualified and trainee clinical 
psychologists. The trainee clinical psychologists received regular supervision from an expert 
in the field of IDs and were aware of the potential risks associated with this study. Lastly, 
participants were informed that participating in this study could improve our understanding 
people with IDs and inform further treatment.  
2.6.4 Distress. Two participants become distressed during the study. The first 
participant became distressed prior to the screening. This participant had initially agreed to 
participate in the study after meeting the researcher two weeks prior. However, on the day 
they became distressed during the consent discussion. Because of this, they were excluded 
and thanked for their interest in the study. They were also seen by the in-house consultant 
psychologist and were scheduled into weekly appointments. A follow up call was made a few 
days later to check on the participant and no further problems were reported. 
The second participant became distressed during the Time 1 data collection. They 
were asked if they wanted to continue and they asked for a cigarette break to decide. During 
their cigarette break they spoke to their key worker. After their cigarette break, they agreed to 
complete the data collection the next day. They were seen the following day and they 
completed the remainder of the measures.  
Both of these incidents were discussed with the Chief Investigator on the day that 
they occurred. 
2.6.5 Storage and access to data. Confidential data should be stored securely (Data 
Protection Act, 1998). Therefore, all identifiable data was kept separate from participants’ 
NHS records, and stored securely with Chief Investigator (University of East Anglia).  
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 Paper forms (i.e. completed outcome measures; informed consent forms) were stored 
in a locked cabinet that was only accessible to the research team. A unique study code linked 
participants to their data. Only members of the research team were able to link the study code 
and identifiable data. Electronic data was anonymised and stored on a University of East 
Anglia (UEA) encrypted desktop computer. In situations where anonymised electronic data 
needed to be accessed off site, an encrypted password protected keydrive was used.  
Once the study was complete, data was stored securely and remained the 
responsibility of the Chief Investigator. The procedure for data storage was for it to be 
archived off-site. The Data Protection Act (1988) specified that data should not be kept for 
longer than necessary. Therefore, data would be kept for a period of 10 years in order to re-
appraise the data for further research; and/or to provide the original data for inspection if 
queries were raised regarding the integrity of the results. 
2.7 Data Preparation and Analysis 
2.7.1 Data preparation. The raw data was checked to ensure that all the 
questionnaires were completed before being prepared for statistical analysis (Pallant, 2010). 
All the questionnaires were hand scored. Demographic information and FSIQ scores were 
obtained for all participants. Data was then transferred into SPSS Version 20.0.0. Statistical 
analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 20.0.0.  
There were some items that had not been answered. Firstly, 14 participants did not 
answer all the questions in the SRM-SF. According to the scoring manual, a minimum of 7 
questions needed to be answered in order for the measure to be valid and a global stage to be 
calculated.  The scoring manual provided a separate calculation that was used if respondents 
did not answer all the questions. This calculation was done manually for each of the 14 
participants. Secondly, two participants missed one answer for the HIT. According to the 
scoring manual for the HIT, respondents needed to answer at least 49 out of the 54 items in 
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order for the measure to be valid. Because these participants only missed one item, the 
scoring was not affected. No data was missing for all the SPSI-R-SF measures. 
Where relevant, missing data was coded as ‘999’ on the database. Raw data was 
screened and cleaned before the analysis could commence. Outliers and data for participants 
that dropped out were also removed (Pallant, 2010). 
2.7.2 Inter-rater reliability.  For the SRM-SF inter-rater reliability was calculated. 
According to Gibbs et al. (1992) an inter-rater reliability of r > 0.80 was required for the 
SRM-SF. Therefore, 33% (n=24) of the SRM-SF measures in this study were second-rated 
by an expert rater.  
This was done in two parts that included 12 SRM-SF measures each. For the first part, 
the first 12 SRM-SF measures were rated by the researcher. Once the ratings had been done 
the expert rater was then asked to rate the same 12 measures. Rating scores were entered onto 
a separate database and inter-rater reliability was computed using SPSS. The result for the 
first 12 SRM-SF measures indicated an inter-rater reliability of r= 0.694 which was below 
the recommendation by Gibbs et al. (1992). The expert rater provided the researcher with a 
detailed breakdown of the moral reasoning stage for all the participants that were included in 
the first inter-rater reliability calculation. Keywords were also highlighted as the researcher 
was scoring these incorrectly. The keywords were ‘upset’, ‘happy’, ‘learn’ and ‘feel.’ Scoring 
across the different sections of the manual were also explained and demonstrated. Scoring the 
same question across all the measures was also encouraged in order to focus on each 
question. The inconsistencies were amended and the 12 SRM-SF scores were entered onto 
the database using the expert rating. 
Because the inter-rater reliability was too low, a second set of 12 SRM-SF measures 
were selected and the process was repeated. The inter-rater reliability was r=0.958 using an 
intra-class correlation. This was an excellent inter-rater reliability and was above the 
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recommendation by Gibbs et al. (1992). The remaining 48 SRM-SF questionnaires were then 
scored by the researcher, with a particular emphasis on the keywords and expert advice for 
scoring across sections. 
2.7.3 Data analysis. Various methods were used to conduct the data analysis. First, 
demographic data was explored using descriptive statistics (Field, 2009, 2013; Pallant, 2010). 
This was followed by tests of normality and homogeneity of variance. 
2.7.3.1. Age and Full Scale IQ. As previously mentioned the IDN Group were 
significantly older than the IDO Group; and there were no significant differences when the 
IQ scores for the two groups were compared. However, in order to explore Hypothesis 1, 2 
and 3b, the relationship between age and all the dependant variables (total scores) were 
explored (Appendix U). Similarly, the relationship between IQ and all the dependant 
variables (total scores) were also explored. Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were used 
to explore relationships between the variables.  
There were no significant relationships between age and any of the dependant 
variables for the IDO Group or the IDN Group (Appendix U). For IQ and the IDO Group 
there were no significant relationships between IQ and the SRM-SF; IQ and the SPSI-R-SF; 
and IQ and the HIT1. For the IDN Group there were no significant relationships between IQ 
and the SPSI-R-SF; and IQ and the HIT1. There was a significant relationship between IQ 
and the SRM-SF, (r=.44, p=.003); and IQ and the HIT2, (r=-.28, p=.047). For both groups 
there was a small significant relationship between IQ and the HIT2. 
In order to select appropriate statistical analyses, skewness, normality and 
homogeneity of variance were explored for all the variables, taking into account any 
significant correlations between the variables. This was done to determine whether 
parametric or non-parametric analysis could be used. 
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2.7.3.2 Tests of normality and homogeneity of variance. In the first instance, 
histograms were used to assess whether a distribution was normal. This was followed by the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to assess whether the distribution was significantly different from 
a normal distribution. Skewness and kurtosis were also explored. Tests of normality and 
homogeneity of variance were conducted using total scores for all the measures (Appendix 
V).  
For the IDO Group, the SRM-SF Global score was normally distributed; D (33)= 
.110, p=.200. The HIT Time 1 Total score was significantly non-normal; D (33)=.183, 
p=.007. The HIT Time 2 Total score was normally distributed; D (33)= .074, p=.200. The 
SPSI-R Total score was normally distributed; D (37)=. 102, p=.200.  
For the IDN Group, the SRM-SF Global score was normally distributed; D (37)= 
.124, p=.160. The HIT Time 1 Total score was significantly non-normal; D (37)= .177, p= 
.005. The HIT Time 2 Total score was normally distributed; D (37)= .130, p=.117.The SPSI-
R Total score was normally distributed; D (37)=.081, p=.200.  
Normality for the sub-scores across all the measures were assessed for the full sample 
and these are illustrated in Appendix V and Appendix W. There were 7 construct scores for 
the SRM-SF, 5 sub-scores for the SPSI-R-SF and 22 sub-scores for the HIT1 and HIT2. For 
the IDO Group, 14 of the sub-scores were non-normal and 20 were normal. For the IDN 
Group, 16 of the sub-scores were non-normal and 18 were normal. The mean and 
interquartile ranges (IQR) using Tukey’s Hingers are reported for all non-normal data in 
Appendix X. 
Levene’s test for Equality of Variances was used to test the homogeneity of variance 
(Field, 2009). Levene’s test was conducted for the total scores of each outcome measure 
(Table 17). For Levene’s test, equal variances are assumed when p>.05.  
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Table 17 
Tests for homogeneity of variance 
Measure Levene’s Statistic Sig. 
SRM-SF Global Score 0.349  0.556  
HIT Time 1 Total Score (HIT1) 8.525 0.005 
HIT Time 2 Total Score (HIT2) 1.848    0.178    
SPSI-R-SF Total Score 0.863  0.356 
Levene’s test indicated equal variances between the two groups for SRM-SF Global 
score, SPSI-R-SF Total score, and the HIT2 Total score, which supported parametric data 
analyses. Levene’s test indicated unequal variances for the HIT1 Total score, which 
supported non-parametric data analysis.  However, across all the data, there was a mix of 
normal and non-normally distributed data, which supported non-parametric data analysis. 
2.7.3.3 Analysis.  After assessing for normality not all the data were normally 
distributed. Substantial proportions of the data were skewed. An attempt was made to 
transform the data. However, this was unsuccessful.For Hypothesis 1 and 2, where difference 
were being explored there were some problems with comparing non-normal and normal data 
sets. Therefore, non-parametric analyses were used (Field, 2009; Howell, 2010). For 
consistency this was used throughout, even when data was normal. This process was 
followed for all the hypotheses and was discussed with the Chief Investigator who has 
conducted similar studies with ID populations.  
Because some of the research hypotheses included multiple comparisons, Bonferroni 
corrections were used to control the family-wise error rate and the risk of making a Type 1 
error (Clarke-Carter, 2010). Bonferroni corrections can be used to adjust the p value when 
several independent statistical tests are performed simultaneously. Bonferroni corrections can 
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also be used when there are multiple comparisons, regardless of independence. This means 
that if outcomes are correlated, corrections should be used. In order to address this, 
Bonferroni corrections were used for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 and Psychometric Question 
1b. 
The the statistical analysis for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 were the same. For 
these hypotheses, Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to explore the difference between 
the groups (Field, 2009, 2013; Foreshaw, 2007).  
Relationships between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions (Hypothesis 3a; 
Hypothesis 3b); and moral reasoning and problem solving abilities were explored 
(Hypothesis 4a; Hypothesis 4b). This statistical analysis was conducted for the full sample 
(Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 4a) and then for the IDO Group (Hypothesis 3b and 
Hypothesis 4b). For these hypotheses, Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients were 
calculated to explore relationships between the variables (Field, 2009, 2013). Therefore, a 
statistical analysis was conducted to explore correlations between scores on the SRM-SF and 
the HIT1; SRM-SF and the HIT2; and the SRM-SF and the SPSI-R-SF. 
The basic psychometric properties for one of the measures that were amended and 
used in the study. For Psychometric Question 1a, internal consistency was examined by 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) and intra-class correlation coefficients were 
calculated to measure test-retest reliability (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). For Psycometric 
Qustion 1b, Mann-Whitney U tests were used to explore the differences between the two 
groups on a measure of cognitive distortions (total scores and sub-scale scores).  
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Results  
3.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter describes the analysis and results for the study. The demographic profile 
is discussed in the previous chapter. The results for the hypotheses are presented in detail. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings. 
3.2 Hypothesis 1 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Offenders with intellectual disabilities will have signficiantly 
higher moral reasoning that non-offenders. The moral reasoning abilities of the IDO Group 
were significantly higher than the IDN Group when the SRM-SF Global Scores were 
compared, U = 247.50, z = -4.5, p = .000. Hypothesis 1 was supported (Table 18). 
The differences between the constructs on the SRM-SF were also compared (Table 
20) using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.007 per test (.05/7). Results indicated that the 
IDO Group scored significantly higher than the IDN Group on Contract (U = 382.50, z = -
3.03, p = .001), Life (U = 343.00, z = -3.46, p = .000), Law (U = 323.00, z = -3.63, p = .000) 
and Legal Justice (U = 356.00, z = -3.20, p = .001). There were no significant differences on 
Truth (U = 467.00, z = -2.11, p = .017), Affiliation (U = 468.50, z = -2.02, p = .022) and 
Property (U = 449.50, z = -2.11, p = .017). 
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Table 18 
Comparing offenders and non-offenders on the SRM-SF and SRM-SF Constructs 
SRM-SF 
Construct: 
 
Offenders with 
ID (IDO) 
n=34 (M, SD) 
IDO: Median and 
Interquartile 
Range  
Non-offenders 
with ID (IDN) 
n=38 (M, SD) 
IDN: Median 
and 
Interquartile 
Range 
SRM-SF 
Global Score 
242.41  
(35.06)* 
244 
(227-268) 
202.03  
(30.74)  
200  
(182-225) 
Contract 237.50  (33.73)**  
250 
(225-250) 
213.60  
(29.02) 
217  
(200-233) 
Truth 233.53  (62.37)    
250 
(200-250) 
200.00  
(56.95) 
200  
(150-250) 
Affiliation 248.97  (59.91)   
250 
(200-300) 
217.11  
(63.70) 
225  
(175-250) 
Life 262.50  (48.17)** 
250 
(225-300) 
219.74  
(47.63) 
225  
(200-250) 
Property 210.61  (70.44)  
200 
(200-250) 
172.37  
(74.16) 
150  
(100-250) 
Law 234.85  (98.02)** 
200 
(200-300) 
151.32  
(74.88) 
150  
(100-200) 
Legal Justice 250.00  (90.45)** 
200 
(200-300) 
185.14  
(87.29) 
150  
(100-250) 
* p<.05, **p<.007 using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels, M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation 
3.2.2 Stages of moral reasoning per group. Hypothesis 1 showed significant 
differences between the groups on the SRM-SF Global Score. In order to illustrate this 
difference further, a frequency table for the levels and stages of moral reasoning was 
generated. Table 19 depicts the stage and level of moral reasoning for both groups. For the 
IDO Group, 35.3% fell into Stage 2(3). For the IDN Group, 60.5% fell into Stage 2.  
A Mann-Whitney U test was conducted to explore the difference between the groups 
on stages of moral reasoning. The IDO group were signficiantly higher across the stages, U = 
262.50, z = -4.5, p = .000.  
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Table 19 
Moral reasoning stages for offenders and non-offenders with intellectual disabilities 
SRM-SF Stage and Level IDO Group (n=34) IDN Group (n=38) 
 n (%) n (%) 
Stage 1 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Transition Stage 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Transition Stage 2 (1) 1 (2.9) 6 (15.8) 
Stage 2 7 (20.6) 23 (60.5) 
Transition Stage 2(3) 12 (35.3) 6 (15.8) 
Transition Stage 3(2) 8 (23.5) 3 (7.9) 
Stage 3 6 (17.6) 0 (0) 
Transition Stage 3(4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Transition Stage 4(3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Stage 4 0 (0) 0 (0) 
In terms of frequencies, this suggested that the majority of offenders with IDs fell into 
Stage 2(3) of Gibbs Sociomoral stages (Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992). 
Similarly, the majority of non-offenders with IDs fell into Stage 2 of Gibbs Sociomoral 
stages (Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992). 
3.3. Hypothesis 2  
3.3.1 Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant difference in problem solving 
between offenders and non-offenders with intellectual disabilities. Problem solving abilities 
of the IDO Group were significantly higher than the IDN Group when the SPSI-R-SF total 
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scores were compared, U = 463.50, z = -2.06, p = 0.020. This suggested that the IDO Group 
demonstrated better problem solving abilities than the IDN Group. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 
was supported.   
In order to understand this difference further, the sub-scores on the SPSI-R-SF were 
explored using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.01 per test (.05/5). The sub-scores that 
were included are Positive Problem Orientation (PPO), Negative Problem Orientation (NPO), 
Rational Problem Solving Style (RPS), Impulsive / Careless Problem Solving Style (ICS) and 
Avoidance Problem Solving Style (APS). The results indicated that there were significant 
differences for one of the SPSI-R-SF sub-scores (Table 20). For ICS, the IDO Group were 
significantly higher than the IDN Group, U = 370.00, z = -3.11, p = .001. There were no 
significant differences between the groups on NPO, U = 485.00, z = -1.82, p = .034; PPO, U 
= 508.50, z = -1.56, p = .060; RPS, U = 601.00, z = -0.51, p = .307; APS, U = 622.50, z = -
0.27, p = .397. Notably, the mean for the IDN Group was higher than the mean for IDO 
Group on APS. The mean for the IDO Group was higher than the mean for IDN Group on 
PPO.  
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3.4. Hypothesis 3 and 4 
Hypothesis 3 and 4 tested whether there was a significant relationship between moral 
reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs; and moral reasoning and problem 
solving ability for men with IDs. Four hypotheses were tested and these were reported below. 
All participants were included and there was no missing data. For Spearman’s rho, a small 
(0.1 > r >0.29), medium (0.3 > r >0.49), or strong (0.5 >r >1.0) correlation was deduced 
(Field, 2009, 2013).  
3.4.1 Hypothesis 3a: There will be a significant relationship between moral 
reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with intellectual disabilities. In Table 21, 
there was a significant relationship between the SRM-SF Global scores and HIT1 Total 
scores, r (72)= .380, p = .001. This result indicated a medium positive significant correlation 
between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs.  
Table 21 
Correlations between moral reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving 
Correlation Spearman’s Rho:  Full Sample (N=72) 
Spearman’s Rho: 
IDO Group (n=34) 
SRM-SF and HIT1 0.380 * -0.011  
SRM-SF and HIT2 0.214 * 0.060  
SRM-SF and SPSI-R-SF 0.419 *   0.310 * 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< .001 
A second analysis was conducted to explore the relationship between moral reasoning 
and the HIT2 Total scores (Table 21). There was a significant relationship between the SRM-
SF Global scores and HIT2 Total scores, r(72)= .214, p = .035. This result indicated a small 
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positive significant correlation between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men 
with IDs. In summary, there was a statistically significant positive relationship (small to 
medium) between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs. Therefore 
Hypothesis 3a was supported. 
3.4.2 Hypothesis 3b: Moral reasoning will correlate positively with cognitive 
distortions for offenders with intellectual disabilities. In Table 21, there was a non-
significant relationship between the SRM-SF Global scores and HIT1 Total scores for 
offenders with IDs, r(34) = -.011, p = .241. A second analysis was conducted to explore the 
relationship between moral reasoning and the HIT2 Total scores. There was a non-significant 
relationship between the SRM-SF Global scores and HIT2 Total scores for offenders with 
IDs, r(34) = .060, p = .369. In summary, moral reasoning was not positively correlated with 
cognitive distortions for offenders with IDs. Therefore Hypothesis 3b was not supported.  
3.4.3 Hypothesis 4a: There will be a significant relationship between moral 
reasoning and problem solving for men with intellectual disabilities. In Table 21, there 
was a significant relationship between the SRM-SF Global scores and the SPSI-R-SF Total 
scores, r(72) = .419, p = .000. This result indicated a medium positive significant correlation 
between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs. Therefore Hypothesis 4a 
was supported. 
3.4.4 Hypothesis 4b: Moral reasoning will correlate positively with problem 
solving for offenders with intellectual disabilities. In Table 21, there was a significant 
relationship between the SRM-SF Global scores and the SPSI-R-SF Total scores for 
offenders with IDs, r(34) = 0.310, p = .037. This result indicated a medium positive 
significant correlation between moral reasoning and problem solving for offenders with IDs. 
Therefore Hypothesis 4b was supported. 
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3.5 Basic Psychometric Properties of the HIT 
3.5.1 Psychometric Question 1a: Psychometric properties of the HIT will identify 
a medium to strong test-retest reliability and internal consistency with men who have 
intellectual disabilities.  Two analyses were computed for Psychometric Question 1a (Table 
22). The internal consistency and test-retest reliability was determined. For the total sample, 
the Cronbach’s alpha for the 54-item modified How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) was α = 
.81. This suggested that the modified HIT was found to have a good internal consistency 
when used with the IDN Group (54 items; α = .81). The Intra-class correlation co-efficient 
produced good test-retest reliability for the IDO Group (r = 0.81, p = .000). Therefore, 
Psychometric Question 1a was supported.  
Table 22 
Internal consistency and test-retest reliability for the modified How I Think Questionnaire   
Group Internal consistency Test-retest reliability 
Total Sample (N=72) 0.808* 0.808* 
IDO (n=34) 0.751* 0.751* 
IDN (n=38) 0.749* 0.749*  
* p<.05, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< .001 
3.5.1.1 Psychometric properties of the HIT for the two groups. This same analysis 
was repeated for each group (Table 22). For the IDO Group, the Cronbach’s alpha for the 54-
item modified How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) was α = .75. This suggested that the 
modified HIT was found to have a good internal consistency when used with the IDO Group 
(54 items; α = .75). The Intra-class correlation co-efficient produced good test-retest 
reliability for the IDO Group (r = 0.75, p = 0.000). For the IDO Group, the Cronbach’s alpha 
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for the 54-item modified How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) was α = .75. This suggested that 
the modified HIT was found to have a good internal consistency when used with the IDO 
Group (54 items; α = .75). The Intra-class correlation co-efficient produced good test-retest 
reliability for the IDO group (r = 0.75, p = 0.000). The results suggested that the modified 
version of the HIT demonstrated good internal consistency and good inter-rater reliability 
when used with the IDN Group and the IDO Group. These results were consistent with 
Psychometric Question 1a. 
3.5.2 Psychometric Question 1b: Offenders with intellectual disabilities will have 
significantly higher cognitive distortions than non-offenders.  In order for the HIT to be a 
psychometrically valid measure, it should discriminate between the IDO Group and the IDN 
Group. Analyses for the HIT1 and HIT2 were conducted to explore the difference between 
the groups (Table 23). For the HIT Total scores, the IDO Group had significantly higher 
cognitive distortions than the IDN Group at both Time 1, U = 191.00, z = -5.13, p = 0.000, 
and Time 2, U = 349.00, z = -3.35, p = 0.000. Therefore Psychometric Question 1b was 
supported.  
In order to understand this difference further, the sub-scores on the HIT1 and the 
HIT2 were explored using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of 0.005 per test (.05/11). The 
sub-scores that were included are Overt, Covert, Anomalous Responding, Self-Centred, 
Blaming Others, Minimisation / Mislabeling, Assuming the Worst, Oppositional Defiance, 
Physical Aggression, Lying and Stealing (Table 23). 
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For the HIT1 the IDO Group reported significantly higher scores on 10 of the sub-
scores when compared with the IDO Group; Overt, U = 257.00, z = -4.39, p = .000; Covert, 
U = 222.50, z = -4.79, p = .000; Self-Centred, U = 263.00, z = -4.33, p = .000; Blaming 
Others, U = 299.00, z = -3.93, p = .000; Minimisation / Mislabeling, U = 266.50, z = -4.30, p 
= .000; Assuming the Worst, U = 230.00, z = -4.71, p = .000; Oppositional Defiance, U = 
287.00, z = -4.06, p = .000; Physical Aggression, U = 266.50, z = -4.30, p = .000; Lying, U = 
261.50, z = -4.35, p = .000; and Stealing, U = 325.00, z = -3.63, p = .000. For the Anomalous 
Responding scores, the IDN Group reported significantly higher scores, U = 220.50, z= -4.81, 
p = 0.000. 
For the HIT2, the IDO Group reported significantly higher scores on 7 of the sub-
scores when compared with the IDO Group: Overt, U = 377.00, z = -3.04, p = .001; Covert, 
U = 359.00, z = -3.24, p = .001; Self-Centred, U = 315.00, z = -3.75, p = .000; Assuming the 
Worst, U = 342.50, z = -3.43, p = .000; Oppositional Defiance, U = 412.00, z = -2.65, p = 
.004; Physical Aggression, U = 363.00, z = -3.22, p = .001; and Lying, U = 319.00, z = -3.70, 
p = .000. There were no significant differences on 3 of the sub-scores: Blaming Others, U = 
446.00, z = -2.26, p = .012; Minimisation / Mislabeling, U = 459.00, z = -2.13, p = .017; 
Stealing, U = 509.50, z = -1.55, p = .062. For the Anomalous Responding scores, the IDN 
Group reported significantly higher scores, U = 332.00, z = -3.55, p = 0.000. 
3.5.2.1. Anomalous responding. The results indicated that there were significant 
differences between the two groups for Anomalous Responding on the HIT1 and the HIT2. 
Anomalous Responding was the only sub-score where the IDN Group was significantly 
higher than the IDO Group.  
According to the scoring manual, anomalous responses should be explored to 
determine whether the scores should be interpreted with caution. An Anomalous Responding 
score that is greater than 4 was considered to be suspect (i.e. subject to social desirability). 
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Using the manual, the cut-off score for excluding data was an Anomalous Responding score 
that was greater than 4.25. A score of 4.25 was approximately one standard deviation above 
the mean. Because the Likert scales were changed from 6-point scales to 4-point scales, the 
cut-off score of 4.25 could not be used. Therefore, for the current study, Anomalous 
Responding scores were explored to identify scores that were approximately one standard 
deviation above the mean. For the HIT1, using the total sample (M=4.77, SD=0.72), an 
Anomalous Responding score that was above 5.49 could be considered as suspect. Frequency 
charts were explored and 15 participants (20%) had Anomalous Responding scores that were 
above 5.49. For the HIT2, using the total sample (M=4.75, SD=0.74), an Anomalous 
Responding score that was above 5.49 could be considered as suspect. Frequency charts were 
explored and 16 participants (22%) had Anomalous Responding scores that were above 5.49. 
This suggested that approximately 22% of the total sample should have been excluded based 
on the Anomalous Responding scores. However, this would have been problematic for the 
other hypotheses and these participants were not excluded. This was also observed in 
Langdon et al. (2013) where participants with high Anomalous Responding scores were 
retained for their study. The Anomalous Responding scores highlighted the potential 
influence of social desirability, which would be discussed in the limitations section.  
In summary, the results indicated that the total scores for the HIT1 and HIT2 were 
significantly higher for the IDO Group, irrespective of their Anomalous Responding scores.  
This meant that the IDO Group presented with significantly greater levels of distorted 
cognitions, or in other words, offence supportive beliefs. This also suggested that the HIT 
was able to discriminate between offenders and non-offenders when the total scores were 
compared. This demonstrated discriminant validity and provided further support for 
Psychometric Question 1a.  
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3.6 Summary of Findings 
In the current chapter, there were six hypotheses and two psychometric questions. 
Hypothesis 1 explored the difference in moral reasoning between offenders with IDs and 
non-offenders with IDs.  The results indicated that there was a significant difference in moral 
reasoning when the IDO Group was compared with the IDN Group; that moral reasoning 
total scores were significantly higher for the IDO Group; and that the IDO Group scored 
significantly higher than the IDN Group on constructs of Contract, Life, Law and Legal 
Justice. The majority of the IDO Group (35.3%) fell into Transition Stage 2(3) and the 
majority of the IDN Group (60.5%) fell into Stage 2 of Gibbs Sociomoral stages (Gibbs, 
2003, 2010, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992). Hypothesis 1 was supported.  
Hypothesis 2 explored the difference in problem solving between offenders with IDs 
and non-offenders with IDs. For problem solving total scores, the IDO Group was 
significantly higher than the IDN Group. Therefore Hypothesis 2 was supported. Further 
analyses were conducted for the sub-scores of the SPSI-R-SF and these yielded more detailed 
results. The IDO Group reported significantly higher Impulsive / Careless Problem Solving 
Styles than the IDN Group. There were no significant differences between the two groups for 
Positive Problem Orientation, Negative Orientation, Rational Problem Solving Style or 
Avoidance Problem Solving Style. These results partially supported Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3a explored the relationship between moral reasoning and cognitive 
distortions for men with IDs. The results indicated that there was a small to medium 
significant positive relationship between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men 
with IDs, and Hypothesis 3a was supported. Hypothesis 3b explored this relationship with the 
IDO Group. The results were not consistent with Hypothesis 3a. Moral reasoning was not 
positively correlated with cognitive distortions for offenders with IDs. Hypothesis 3b was not 
supported. 
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Hypothesis 4a explored the relationship between moral reasoning and problem 
solving for men with IDs. The results indicated that there was a medium significant positive 
relationship between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs, and Hypothesis 
4a was supported. Hypothesis 4b explored this relationship with the IDO Group. Similar 
results were found. There was a medium significant positive relationship between moral 
reasoning and problem solving for offenders IDs, and Hypothesis 4b was supported. 
Psychometric Question 1a explored the basic psychometric properties of the HIT for 
men with IDs. The results indicated that the HIT demonstrated good internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability for use with men with IDs. Identical findings were found when the same 
analysis was conducted separately with the IDN and IDO groups. Psychometric Question 1a 
was supported.  
Psychometric Question 1b explored the difference in cognitive distortions between 
offenders and non-offenders with IDs. The results indicated that there were significant 
differences between the groups for cognitive distortions total scores; and that the IDO Group 
reported significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions on the HIT1 and HIT2 total 
scores. Psychometric Question 1b was supported.  
The results also indicated that the IDO Group reported significantly higher cognitive 
distortions on the following sub-scales when the HIT was completed on two separate 
occasions: Overt, Covert, Self-Centred, Assuming the Worst, Oppositional Defiance, 
Physical Aggression and Lying. Notably, when the HIT1 was completed the results indicated 
that the IDO Group reported significantly higher cognitive distortions on Blaming Others, 
Minimisation / Mislabelling and Stealing on the HIT1, and that these sub-scales were not 
significantly different when the HIT2 was completed. There was a significant difference in 
the Anomalous Responding scores when the two groups were compared. For both the HIT1 
and HIT2, the IDN Group Anomalous Responding scores were significantly higher than the 
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IDO Group. For approximately 22% of the sample the Anomalous Responding scores were 
above the threshold that was recommended by the manual. This presented a problem for 
Psychometric Question 1b and would be discussed in the next chapter.  
In summary, the HIT was modified for use with men with IDs and basic psychometric 
properties were supported (Psychometric Question 1a and 1b). This suggested that the 
modified HIT was a good psychometric instrument for use with ID populations that consisted 
of male offenders and non-offenders.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Overview of Chapter 
Within this chapter, an overview of the findings is presented. The findings are 
discussed in relation to the hypotheses. A methodological critique, followed by the 
theoretical and clinical implications for the study, is also presented. The chapter concludes 
with recommendations for future studies and a final conclusion. 
4.2 Summary of Results in Relation to the Hypotheses 
This study intended to explore the difference between moral reasoning and problem 
solving respectively, when comparing offenders and non-offenders with IDs; the relationship 
between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs and offenders with IDs; 
the relationship between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs and 
offenders with IDs; and the psychometric properties of an adapted cognitive distortions 
measure for use with men with IDs. The  hypotheses are discussed below and linked to 
previous research with ID populations. 
 4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Offenders with intellectual disabilities will have significantly 
higher moral reasoning than non-offenders. Previous studies highlighted that offenders 
with IDs had higher levels of moral reasoning when compared to non-offenders with IDs. 
More specifically, offenders with IDs were found to demonstrate Stage 2(3) reasoning and 
non-offenders with IDs were found to demonstrate Stage 2 reasoning (Langdon et al., 2011b, 
2013; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). Intelligence was related to higher levels of education 
and abstract thinking, which was linked to higher stages of moral reasoning (Farrington, 
1973, 2000, 2005; Goodman et al., 1995). Langdon et al. (2011a) suggested that IQ was 
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related to increased opportunities for socialisation and that this resulted in higher moral 
reasoning levels for offender with IDs. These studies provided the setting for the current 
study, which predicted that similar findings would be identified. More specifically, the 
current study predicted that offenders with IDs would demonstrate higher levels of reasoning 
when compared to non-offenders with IDs; and that ID offenders would demonstrate 
reasoning that was based upon moral justifications, understanding interactions, exchanges 
and instrumental needs. 
The findings for this study were consistent with three previous studies (Langdon et 
al., 2010a, 2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). When moral reasoning global scores were 
explored, offenders with IDs were reasoning at significantly higher levels when compared to 
non-offenders with IDs. The results appeared to support Langdon et al. (2011b)’s explanation 
that offenders with IDs were more ‘morally mature’ than non-offenders with IDs in the 
context of Gibbs Sociomoral Stages (Gibbs et al., 1992). Garrigan and Langdon (in press) 
suggested that offenders with IDs would engage in reasoning that involved meeting 
individual needs as opposed to lower reasoning stages that would be guided by rules or 
authority to avoid punishment or negative consequences. The premise here was that unilateral 
and physical authority acted as a protective factor for offending. An example of this was a 
response from a non-offender where they indicated that they would not steal because the 
“Police would catch you and put you in jail.”  These results suggested that the higher levels 
of immature moral reasoning were associated offending with behaviour. 
To explore this further, the moral reasoning construct scores were compared. Some 
studies have found that offenders with IDs reported higher reasoning scores on some of the 
constructs of the SRM-SF (Langdon et al., 2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). 
Specifically, offenders with IDs scored higher on the Contract, Life, Law and Legal Justice 
constructs. In the current study, offenders with IDs were reasoning at significantly higher 
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levels on the same constructs. Notably, the non-offenders reasoned at Stage 2 for these 
constructs while the offenders reasoned at Stage 2(3) for Contract and Law, and Stage 3(2) 
for Life and Legal Justice. This suggested that reasoning at lower stages (where decision-
making was based on authority and punishment) for Contract, Life, Law and Legal Justice 
was likely to prevent the non-offenders from engaging in criminal behaviour. These results 
supported previous studies where offenders with IDs were found to have higher scores on 
Law and Legal Justice in comparison to their non-offender counterparts (Langdon et al, 
2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). Therefore, higher stages on these constructs were 
characterised by egocentric thinking and difficulties with perspective taking and were linked 
with the offender group.  
Hypothesis 1 also explored the moral developmental stages for offenders and non-
offenders with IDs. The majority of offenders with IDs (35.5%) were reasoning at Stage 2(3) 
and the majority of non-offenders with IDs (60.5%) were reasoning in Stage (2). Langdon et 
al. (2013) also identified 2 participants in Stage 2(3) reasoning prior to engaging in a EQUIP 
programme. The same 2 participants later had transitioned into Stage 3(2) following the 
EQUIP programme, which suggested that participants who engaged in treatment could 
potentially score in a much higher level than the other studies identified (Langdon et al., 
2011b; McDermott & Langdon, 2014). Similar findings were also observed in the current 
study where 17.6% of offenders with IDs were reasoning at Stage 3(2). 
Typically in Stage 2(3), behaviours could include individualistic perspective taking 
and interactions that were congruent with meeting one’s own needs or interests. However, 
Stage 2(3) excluded mutual and prosocial perspective taking, which according to Garrigan 
and Langdon (in press), made them more vulnerable to increased illegal and antisocial 
behaviours. Secondly, mutual relationships would be observed in Stage 3 (Gibbs et al., 1992) 
and would act as a protective factor for avoiding illegal behaviour because moral 
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justifications were based on empathy, good conduct and other prosocial interactions. 
McDermott and Langdon (2014) suggested that Transition Stage 2(3) could represent the 
middle stage of moral reasoning and introduce a higher risk of anti-social and/or illegal 
behaviour (Blasi, 1980).    
It was also noted that current or previous psychological treatment could influence 
moral reasoning scores for the IDO Group. This could explain why 6 offenders with IDs were 
in Stage 3 reasoning (17.6%; n=34) and would be consistent with Langdon et al. (2013)’s 
findings where 2 offenders with IDs transitioned into Stage 3(2) reasoning following a 
psychological intervention. In summary Hypothesis 1 was supported and has been identified 
in previous studies. The occurrence of consistent results across these studies has started to 
provide reliable results, which suggested that offenders with IDs would reason at Stage 2(3) 
when using Gibbs Sociomoral Stages (Gibbs, 2003; Gibbs, 2010; Gibbs et al., 1992). 
Hypothesis 1 was therefore accepted. 
 4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: There will be a significant difference in problem solving 
between offenders and non-offenders with intellectual disabilities. Problem solving was 
linked with moral development (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004). In the current study, Hypothesis 
1 identified Stage 2(3) reasoning for offenders with IDs. Stage 2(3) reasoning included moral 
justifications based on understandings that developed following social interactions. D’Zurilla 
et al. (2004) suggested that offending behaviour was related to poor problem solving while 
Garrigan and Langdon (in press) suggested that the problematic behaviours were linked with 
social problem solving. They argued that ongoing social experiences presented the 
opportunity for social perspective taking which helped spur on moral and cognitive 
development leading to increasing problem solving ability.  For this reason, a series of 
negative experiences were problematic and resulted in problem solving difficulties. Given 
that offenders with IDs were found to reason at higher stages and reported fewer physical 
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disabilities than non-offenders with IDs, they were more likely to engage in more social 
experiences where they would be faced with having to solve problems on a daily basis. 
Therefore, problem-solving abilities for offenders with IDs would be higher than non-
offenders with IDs. 
Offenders with IDs were also likely to be engaging in psychological therapy that was 
related to their index offence.  Some of the treatment would have included basic problem 
solving skills, which would have improved their problem solving ability. This was supported 
by Langdon et al. (2013) when they identified that problem-solving abilities increased 
following participation in the adapted EQUIP programme. However, as previously 
mentioned, Langdon et al. (2013)’s findings should be treated cautiously because they used a 
small sample size and their results were based on only 3 participants in their sample. Lindsay 
et al. (2011) also found that offenders with IDs problem solving abilities improved following 
a pilot evaluation of the SPORT programme. Their study indicated that offenders with IDs 
demonstrated significant improvements in Positive Problem Orientation, Impulsive/Careless 
and Avoidant Problem Solving Styles. Therefore, because the IDO participants in the current 
study were in a secure service (and most likely engaging in some type of psychological 
intervention) it was hypothesised that they would demonstrate higher problem solving 
abilities when compared to the IDN Group.  
For clarity, high scores on the total score and adaptive scales, which were the PPO 
and RPO, suggested a positive and effective problem solving style, while high scores on the 
dysfunctional scales, which were the NPO, ICS and AS, suggested the presence of defective 
problem-solving strategies. The results for the current study indicated that the total problem 
solving scores for the IDO Group were significantly higher when compared to the IDN 
Group. This suggested that the IDO Group had significantly better problem solving abilities 
and was consistent with improved levels of problem solving as found by Lindsay et al. 
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(2011). However, in terms of the SPSI-R-SF scoring manual, both groups were still within 
the ‘extremely below the norm group average’ which was indicated when both the mean 
scores for each group was below 55 (D’Zurilla et al., 2002). This suggested that both groups 
experienced significant difficulties with problem solving when compared to a non-ID 
population. Similar findings were also identified in Basquill et al. (2004). It was possible that 
the IDO Group’s current environment was modelling effective problem solving strategies on 
a day to day basis, and that they were reporting their problem solving ability based on 
‘seeking help from staff’ on a secure unit.     
In order to understand the difference in problem solving ability, comparisons were the 
made using the sub-scores of the problem solving measure. The results indicated that there 
was a significant difference in Impulsive / Careless Problem Solving Style, where the scores 
for the IDO Group were higher than the IDN Group. A high score on this scale indicated 
higher levels of dysfunctional problem solving. The mean scores for Impulsive / Careless 
Problem Solving Style for the IDO Group were similar to the mean scores for the same sub-
score at the midpoint in Lindsay et al. (2011)’s study. In a comparative context, this 
suggested that offenders with IDs were responding in the same way as offenders in the 
‘middle’ of treatment. It could be argued that their problem solving abilities might have been 
different had they have been recruited into the study prior to their offence. Nonetheless, this 
difference was important as it suggested that impulsivity and carelessness differentiated the 
two groups when the problem solving sub-scores were compared.  The Impulsive / Careless 
Problem Solving Style is a dysfunctional problem solving style that is characterised by 
impulsive attempts to respond to problems. According to D’Zurilla et al. (2002), individuals’ 
that rated highly on this sub-score processed information too quickly, which resulted in few 
solutions being considered and the possibility that they could become upset or frustrated. 
This is a crucial finding that can be used to inform interventions with offenders with IDs. 
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There were no significant differences between the groups for Positive Problem 
Orientation Negative Problem Orientation, Rational Problem Solving Style and Avoidance 
Problem Solving Style. For the IDO Group, the mean scores for PPO, NPO, RPO and APS 
for the IDO Group were similar to Lindsay et al. (2011).  However, these similarities were 
varied as they could only be compared with scores across various points of Lindsay et al. 
(2011)’s study, making it challenging to compare the current study’s results. Given that 
Lindsay et al. (2011) did not include non-offenders with IDs, it was not possible to compare 
the problem solving scores for the non-offenders in the current study.  
In summary, the results of the current study suggested that offenders with IDs were 
more likely to act impulsively and become frustrated or upset when dealing with problems, 
putting them at risk of ineffective problem solving or pro-offending responses (i.e. 
responding aggressively). This highlighted the link with offending behaviours. The current 
study also identified how offenders with IDs were more likely to engage in limited and 
impulsive problem solving strategies, which could potentially result in poor ‘response 
selection.’  This was consistent with faulty information processing and cue interpretation 
(Crick & Didge, 1994, 1996), which also resulted in poor social experiences and ultimately 
moral schema deficits. Ultimately the study highlighted that men with IDs did not 
demonstrate effective problem solving and that offenders with IDs were more likely to be 
impulsive and frustrated when they encountered problems. In conclusion, Lindsay et al. 
(2011b) were the only study that used the adapted version of the SPSI-R-SF for men with 
IDs. Therefore comparisons with other studies using the SPSI-R-SF (original version) were 
limited. Given that their study used a small sample size (n=10), further studies with 
adequately sized samples are required to generalise the results for the current study. For this 
reason, studies with offenders and non-offenders with IDs were required to replicate these 
conclusions. 
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4.2.3 Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b: There would be a significant relationship 
between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with intellectual disabilities. 
Hypothesis 3 was divided into two hypotheses, which explored the relationship between 
moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs (Hypothesis 3a); and for 
offenders with IDs (Hypothesis 3b). Langdon et al. (2011b) conducted a study where they 
identified cognitive distortions in a sample of men with IDs. Previous research found that 
cognitive distortions were also identified in studies with offenders with IDs (Barriga et al., 
2000; Gibbs et al., 1995; Hudson, 2005; Langdon et al., 2011a; Langdon et al., 2011b; 
Murphy, 1990; Ward et al., 1997).  Gibbs (1993) suggested that cognitive dissonance was 
when cognitive distortions protected an offender from blame and the consequences of their 
behaviour. Therefore, offenders were able to engage in offending behaviour as a result of 
their cognitive distortions. Cognitive distortions were also described as egocentric thinking, 
which was identified in Stage 2 reasoning (Gibbs, 2003; Gibbs, 2010; Gibbs et al., 1992).  
Garrigan and Langdon (in press) hypothesised that moral reasoning was related to 
cognitive distortions. They proposed that cognitive distortions were a product of egocentric 
bias, which was associated with a moral developmental delay. Therefore, development was 
affected by experiences, which lead to moral developmental delays and cognitive distortions.  
For Hypothesis 3a, a statistical analysis revealed that there was a small to medium 
significant positive relationship between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men 
with IDs. Hypothesis 3a was supported. These findings supported the theoretical relationship 
between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 2003, 2010; Hoffman, 2000; 
Langdon et al., 2011a). Hypothesis 3b explored the same relationship with offenders with 
IDs. A statistical analysis did not reveal a significant relationship and Hypothesis 3b was not 
supported. It was possible that Hypothesis 3b was not supported due to the limited variability 
of the mean scores on both measures in the IDO Group and the small sample size (n=34). 
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In summary, the current study confirmed that there was a small to medium significant 
relationship between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs. Given the 
positive relationship between moral reasoning and illegal behaviour among young offenders 
(Blasi, 1980; Stams et al., 2006), this finding was important as it suggested that psychological 
interventions with men with IDs could potentially focus on this relationship. Similar findings 
were found using a sample of non-ID incarcerated delinquents in Sweden, where a small 
correlation (r=0.28) was found between the SRM-SF and the HIT (Larden, Melin, Holst, & 
Langstrom, 2005). Because Hypothesis 3b was not supported this relationship should be 
explored with a larger sample of offenders with IDs. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b: There would be a significant relationship 
between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with intellectual disabilities. 
Hypothesis 4 was divided into two hypotheses, which explored the relationship between 
moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs (Hypothesis 4a); and for offenders 
with IDs (Hypothesis 4b). Problem solving was described as a cognitive developmental 
process that involved executive functioning, memory and information processing (Ferretti & 
Cavalier, 1991; Short & Evans, 1990). Garrigan and Langdon (in press) suggested that 
information processing became more effective through ongoing social experiences where 
moral judgements were made more often. In this context it was hypothesised that moral 
reasoning and problem solving would be positively correlated. Recent studies demonstrated 
how problem solving abilities improved following a problem solving intervention programme 
with offenders with IDs that had been incarcerated for violent and sexual offences (Lindsay 
et al., 2011a; N=10). However Lindsay et al. (2011b)’s study was a pilot and limited due to 
the small sample size and the difficulty of generalising the results to the wider ID population. 
Lindsay et al. (2011) suggested that an amended version of SPSI-R-SF would be a suitable 
measure for use with an ID population. 
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For Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b, a statistical analysis found a medium 
significantly positive relationship between moral reasoning and problem solving for men with 
IDs, and offenders with IDs. The results suggested that there was a positive relationship when 
using an adequate sample size, which was an improvement following Lindsay et al. (2011)’s 
study. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b were supported. 
These findings were consistent with the theoretical relationship between moral 
reasoning and problem solving where McMurran and McGuire (2005) suggested that 
problem solving was related to goal directed behaviour, which activated reasoning ability. 
Given that men in the current study demonstrated immature moral reasoning (Hypothesis 1) 
and below average problem solving ability (Hypothesis 2), the findings also corresponded 
with Palmer (2003, 2005) where moral reasoning was linked with poor decision-making.  
In summary, the current study was a preliminary investigation of the relationship 
between moral reasoning and problem solving using an adapted problem solving and 
cognitive distortions measures and an adequate sample size. Significant relationships were 
identified. A detailed discussion regarding the theoretical implications of these findings was 
discussed in the next section. 
4.2.5 Psychometric Questions. Two psychometric questions were tested in this 
study. 
4.2.5.1 Psychometric Question 1a: An adapted version of the HIT will demonstrate 
a medium to strong test-retest reliability and internal consistency with men who have 
intellectual disabilities. The aim of Psychometric Question 1a was to examine the basic 
psychometric properties of a cognitive distortions measure (HIT) for use with men with IDs.  
It was predicted that a modified version of the HIT would demonstrate a medium to strong 
test-retest reliability and internal consistency. According to Barriga et al. (2001), the HIT 
demonstrated excellent internal consistency ranging from α=0.93 to α=0.96 using a sample of 
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incarcerated adolescents. Similar psychometric properties were reported in a second study 
(Gina & Pozzoli, 2012). However, its use with an ID population was a relatively novel 
phenomenon. Only two studies appeared to use the HIT with an ID population (Langdon et 
al., 2011b; Langdon et al., 2013). Given its limited use with an ID population, the current 
study hypothesised that it would be a psychometrically sound measure if some minor 
amendments were made for it to be used with an ID population. Permission was obtained 
from the distributors of the HIT and amendments were made in order to adapt the wording 
for an ID population. In addition, the Likert scales were also amended to contain less scale-
points and visual analogue scales were used. The results were interpreted using the 
recommendations of McDowell (2006). Notably, Langdon et al. (2010a) used the McDowell 
recommendations in a previous study, where they explored the psychometric properties of a 
different measure, which was also used with an ID population. 
The results of the current study indicated that the amended version of the HIT was 
found to have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability for men with IDs. 
Psychometric Question 1a was supported. Identical findings were reported when the same 
analysis was conducted with the IDO Group and the IDN Group individually. The study 
concluded that the amended HIT was a suitable measure for use with men with IDs. 
4.2.5.2 Psychometric Question 1b: Offenders with intellectual disabilities will have 
significantly higher cognitive distortions than non-offenders. In order for the HIT to be a 
psychometrically valid measure, it should discriminate between offenders and non-offenders 
with IDs. Therefore, the aim of Psychometric Question 1b was to explore the difference in 
cognitive distortions between the two groups. Some studies have found that offenders with 
IDs endorsed various cognitive distortions, (Broxholme and Lindsay, 2003; Langdon et al, 
2013; Lindsy & Michie, 2004) but that this needed to be explored further (Hudson, 2005). In 
a different study Jahoda, Pert and Trower (2006) found that cognitive deficits were related to 
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offending behaviour in a sample of offenders with IDs. Gibbs (2003) suggested that self-
serving cognitive distortions lead to offending behaviour when there were moral 
developmental delays. Notably, in the current study, moral developmental delays for the IDO 
Group were identified in Hypothesis 1. Therefore, offenders with IDs were hypothesised to 
report higher levels of cognitive distortions than their non-offender counterparts. 
The results of the current study indicated that offenders with IDs reported 
significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions when the total scores were compared with 
non-offenders for the HIT1 and HIT2. This finding supported Psychometric Question 1b as 
the HIT1 and HIT2 total scores were able to differentiate offenders and non-offenders with 
IDs. However, when the sub-scores of the HIT1 and HIT2 were compared, the results 
suggested that not all the cognitive distortions sub-scores were significantly different. The 
results also indicated that the IDO Group reported significantly higher cognitive distortions 
on the Overt, Covert, Self-Centred, Assuming the Worst, Oppositional Defiance, Physical 
Aggression and Lying sub-scales when the HIT was completed on two separate occasions. 
This was consistent with Gibbs (1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995) typology of self-serving 
cognitive distortions. The results suggested that these cognitive distortions differentiated the 
offenders from the non-offenders. Therefore, offenders with IDs were processing information 
according to their own views, expectations and needs which would disregard others’ needs 
and legitimise offending behaviour. Furthermore, this also indicated that offenders with IDs 
were attributing hostile intentions to others, which could also legitimise offending behaviour. 
According to Gibbs (2010) these cognitive distortions indicated an egocentric bias with 
egoistic motives resulting in immature moral development. 
The mean for Lying and Oppositional Defiance were the highest sub-scales for the 
IDO Group on the HIT1 and HIT2.  Notably, the mean scores for the same sub-scales were 
also the highest for the IDN Group. This suggested that the mean score for Lying and 
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Oppositional Defiance were the highest for both groups and that the severity of these 
cognitive distortions appeared to differentiate the two groups in the context of offending 
behaviour. 
For the IDO Group, the mean scores for Lying and Oppositional Defiance were not 
compared to Langdon et al. (2011b) because the Likert scales had been changed in the 
current study. However, the baseline scores on these constructs of the HIT were also in the 
‘top group’ for Langdon et al. (2011b)’s study. This was a crude descriptive comparison. 
However, it suggested that the severity of these cognitive distortions were relevant in the 
context of whether someone with an ID engaged in offending behaviour. Lying and 
Oppositional Defiance are behavioural referents. According to Gibbs (1991), these are also 
secondary cognitive distortions, which serve to neutralise guilt or reduce distress when 
engaging in illegal behaviour. Gibbs (1991) suggested that lying or blaming others acted as 
mechanisms for neutralising guilt when engaging in illegal behaviour.   
However, there were some factors that made interpreting the results slightly 
problematic. The Anomalous Responding scores indicated that approximately 22% of the 
sample had scored above one standard deviation from the mean, which suggested that they 
were not suitable for the analysis. This highlighted the effect of social desirability. Because 
participants in the IDO Group were currently in custodial facilities, it was possible that they 
responded to items on the HIT in a socially desirable manner when they first completed the 
measure. All participants responded verbally to items on the HIT, which was designed to be a 
self-rated written measure. For this reason they might have changed their responses to be 
more socially acceptable. For example, one question asked respondents to indicate their 
agreement to a statement, which read: “Everyone breaks the law, it’s no big deal.” The 
majority of participants (59%) in the IDO Group disagreed with this statement despite long 
histories of offending. Significantly higher Anomalous Responding scores for the IDN Group 
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could be understood by relating their responses to lower moral developmental stages where 
they were guided by unilateral authority. Therefore lower stage reasoning served as a 
protective factor. Similar Anomalous Responding score issues were highlighted in Langdon 
et al. (2011b) where they included participants when their scores were above the cut-off.  
These were important findings because they related to future clinical implications that 
would be discussed in the limitations section. In summary, the findings in this study 
supported the findings in previous studies, namely that offenders with IDs presented with 
higher cognitive distortions when compared to their non-offending counterparts. 
Psychometric Question 1b was supported. Self-serving cognitive distortions were identified 
for the IDO Group was consistent with Gibbs typology of self-serving cognitive distortions  
(1991; 1993).  The findings suggested that the HIT was able to differentiate between 
offenders and non-offenders with IDs, which also supported Psychometric Question 1a. 
4.3 Theoretical Implications 
The literature highlighted numerous methodological limitations in previous studies, 
which were conducted with ID populations (Langdon et al., 2010b; Langdon et al., 2011a). 
At present, there appeared to be a need to explore different constructs and theoretical models 
that could be useful when working with offenders with IDs. Previous studies suggested that 
moral reasoning theory could be used to understand offending behaviour with ID populations 
(Langdon, 2010a, 2011b, 2013). With young offenders in particular, there were links between 
moral reasoning and offending behaviour (Stams et al., 2006). Langdon et al. (2010b; 2011a) 
provided an overview of the literature relating to moral development for people with IDs. 
Some of the key points in their overview suggested that: 
 Piagetian and Kohlbergian theories of moral reasoning were limited due to 
their focus on childhood and strict hierarchical models of moral development; 
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 Immature moral reasoning was related to cognitive distortions (Palmer, 
2003); 
 Developmental delays in moral judgement contributed to cognitive 
distortions, social skills deficits and poor problem solving (Gibbs, 2003, 
2013);  
 Stage 2, which included Stage 2(3) reasoning was associated with self serving 
cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 1991, 1993; Gibbs et al., 1995); 
 People with IDs experienced moral reasoning delays and were more likely to 
reason in lower levels of Gibbs Sociomoral Stages; 
 Future research with ID populations should focus on development and design 
aspects of effective measures for moral reasoning; 
 And previous studies with ID populations were laden with methodological 
complications, creating the necessity to re-explore this population group with 
robust methodological designs. 
In addition to these key points, Langdon et al. (2010b) concluded that the life 
experience of people with IDs had changed significantly since many of the previous studies 
with ID populations took place. For example, ID populations would not have had the right to 
education and this could have affected their ability to develop appropriate problem solving 
skills. They highlighted several theoretical developments within the field of moral reasoning 
and that an ‘update’ was needed. Within this context, Garrigan and Langdon (in press) 
proposed an updated theoretical model, which integrated moral development, cognition and 
problem solving. For this reason, their model along with Gibbs Sociomoral Stage model 
(Gibbs et al., 1992) was used as a theoretical framework for the current study. 
Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s Developmental Social Information Processing 
Model of Moral Judgement and Behaviour suggested that several factors were involved in 
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moral development. Their model was described in Chapter 1 and would not be replicated in 
detail. For clarity, the model consisted of two ‘circles that orbit around each other.’ The outer 
cycle represented the steps that occurred when an individual was faced with a social problem 
that required action, which was considered more proximal. The inner circle represented the 
more distal higher order constructs, which developed over time and influenced the more 
proximal steps. Garrigan and Langdon proposed that as the distal higher order constructs 
developed, proximal constructs (i.e. cognition), affect and decision-making became 
increasingly mature. They also suggested that there was some evidence using children and 
adults with IDs that supported their theory (Brugman & Bink, 2010; DiBiase, 2010; Gibbs et 
al., 1996; Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2005; van Nieuwenhuijzen, Orobio de Castro, Wijnroks, 
Vermeer, & Matthys, 2004, van Nieowenhuijzen & Vriens, 2012). Their model included 
theories related to moral development (Gibbs et al., 2013) and problem solving (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994, 1996; Dodge, 1980). In terms of the theoretical implications, each hypothesis 
was discussed in the context of Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s model and Gibbs 
Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992). 
For Hypothesis 1, the results of the current study suggested that ID offenders 
reasoned at Stage 2(3) of Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory and that they reasoned at 
significantly higher levels when compared to non-offenders with IDs, who reasoned at Stage 
2. For the full sample, men with IDs demonstrated immature reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992). 
This finding supported Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory, where Langdon et al. (2011b) 
suggested that offenders reasoned higher than Stage 1 because they would not appeal to 
unilateral or physicalastic consequences (i.e. following rules and avoiding punishment), and 
would be more motivated by their own needs and justifications based on social interactions.  
Hypothesis 2 indicated that offenders with IDs were significantly better at problem 
solving. This finding was consistent with McMurran and McGuire (2005). The full sample 
 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
 127
was in the ‘extremely below norm group average’ range. This suggested that men with IDs 
did not demonstrate effective problem solving abilities in general and supports Garrigan and 
Langdon’s model. The offenders demonstrated difficulties with NPO and ICS, which 
suggested that they experienced difficulties with problem orientation in D’Zurilla and 
Goldfried’s five-stage model of problem solving (1971). In terms of Garrigan and Langdon’s 
model (in press), men with IDs in the current study demonstrated immature reasoning and 
demonstrated poor problem solving abilities as highlighted in the ‘outer circle’ of their 
model. Poor problem solving was linked to social information processing (Dodge, 1986, 
1994, 1996; Dodge & Price, 1994). Garrigan and Langdon (in press) suggested that social 
information processing was problematic for people with IDs because social information 
processing relied on moral development (‘database’). In this context, Hypothesis 2 was 
supported by D’Zurilla and Goldfried’s five-stage, Garrigan and Langdon’s model (in 
presss), and Gibbs Sociomoral Stages (Gibbs et al., 1992). 
Hypothesis 3a identified a positive significant relationship between moral reasoning 
and cognitive distortions for men with IDs. This finding was also supported by Garrigan and 
Langdon (in press)’s model. They suggested that moral development would be influenced by 
cognition, which involved perspective taking and social information processing. In their 
model, Step 1 was where information could be encoded erroneously and result in cognitive 
distortions. Therefore, men with IDs demonstrated immature reasoning (Hypothesis 1) and it 
was expected that they would report cognitive distortions. Hypothesis 3b was not supported 
and no significant relationship was identified between moral reasoning and cognitive 
distortions for offenders with IDs. Issues related to small sample size, social desirability and 
score variability made it challenging to relate this finding to theoretical implications. 
Hypothesis 4a identified a positive significant relationship between moral reasoning 
and problem solving for men with IDs. This finding was supported by Garrigan and Langdon 
 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
 128
(in press)’s model as they suggested that moral maturity (i.e. database) would be related with 
the ability to perform tasks, which also involved information processing. Therefore, 
immature moral development (i.e. Stage 2 and Stage 2/3) was related to problem solving 
difficulties (i.e. extremely below the norm group average) for men with IDs. Similar findings 
were found with offenders with IDs. This was consistent with Garrigan and Langdon (in 
press) as they suggested that as a consequence of higher moral maturity, individuals would be 
better at tasks that involved information processing and visa versa. Notably, the IDO Group 
was significantly better at problem solving (i.e. using the problem solving total scores) and 
demonstrated higher moral developmental stages than the IDN Group.   
Psychometric Question 1a and 1b were related to the psychometric properties of the 
HIT. The findings suggested that the HIT demonstrated good internal consistency and test-
retest reliability for men with IDs. These hypotheses were not directly related to any theory, 
as they assessed the psychometric properties of the HIT. Psychometric Question 1b was also 
related to the psychometric properties as the findings suggested that the HIT total scores 
could discriminate between offenders and non-offenders with IDs; and cognitive distortions 
were significantly higher for offenders with IDs. This finding supported Gibbs typology of 
self-serving cognitive distortions, which suggested that immature moral development was 
causal with respect to self-serving cognitive distortions, which would increase the probability 
of criminal behaviour. There was equal support for Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s model 
where they proposed that moral development would be influenced by perspective taking. 
Given that cognitive distortions involved perspective taking and that offenders demonstrated 
immature reasoning,  their model supported the finding where offenders with IDs 
demonstrated significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions.   
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4.4 Methodological Evaluation  
This section considered the results of the current study in the context of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the methodology, design, statistical analysis and limitations of the 
measures.  
4.4.1 Strengths and limitations. The hand search method was used to explore the 
literature for the study. This approach was used following an initial attempt to identify 
articles using a traditional systematic literature review, which was unsuccessful due to the 
nature of the articles.  The articles were reviewed based on their methodology and their link 
to moral reasoning, cognitive distortions or problem solving. This was done to demonstrate 
the limited number of peer-reviewed articles for offenders with IDs relating to the current 
study. However, this was a limitation for the current study. This process could have been 
strengthened by using the Critical Appraisal Skills Checklist (CASP), which explores the 
quality, clinical utility, benefits and the review question prior to selecting articles for review. 
The benefits of using the CASP is recomened for further reviews and could also prevent any 
bias during the critical appraisal process. 
4.4.1.1 Design, method and analysis. This study used a between groups design with 
additional correlations. Substantial proportions of the data were not normally distributed. 
Attempts to transform the data were unsuccessful because some of the data was skewed. 
Therefore non-parametric data analyses were applied throughout. There were three main 
reasons for this. First, attempts to transform the data were not successful. Second, there was a 
potential risk of transforming the data in order to obtain a significant result (Howell, 2007). 
Third, Grissom (2000) reported that the means of transformed variables could occasionally 
reverse the differences of means of the original variables. Notably, this was also a limitation 
of the study and in hindsight could have been pursued further. 
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Hypothesis 1,2, and Psychometric Question 1b used a between-subjects cross-
sectional design with Mann Whitney U tests. The benefits of this design were that 
comparisons could be made between two groups. For between-subjects designs there needed 
to be a clear group classification criteria. This study used offence history as a main 
discriminative group variable. A key requirement for between-subjects designs was that 
groups needed to be homogenous. Therefore, a demographics questionnaire was used to 
explore descriptive data between the two groups. Notably, the groups were not significantly 
different on the FSIQ variable, which meant that the variable did not need to be controlled 
during the analysis. The groups were different on the Age variable. However, because of the 
skewness of the data, parametric analyses were not used and age was not controlled during 
the analyses. A second measure to address the homogeneity of the sample was to use tests of 
normality and equivalence. Returning to Hypothesis 1, 2, and Psychometric Question 1b, 
significant differences were detected between the groups on moral reasoning, problem 
solving and cognitive distortions. No relationships were inferred between these variables. 
This suggested that a between-groups design was suitable for Hypothesis 1, 2, and 
Psychometric Question 1b. 
Hypothesis 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b used a cross-sectional correlational design with 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients. The strength of this design was that data could be 
collected at a single point, which limited the potential for participants to drop out. There were 
also some disadvantages when using cross-sectional correlational designs. Correlations did 
not allow for causality, as correlations indicated the strength and direction of a relationship 
between two variables (Clark-Carter, 2010). Therefore, the only conclusions that were drawn 
were related to relationships between variables. Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b did not make 
any causal inferences. However, the inability to infer a causal relationship was a weakness of 
the correlational design. A second limitation of the correlational design was that it captured 
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participants’ experiences ‘on the day.’ This was addressed through using measures that 
specifically asked participants to respond based on their experiences over the last 4 weeks. 
The use of cross-sectional correlational designs was appropriate, as the relationship and 
strength between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions, and moral reasoning and 
problem solving were reported.  
The study used correlations to explore the degree of the associations between moral 
reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving. Hypotheses were formed based on 
Gibbs Sociomoral Stage theory (Gibbs et al., 1992). Towards the final stages of the study, the 
Garrigan and Langdon model was made available. This is an unpublished article that was not 
peer reviewed at the time the study took place. Therefore the current study was not focused 
entirely on the Garrigan and Langdon (in press) model but references were made in relation 
to it. This is a limitation as the predictive nature of the Garrigan and Langdon (in press) 
model could have been explored and an alternative statistical analysis could have been 
considered to explore the predictive ability of some of the variables in the model (e.g. the 
ability of problem solving to predict immature moral development and offending behaviour). 
Ordinal and multinomial regression could have been used to examine predictors of different 
patterns of trajectories for the Garrigan and Langdon (in press) model. Regression analyses 
were not used in the current study because the hypotheses were not focused on exploring one-
way causal effects from one variable to another. Furthermore large sample sizes have been 
suggested for ordinal and multinomial regression. Taylor, West and Aiken (2006) suggest 
that to achieve 80% power, a logistic regression model with three categories required a 
sample size ranging from 249 to 461. Such large sample sizes were not possible for the 
current study. In future, larger studies could focus on the predictive nature of moral 
reasoning, cognitive distortions and problem solving using the Garrigan and Langdon (in 
press) model. 
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Psychometric Question 1a used Cronbach’s alpha and Intraclass correlations. The 
benefit of using these analyses was to eliminate individual differences that may have 
occurred when using independent groups (Howitt & Cramer, 2011). Therefore, factors such 
as FSIQ, age, and demographic variables remained the same. Another benefit was that it 
required fewer participants than cross-sectional designs (Field, 2009, 2013) and this was 
particularly attractive given the difficulties that were identified when recruiting ID 
populations (Lindsay, 2002). A third benefit was the ability to explore test-retest reliability 
and consistency of measures which is a recognised method of assessing basic psychometric 
characteristics (Clark-Carter, 2010; Field, 2009, 2013).  
However, as with all designs, there were also limitations for repeated-measures 
designs. Firstly, not all factors were measured in the first instance. It was impossible to 
measure every aspect of each and every participant (i.e. motivation). Therefore, for 
Psychometric Question 1a, some participants could have changed their responses between 
Time 1 and Time 2. Examples of this could be that they trusted the researcher since meeting 
them at Time 1 and that they provided more accurate responses at Time 2; or that they were 
more motivated because they would be paid for participating immediately after Time 2. 
Alternatively, there could be other unknown personality or motivational factors that could 
have influenced their response patterns for Time 1 and Time 2. Clark-Carter (2010) 
suggested that order effects and carry-over effects contributed to participant responses in 
repeated-measure designs. Order effects occurred when a participant became ‘better’ at 
answering the Time 2 questionnaire because they learnt the answers at Time 1. Carry-over 
effects occurred when a participant remembered their answer from Time 1, rather than 
providing an answer that was more accurate. There were two ways of countering against 
order effects. The first was to randomise the order and the second was to use 
counterbalancing. Neither of these countering techniques was used as it was not possible to 
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randomise participants and changing the order would not have mattered because data was 
only collected twice. This was a limitation for Psychometric Question 1a. In an attempt to 
control carry-over effects, the study was very strict about seeing each participant exactly two 
weeks apart. Increasing the delay between data collection points was a recognised strategy to 
minimise carry-over effects (Clark-Carter, 2010). 
4.4.1.2 Sample, size and recruitment. The sample consisted of 72 adults with mild to 
moderate IDs. These were split into two groups of offenders (n=34) and non-offenders 
(n=38). The groups were ‘close to being equal.’ A clinical sample was used and this 
increased the ability to generalise the results to an ID population. One limitation is that the 
sample was a convenience sample and this introduced the possibility of bias. The issue of 
convenience sampling was challenging and other studies with ID offenders have also relied 
on this method of sampling due to the ethical and practical challenges of recruiting 
participants from ID populations (Langdon et al., 2011b; Langdon et al., 2013; McDermott & 
Langdon, 2014; Lindsay et al., 2011a). This study was not able to maneuver its way around 
this challenge, and it is a limitation and an ongoing issue for studies with offenders with IDs. 
A further limitation was identified in hindsight and was related to the absence of data on the 
location of recruitment for the IDN group. Further studies could include this in the 
demographic questionnaire. 
Sex was an exclusion criterion and was also not considered in the demographics 
questionnaire. Only men with IDs were included. A limitation of the current study relates to 
sex differences. Gilligan (1982) suggests that men and women are different in their moral 
reasoning styles. Men are said to be justice orientated and women care orientated. 
McDermott and Langdon (2014) found no differences between moral development when 
comparing men and women and this contradicts Gilligan’s findings. This suggests that the 
findings in the current study might be relevant to male and female ID populations.  
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A power calculation was used to determine the sample size prior to the recruitment. 
This calculation indicated that 52 participants were required and the sample size was 
achieved. The overall power would have increased if more participants could have been 
recruited, in particular if more participants could have been recruited for Hypothesis 3a and 
4a. However, the recruitment period was beyond 6 months and this highlighted the timeous 
task of recruiting participants from an ID population.  
In terms of the recruitment, the study used 3 researchers to collect data. This was a 
major strength as the required sample size was collected. For the IDO Group, recruitment 
was conducted through secure units across the East of England. Therefore, recruitment 
involved a substantial amount of travelling. Furthermore, these secure units were often 
‘tucked away’ in rural locations that could be over 40 miles away from the base of the 
researcher. It would have been very near impossible for a single researcher to obtain all the 
data in 6 months if they were collecting the data on their own. For this reason, the shared 
recruitment procedure was a great strength of this study, and should be considered for further 
studies with ID populations. It should also be mentioned that recruitment for the IDO Group 
involved contact with clinicians to screen whether participants were suitable. This ‘middle 
man’ approach appeared to be quite challenging at times because very often clinicians on 
secure units were unable to respond due to high case loads and other clinical commitments. 
The issue of burnout and the negative affects on staff morale when working in secure units 
with ID offenders was raised in previous studies (Skirrow & Hatton, 2007; Taylor, 2002) 
This was something that needed to be considered when conducting research with ID 
offenders in secure facilities.  
Notably the IDN group were seen in their homes and the IDO group were seen in 
forensic hospitals. The location of where each group was seen was different and this could 
have influenced their responses. It is possible that participants in the IDO group could have 
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underreported for fear of punishment or having to attend additional therapy sessions. It is also 
possible that participants in the IDN group underreported to avoid punishment or ‘getting into 
trouble.’ In order to address this, both groups were informed that participation was voluntary 
and that they could stop at any time. 
Because participants were screened for offending histories, allocation into the IDO or 
IDN group was straightforward. This was a strength of the current study. On one occasion, an 
IDN participant revealed that the “Police told them off for taking something in a shop.” The 
researcher asked how long ago this took place and the participant’s response was “When I 
was about 5 and it never happened again.” On this occasion, the researcher made contact with 
the Chief Investigator and it was agreed that the participant would be recruited into the IDN 
Group, given that they had no long history of offending and no crown court convictions. 
4.4.1.3 Risk management. In order to manage risk and distress, all participants were 
asked if they wanted to participate in the study. Therefore, participation was voluntary. In 
order to manage coercion, participants were asked if they wanted someone present during the 
data collection points. A carer or support worker was asked to sit in during informed consent 
sessions. These risk management procedures were strengths of the study. On one occasion a 
participant in the IDO Group made use of the telephone number and let the Chief Investigator 
know that they wanted to participate after reading the information sheet. This suggested that 
information sheets were being read once they had been left with participants. 
The procedure before seeing a participant was to ask staff or carers how they were 
doing on the day and if it was ‘okay’ to see them. For the IDO Group, the researcher also 
checked whether a participant could be seen alone and whether there were any other risk 
indicators. These procedures helped to minimise any distress and risk to participants and 
researchers. 
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4.4.2 Strengths and limitations of measures. This section described the strengths 
and limitations of each measure. The measures included the demographic questionnaire, 
WASI (Wechsler, 1999), SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992), HIT (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga 
et al., 2001) and the SPSI-R-SF (D’Zurilla, et al., 2002). Each participant completed every 
measure. In general, this was a strength of the current study as only a few items on some of 
the measures were incomplete or unscorable. The missing data was minimal and insufficient 
to warrant excluding participants. All measures were read out aloud to participants and visual 
analogue scales were used. These were strengths of the current study. 
4.4.2.1 Demographics questionnaire. A demographics questionnaire was used to 
determine the demographic profile of the sample. It may have been appropriate to collect 
information regarding whether participants in the IDO Group were currently receiving any 
type of psychological treatment. It could be argued that their participation in psychological 
interventions, which were related to cognitive restructuring or improving problem solving, 
may have had an impact on their responses to the HIT and the SPSI-R-SF. This was a 
limitation of the demographics questionnaire. 
There were more mental health problems reported in the IDO Group. This concurred 
with Barron et al. (2002), which found higher levels of mental health difficulties in offenders 
in comparison to non-offenders. This suggested that other factors such as anxiety or 
personality disorders could have influenced participants’ responses. 
In sum, the demographics questionnaire was useful in collecting data that was used to 
explore the profile of participants. This study did not focus on the sample characteristics and 
there were no specific hypotheses that were linked to the profile. For example, other studies 
have included hypotheses on female offenders and demographic information for their study 
was essential (McDermott & Langdon, 2014). This could be considered as a limitation. 
Should further studies wish to replicate the current study, it would be worthwhile to collect 
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data on previous therapy, current therapy and diagnosis of personality disorder, as these 
might influence participants’ responses to items on the measures. 
4.4.2.2 Definition of intellectual disability. Langdon et al., (2011a) highlight the need 
for studies with ID populations to be clear that the sample recruits participants with IDs. The 
rationale for this was because some studies used samples where they included Borderline 
FSIQ scores, which are between 71 and 84. The problem with including Borderline IDs is 
that comparisons couldn’t be drawn because the samples were not heterogeneous.  This study 
ensured that all participants were in the mild ID range by using the two-subtest version of the 
WASI (Wechsler, 1999) as part of the screening procedure. In some instances where FSIQ 
scores were available on the file and permission to access the file was granted, these FSIQ 
scores were then used. The two-subtest version of the WASI was a useful screening tool that 
was administered fairly quickly, which was another motivation for using it. Using the WASI 
in this context was a strength of the current study. However, there was a floor effect for the 
WASI as the minimum FSIQ that could be obtained is 55 and this potentially limited the 
inclusion of participants with a FSIQ score below 55. Notably, in the current sample, there 
were 8 participants that had a FSIQ of exactly 55 using the WASI. There was also only 1 
participant with a FSIQ of 50 and their score was obtained from their file.  
The current study could have used the WAIS-III or the WAIS-IV as a screening 
measure to limit the floor effect of the WASI. However, given the 2-hour time frame that was 
planned for data collection sessions and that none of the hypotheses were related to FSIQ, it 
was decided that the WASI would be suitable. It was envisaged that using the WASI would 
take less time and minimise the potential of participants dropping out, due to the long time 
period and potential difficulty when completing the WAIS-III or the WAIS-IV.  
4.4.2.3 The Socio-moral Reflection Measure Short-form. In general, a strength of 
the study was that there was that there was a very limited amount of missing data for the 
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SRM-SF. Fourteen participants did not complete all the questions. However, their scores 
were still eligible as they all completed more than 7 of the items of the SRM-SF. One of the 
strengths of the SRM-SF is that it was used in previous studies with offenders with IDs 
(McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Langdon et al., 2011b). Secondly it was read out aloud and 
the researcher could probe for answers that were scorable. The advantage was that 
participants could respond to each item with some discussion. Participants were also able to 
‘skip’ questions and this was noticed in only a few recording forms. It was possible that some 
of the questions might have been difficult to understand and this was something that could be 
explored further. 
The SRM-SF has been found to demonstrate sound psychometric properties (Langdon 
et al., 2010a) and this was a strength of the current study.  The results in the current study 
were consistent with the results in the previous studies that have used the SRM-SF with 
offenders with IDs. This was a strength of the current study as it suggested that the SRM-SF 
was a reliable measure that would produce similar results across studies with ID offenders. 
As a final point, inter-rater reliability was calculated on two occasions. The first occasion 
reported an inter-rater reliability that was too low (r = .694). The second occasion reported an 
inter-rater reliability that was excellent (r = .958). Using inter-rater reliability was a strength 
of the current study as it suggested that the scoring was accurate in consistent with the 
scoring manual.  
4.4.2.4 The How I Think Questionnaire. An adapted version of the HIT was used in 
this study. The HIT was completed by all participants. Only two participants missed a single 
item on the HIT. This was permitted in terms of the manual and their total scores and sub-
scale scores could still be determined (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Barriga et al., 2001). A key 
strength for using the HIT was that it has been used in 2 previous studies with offenders with 
IDs (Langdon et al., 2011b; Langdon et al., 2013). Barriga et al. (2001) reported that 
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confirmatory factor analysis supported the structure of the HIT, which made it a useful 
measure for the study as it suggested that the HIT measured the construct of cognitive 
distortions. 
Langdon et al. (2011b) identified the need to explore reliability and validity data for 
the HIT given that they had started to use it with an ID population and that this data was not 
available. This formed the basis for Psychometric Question 1a, 3b of the current study. As a 
result the HIT was amended for use with an ID population and this was strength as it 
responded to Langdon et al. (2011b)’s recommendation. The results indicated that the HIT 
had good psychometric properties for use with men with IDs. 
There were also some limitations because the current study used an adapted version of 
the HIT. Firstly, it was difficult to compare the findings in the current study with the norm 
scores in the manual. Secondly, it was not possible to determine whether participants could 
be assigned into the clinical, borderline or non-clinical ranges given that the scoring of the 
Likert scales in the amended version of the HIT had been changed for the current study. And 
thirdly, there were problems related to social desirability as indicated be the Anomalous 
Responding scores. Social desirability occurred when participants minimised their 
undesirable qualities and over reported their positive qualities. This was a limitation that 
should be considered when using amended measures. A similar issue was also identified by 
Langdon et al. (2013) when they used the HIT and described elevated Anomalous 
Responding scores as a possible result of intellectual or developmental disabilities. These 
limitations made it difficult to compare HIT total scores and sub-scale scores to previous 
studies. Inter-rater reliability was not calculated for the HIT and this was a limitation for the 
current study. As a result, the hypotheses that explored cognitive distortions should be 
replicated in further studies using the amended version of the HIT.  
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4.4.2.5 The Social Problem Solving Inventory Revised Short-form. An adapted 
version of the SPSI-R-SF was used in this study. All participants completed the SPSI-R-SF 
and there was no missing data. The rationale for using an amended version of the SPSI-R-SF 
was based on a previous study where it was used with ID offenders (Lindsay et al., 2011a). 
Therefore, results in the current study could be compared to Lindsay et al. (2011a) and this 
was a strength. Another strength for using the SPSI-R-SF was that it is not limited to any 
specific client group. For example, Langdon et al. (2013) used the Problem Solving Task 
(PST; Nezu et al., 1991) in their study where they also explored problem solving ability for 
offenders with IDs. Upon closer inspection it was noted that the PST was originally 
developed for use with sex offenders with IDs. Because this study was looking to recruit 
offenders with multiple offences, the SPSI-R-SF was used.  
One of the limitations for comparing the results to Lindsay et al. (2011a) was that 
their study collected data at different points during an intervention and their study used a very 
small sample size (N=10). For this reason comparisons were made, but should be interpreted 
with caution as Lindsay et al. (2011a)’s study was a preliminary study with an underpowered 
sample size.  
Another limitation for the SPSI-R-SF was the issue of cognitive dissonance. 
Cognitive dissonance was when an individual held two contradictory beliefs. In other words 
they ‘thought one thing’ and ‘did another.’ The SPSI-R-SF appeared to assess their problem 
solving plan or what they have done in the past. It was unclear whether participants were 
scripting responses such as “I’ll just ask someone here to help me”; or whether they were 
simply repeating what they had heard from others. Therefore the SPSI-R-SF did not appear to 
measure the behavioural component of problem solving, as it did not follow the participant to 
observe how they responded to situations. This was a limitation of the measure and would 
need to be considered in future studies. 
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In sum, the current study was the first study that used the amended SPSI-R-SF with 
an adequately powered sample size. The hypotheses that explored problem solving were all 
consistent with the key theoretical frameworks for moral reasoning (Garrigan & Langdon, in 
press; Gibbs, 2003, 2010, 2013; Gibbs et al., 1992, 1995). Because this was the second time 
the amended SPSI-R-SF was used with an ID population, the hypotheses related to problem 
solving should be replicated to test the validity of the conclusions in the current study. 
4.4.3 Summary. In conclusion the results for Hypothesis 1, 2, 3a, 4a, 4b and 
Psychometric Question 1a and 1b were significant. Only one hypothesis was not significant 
and this appeared to be related to social desirability and variability in data for the IDN Group 
on some of the measures. Non-parametric analyses were used for all the hypotheses for 
consistency and due to the skweness and normality of the data. The hypotheses were 
replicated in some previous studies and were linked with upcoming theoretical models that 
integrated moral development, information processing, problem solving and distorted 
cognition. This suggested that these results demonstrated external validity as they were 
consistently identified in other studies. This was a strength of the study as future studies 
could use the findings for comparative purposes. The results for Psychometric Question 1a 
and 3b indicated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability for men with IDs. This 
suggested that the HIT was a psychometrically valid measure for use with ID populations. 
However, this was a preliminary finding and it should to be replicated in future studies. 
In terms of the measures, the SRM-SF showed positive strengths as a reliable and 
valid measure. Similar results were found in the current study when compared with previous 
studies. The amended version of the HIT produced good results. The SPSI-R-SF showed 
positive results and it supported existing (Gibbs et al., 1992; D’Zurilla et al., 2002) and 
developing theoretical frameworks (Garrigan & Langdon, in press). Given that the SPSI-R-
SF was amended, relevant hypotheses should be replicated in further studies in order to 
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validate them further. All the measures were read out aloud and visual analogue scales were 
used. This is was a strength for the current study. 
4.5 Clinical Implications and Future Research Recommendations 
The current study used moral development as a theoretical framework for exploring 
problem solving and cognitive distortions for offenders and non-offenders with IDs. The 
results were consistent with the few studies that focused on moral reasoning with ID offender 
populations (McDermott & Langdon, 2014; Langdon et al., 2011b; Langdon et al., 2013). 
According to Langdon et al. (2011a) people in the highest and lowest levels of moral 
development tend to be less likely to engage in illegal or antisocial behavoiur. The rationale 
for this was based on Gibbs Sociomoral Stages (Gibbs et al., 2013). Therefore, Stage 2(3) 
was considered the high risk stage for offenders. The results indicated that offenders were 
reasoning at Stage 2(3) where they demonstrated understanding social interactions, goal 
identification and response access. This appeared to be consistent with Step 2, Step 3 and 
Step 4 of Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s model. Ultimately, it suggested that moral 
development had important clinical implications for working with ID populations.  
In a clinical context, this was an extremely important finding given that treatment for 
ID offenders was identified as a costly and urgent focus area (Barron et al., 2004; Taylor et 
al., 2002; Holland, 2004; Ward et al., 1997). In terms of treatment, previous studies 
highlighted interventions for offenders with IDs. These included the EQUIP programme 
(Gibbs et al., 1995), SPORT programme (Lindsay, Steele, Smith, Quinn, & Allan, 2006c) and 
SOTSEC-ID (Langdon et al., 2007). Notably, moral reasoning, cognitive distortions and 
problem solving were integrated across these interventions and this suggested their 
importance for clinical implications. Because offenders IDs demonstrated Stage 2(3) 
reasoning it is important to consider constructs like problem solving, moral development and 
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distorted cognitions. Furthermore, these constructs should be incorporated as targets within 
clinical interventions.  
The use of measures in the current study were linked to the clinical implications. 
Since commencing with this study, the researcher was approached on a few occasions with 
the same question: “Do you know of a measure I can use for cognitive distortions as I’m 
based in a learning disability service?” It was possible that the question was raised because 
the researcher is currently in contact with other trainee clinical psychologists. However, these 
trainee clinical psychologists have supervisory clinical psychologists in existing services and 
the question suggested that measures for ID offenders were of importance. For this reason 
measures in this study could be useful in clinical settings for offenders and non-offenders 
with IDs. Notably, the measures were all completed which suggested that they could be 
completed by people with IDs. Furthermore, visual analogue scales were useful and should 
be considered when working with ID populations. Secondly, the SRM-SF showed 
consistency in identifying ID offenders reasoning ability. Thirdly, the amended HIT showed 
good psychometric properties and was suitable for use in clinical settings once permission 
from the publishers was obtained. Fourthly, the amended SPSI-R-SF demonstrated links with 
existing and developing moral reasoning theoretical frameworks. 
4.5.1. Future research recommendations. The current study explored moral 
development, cognitive distortions and problem solving for offenders and non-offenders with 
IDs. Significant differences were found on all the variables when offenders and non-
offenders were compared. The results supported existing and upcoming theoretical 
frameworks and appropriate methodological designs and analyses were used. 
The results were useful as they contributed to the small pool of methodologically 
rigorous studies that focused on moral reasoning with ID populations. What was still unclear 
was whether these results related to stronger ‘causes’ of behaviour and whether theoretical 
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models could predict behaviour. McDermott and Langdon (2014) started to explore the 
predictive nature of moral reasoning. They found that moral development predicted 
behavioural problems for people with IDs. The current study added to this limited pool of 
methodologically robust studies. The findings suggested that moral reasoning, problem 
solving and cognitive distortions were relevant to working with offenders with IDs. The 
findings supported the Garrigan and Langdon (in press) model where they proposed that 
social experiences were understood through a cognitive filter, which influenced the ability to 
solve problems. Over time, distal higher order constructs (i.e. brain maturation, moral schema 
development and emotion regulation) developed and contributed to moral development as 
illustrated in the Garrigan and Langdon (in press) model. Therefore, delayed moral 
development was related to distorted cognitions and poor problem solving for men with IDs. 
Because this study was one of the first to explore this relationship, further studies should be 
conducted to replicate the results. 
Notably, psychological interventions were not a focus of this study. This was a 
limitation and further studies could potentially build on the current study by measuring the 
same constructs along with different interventions. Treatment programmes that were based 
on problem solving and moral development for ID offenders, with varied offence types, were 
still developing. Further studies should focus on using the amended version of the HIT and 
SPSI-R-SF to explore the changes after such intervention programmes. Theories for 
interventions should be theoretically robust and need to be tested with ID populations. The 
current study supported the hypothesis that ID offenders demonstrate reasoning at Stage 2(3) 
of Gibss Sociomoral Stage theory and this appeared to be consistent with Step 2, Step 3 and 
Step 4 of Garrigan and Langdon (in press)’s model.  It was promising to see that Garrigan 
and Langdon (in press)’s theory has started to resemble some consistency with a well-
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established theory of moral development. Because this theory is still ‘youthful’ future studies 
needed to explore its validity and make comparisons with the results in the current study. 
4.6 Final Conclusions  
The current study examined moral reasoning for offenders and non-offenders with 
IDs. This was considered in the context of relationships between moral reasoning and 
cognitive distortions; relationships between moral reasoning and problem solving; and moral 
reasoning ability when compared to non-offenders with IDs. In addition, the study was a 
preliminary study, which used two measures that were adapted for use with ID populations. 
One of the hypotheses explored the psychometric properties of an adapted cognitive 
distortions measure. The findings in the current study indicated that: 
 There was a significant difference between moral reasoning for offenders and 
non-offenders with IDs. Offenders with IDs demonstrated Stage 2(3) 
reasoning, which is based on exchanges, and instrumental needs. Non-
offenders with IDs demonstrated Stage 2 reasoning. The constructs of 
Contract, Life, Law and Legal Justice were significantly different (IDO>IDN) 
when using the SRM-SF.  
 Offenders with IDs were significantly better at problem solving when 
compared to non-offenders with IDs. However, they reported higher levels of 
Careless Problem Solving Style, which suggested that they might engage in 
impulsive and narrow behaviours in order to solve problems.  
 The HIT demonstrated good internal consistency and test-retest reliability for 
use with men with IDs.  
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 Offenders with IDs reported significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions 
when compared to non-offenders with IDs. 
 In terms of rank order, Lying and Oppositional Defiance were the most 
prominent cognitive distortions for ID offenders. 
 There was small to medium positive and statistically significant relationship 
between moral reasoning and cognitive distortions for men with IDs. This 
relationship was not replicated offenders with IDs. 
 There was medium positive and statistically significant relationship between 
moral reasoning and problem solving for men with IDs. This relationship was 
replicated with offenders with IDs. 
The study contributed to the limited number of studies that have explicitly focused on 
moral development and offenders and non-offenders with IDs. The strengths and limitations 
of the current study were described in relation to the design, methodology and statistical 
analysis. A key strength of the study was an adequately powered sample size. Therefore, it 
addressed a major critique that was related to methodological flaws (Langdon et al., 2011a). 
Limitations included extraneous variables such as social desirability, personality factors, 
motivation and treatment. 
It was envisaged that future studies would revisit and replicate some of the hypotheses 
in the current study. Further studies could include a second series of validation studies for the 
psychometric properties of the amended HIT and the amended SPSI-R-SF. There was also a 
need to explore the structure of the relationships between moral reasoning, cognitive 
distortions and problem solving using a longitudinal design where causal inferences could be 
examined. Lastly, there was a need to explore how these constructs changed before, during 
and after interventions that were used with ID populations. It was envisaged that future 
studies would use these recommendations and that this would contribute to current and 
 
IDS, MORAL REASONING, COGNITIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING  
 147
upcoming theories of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992; Garrigan & Langdon, in press). 
The conclusion for the current study was that further research with ID populations was still 
required.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Socio-Moral Reflection Measure Short Form (SRM-SF) * 
 
 
1 Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. How important is it 
for people to keep promises? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 What about keeping a promise to anyone? How important is it for people to keep 
promises, if they can, even to someone they hardly know? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
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3 How about keeping a promise to a child? How important is for parents to keep 
promises, if they can, to their children? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 In general, how important is it for people to tell the truth? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
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5 Think about when you’ve helped your mother of father. How important is it for 
children to help their parents? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Let’s say a friend of yours needs some help and may even die, and youre the only 
person who can save him or her. How important is it for a person (without losing his 
or her own life) to save the life of a friend? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 What about saving the life of anyone? How important is it for a person (with losing 
his or her own life) to save the life of a stranger? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
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8 How important is for a person to live even if that person doesn’t want to? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 How important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
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10 How important is for people to obey the law? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 How important is for judges to send people who break the law to jail? 
 
Circle one:          Very Important          Important          Not Important 
 
WHY IS THAT VERY IMPORTANT / IMPORTANT / NOT IMPORTANT 
(WHICHEVER YOU CIRCLED?) 
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Appendix B: Modifications to the How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) * 
 
Original Item Flesh Reading Ease (FRE) (%) Rationale 
Proposed New 
Item (FRE %) 
1 People should try to 
work on their problems. 92.0 - Retain 
2 I can’t help losing my 
temper a lot. 92.9 
Ambiguous 
sentence 
I lose my temper 
a lot. (100.00) 
3 Sometimes you have to 
lie to get what you 
want. 
95.1 - Retain 
4 Sometimes I get bored.  
75.8 - Retain 
5 People need to be 
roughed up once in a 
while. 
100.00 - Retain 
6 If I made a mistake, it’s 
because I got mixed up 
with the wrong crowd. 
95.7 - Retain 
7 If I see something I like, 
I take it. 94.3 - Retain 
8 You can’t trust people 
because they always 
lie to you. 
86.7 - Retain 
9 I am generous with my 
friends. 87.9 
Substituted 
‘Generous.’ 
I give a lot to my 
friends. (100.00) 
10 When I get mad, I don’t 
care who gets hurt. 100.00 Substituted ‘mad.’ 
When I get angry, 
I don’t care who 
gets hurt. 
(100.00) 
11 If someone leaves a 
car unlocked, they are 
asking to have it stolen. 
76.5 - Retain 
12 You have to get even 
with people who don’t 
show you respect. 
88.9 - Retain 
13 Sometimes I gossip 
about other people. 31.5 Low FRE 
Sometimes I talk 
about other 
people when they 
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don’t know. 
(69.7) 
14 Everybody lies, it’s no 
big deal. 59.7 Low FRE 
Everyone lies. It’s 
not a problem to 
lie. (86.4) 
15 It’s no use trying to stay 
out of fights. 100.00 - Retain 
16 Everyone has the right 
to be happy. 78.8 - Retain 
17 If you know you can get 
away with it, only a fool 
wouldn’t steal. 
95.9 - Retain 
18 No matter how hard I 
try, I always get into 
trouble. 
80.3 - Retain 
19 Only a coward would 
ever walk away from a 
fight. 
78.2 - Retain 
20 I have sometimes said 
something bad about a 
friend. 66.1 Low FRE 
Sometimes I 
have said bad 
things about a 
friend. (84.9) 
21 It’s ok to tell a lie if 
someone is dumb 
enough to fall for it. 
90.0 - Retain 
22 If I really want 
something, it doesn’t 
matter how I get it. 
81.8 - Retain 
23 If you don’t push 
people around, you 
always get picked on. 
87.9 - Retain 
24 Friends should be 
honest with each other. 90.9 - Retain 
25 If a store or home 
owner gets robbed, it’s 
really their fault for not 
having better security. 
65.1 
Low FRE and 
substituted 
‘store.’ 
If shops get 
robbed it’s their 
fault for not 
having good 
security. (74.8) 
26 People force you to lie 
if they ask too many 
questions. 
87.9 - Retain 
27 I have tried to get even 
with someone. 82.3 - Retain 
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28 You should get what 
you need, even if it 
means someone has to 
get hurt. 
90.0 - Retain 
29 People are always 
trying to hassle me. 78.8 Substituted ‘hassle.’ 
People are 
always trying to 
get on my 
nerves. (94.3) 
30 Stores make enough 
money that it’s ok to 
just take the things you 
need. 
95.9 Changed ‘stores’ to ‘shops.’ 
Shops make 
enough money 
that it’s ok to just 
take the things 
you need. (95.9) 
31 In the past, I have lied 
to get myself out of 
trouble. 
95.9 - Retain 
32 You should hurt people 
first, before they hurt 
you.  
94.3 - Retain 
33 A lie doesn’t really 
matter if you don’t 
know that person. 
87.9 - Retain 
34 It’s important to think of 
other people’s feelings. 61.2 Low FRE 
I should think 
about others 
feelings. (73.8) 
35 You might as well steal. 
If you don’t take it 
somebody else will. 
96.1 - Retain 
36 People are always 
trying to start fights with 
me. 
94.3 - Retain 
37 Rules are mostly meant 
for other people. 78.8 - Retain 
38 I have covered up 
things that I have done.  100.00 - Retain 
39 If someone is careless 
enough to lose a wallet, 
they deserve to have it 
stolen.  
61.8 Ambiguous sentence 
It’s ok to steal a 
wallet if someone 
leaves it behind. 
(80.3) 
40 Everyone breaks the 
law, it’s no big deal. 92.9 - Retain 
41 When friends need 
you, you should be 
100.00 - Retain 
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there for them. 
 
42 Getting what you need 
is the only important 
thing. 
75.5 - Retain 
43 You might as well steal. 
People would steal 
from you if they had the 
chance. 
100.00 - Retain 
44 If people don’t 
cooperate with me, it’s 
not my fault if someone 
gets hurt. 
77.8 - Retain 
45 I have done bad things 
that I haven’t told 
people about. 
87.9 - Retain 
46 When I lose my 
temper, it’s because 
people try to make me 
mad. 
89.5 Removed ‘mad.’ 
When I lose my 
temper, it’s 
because people 
try to make me 
angry. (83.0) 
47 Taking a car doesn’t 
really hurt anyone if 
nothing happens to the 
car and the owner gets 
it back. 
76.2 - Retain 
48 Everyone needs help 
once and a while. 90.9 - Retain 
49 I might as well lie. 
When I tell the truth, 
people don’t believe 
me anyway. 
92.0 - Retain 
50 Sometimes you have to 
hurt someone if you 
have a problem with 
them. 
76.5 - Retain 
51 I have taken things 
without asking. 73.8 - Retain 
52 If I lied to someone 
that’s my business. 71.8 - Retain 
53 Everybody steals – you 
might as well get your 
share. 
75.5 - Retain 
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54 If I really want to do 
something, I don’t care 
if it’s legal or not. 84.4 - Retain 
Mean FRE 84.48 New Mean FRE  87.31 
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Appendix C: How I Think Questionnaire – Modified (HIT) * 
  Agree 
Strongly
Agree Disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
1 People should try to work on their problems     
2  I lose my temper a lot     
3 Sometimes you have to lie to get what you 
want   
  
4 Sometimes I get bored      
5 People need to be roughed up once in a while     
6 If I made a mistake, it’s because I got mixed 
up with the wrong crowd   
  
7 If I see something I like, I take it     
8 You can’t trust people because they always lie 
to you   
  
9 I give a lot to my friends     
10 When I get angry, I don’t care who gets hurt      
11 If someone leaves a car unlocked, they are 
asking to have it stolen   
  
12 You have to get even with people who don’t 
show you respect   
  
13 Sometimes I talk about other people when 
they don’t know   
  
14 Everyone lies. Its not a problem to lie.     
15 It’s no use trying to stay out of fights     
16 Everyone has the right to be happy     
17 If you know you can get away with it, only a 
fool wouldn’t steal   
  
18 No matter how hard I try, I always get into 
trouble   
  
19 Only a coward would ever walk away from a 
fight   
  
20 Sometimes I have said bad things about a 
friend 
    
21 It’s ok to tell a lie if someone is dumb enough 
to fall for it   
  
22 If I really want something, it doesn’t matter 
how I get it   
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23 If you don’t push people around, you always 
get picked on   
  
24 Friends should be honest with each other     
25 If shops get robbed it’s their fault for not 
having good security   
  
26 People force you to lie if they ask too many 
questions   
  
27 I have tried to get even with someone     
28 You should get what you need, even if it 
means someone has to get hurt    
  
29 People are always trying to get on my nerves     
30 Shops make enough money that it’s ok to just 
take the things you need   
  
31 In the past, I have lied to get myself out of 
trouble   
  
32 You should hurt people first, before they hurt 
you    
  
33 A lie doesn’t really matter if you don’t know 
that person   
  
34 I should think about others feelings     
35 You might as well steal. If you don’t take it 
somebody else will   
  
36 People are always trying to start fights with me     
37 Rules are mostly meant for other people     
38 I have covered up things that I have done      
39 Its ok to steal a wallet if someone leaves it 
behind   
  
40 Everyone breaks the law, it’s no big deal     
41 When friends need you, you should be there 
for them   
  
42 Getting what you need is the only important 
thing   
  
43 You might as well steal. People would steal 
from you if they had the chance   
  
44 If people don’t cooperate with me, it’s not my 
fault if someone gets hurt   
  
45 I have done bad things that I haven’t told 
people about   
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46 When I lose my temper, it’s because people 
try to make me angry   
  
47 Taking a car doesn’t really hurt anyone if 
nothing happens to the car and the owner gets 
it back 
  
  
48 Everyone needs help once and a while     
49 I might as well lie – when I tell the truth, people 
don’t believe me anyway   
  
50 Sometimes you have to hurt someone if you 
have a problem with them   
  
51 I have taken things without asking     
52 If I lied to someone that’s my business     
53 Everybody steals – you might as well get your 
share   
  
54 If I really want to do something, I don’t care if 
its legal or not   
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Appendix E: Social Problem Solving Inventory Short Form Revised (SPSI-R-SF)* 
  Not at all 
true of 
me 
Slightly 
true of 
me 
Moderately 
true of me 
Very 
true of 
me 
 
Extremely 
true of 
me 
1 I feel threatened and afraid 
when I have an important 
problem to solve 
0 1 2 3 4 
2 When making decisions I 
do not look at the options I 
just do the first thing I think 
0 1 2 3 4 
3 I worry when I have an 
important decision to make 0 1 2 3 4 
4 If I fail to solve a problem I 
keep going anyway  0 1 2 3 4 
5 I think a problem is always 
a good challenge 0 1 2 3 4 
6 I wait to see if a problem 
will sort itself out before I 
do anything 
0 1 2 3 4 
7 If I fail at first I get 
frustrated 0 1 2 3 4 
8 If I have a hard problem I 
worry I won’t manage it on 
my own 
0 1 2 3 4 
9 Whenever I have a 
problem, I believe it can be 
solved 
0 1 2 3 4 
10 I go out of my way to avoid 
having to deal with 
problems in my life 
0 1 2 3 4 
11 Difficult problems make me 
very upset 0 1 2 3 4 
12 When I have a decision to 
make I look at the good 
and bad things which may 
happen 
0 1 2 3 4 
13 When problems occur in 
my life, I like to deal with 
them as soon as possible 
0 1 2 3 4 
14 When I am trying to solve a 
problem, I go with the first 
0 1 2 3 4 
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idea that comes to mind 
15 I can always solve hard 
problems on my own 0 1 2 3 4 
16 When I have a problem I 
try to get all the facts first 0 1 2 3 4 
17 When a problem occurs in 
my life, I put off trying to 
solve it for as long as 
possible 
0 1 2 3 4 
18 I spend more time avoiding 
my problems than solving 
them 
0 1 2 3 4 
19 When I try to solve a 
problem I think about what 
I want to happen so I know 
what to do 
0 1 2 3 4 
20 When I have a decision to 
make I don’t think about 
the good and bad I just do 
it 
0 1 2 3 4 
21 When I solve a problem I 
look to see if it was a good 
thing to do 
0 1 2 3 4 
22 I put off solving problems 
until it is too late to do 
anything about them 
0 1 2 3 4 
23 When I am trying to solve a 
problem, I think of all the 
options until I cannot come 
up with any more 
0 1 2 3 4 
24 When making decisions, I 
go with my gut feeling 
without thinking too much 
about what might happen 
0 1 2 3 4 
25 I make decisions on the 
spur of the moment 0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix I: Information Sheet for Professionals 
 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
 
 
                    University of East Anglia                                      
                                       Norwich NR4 7TJ England                                                               
 
Norwich Medical School 
 
 
How do people with learning disabilities understand what is right and 
wrong? 
 
Information for Professionals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Who is involved in the study? 
 
This research is funded by the National Institute of Health Research.  It is being run by the 
University of East Anglia, across the East of England. 
What is the aim of the study? 
 
To better understand the factors which may explain offending behaviour in men with 
intellectual disabilities.  Previous research has shown that an ability to see other people’s 
perspectives (empathy), determining right from wrong (moral reasoning) and the way people 
process and understand the world (cognition) are important factors.  This study aims to 
investigate the way these concepts, and how they interact with each other. 
Who are the researchers? 
 
Dr Peter Langdon, Clinical Senior Lecturer, University of East Anglia 
P.Langdon@uea.ac.uk 
Susan Sadek, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East Anglia 
S.Sadek@uea.ac.uk 
Matthew Daniel, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East Anglia 
Matthew.Daniel@uea.ac.uk 
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I agree for the research team to look at my clinical notes. 
 
 
 
 
I agree for my key worker to know I am taking part. 
 
 
 
 
I agree to take part in the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I understand that I am only to tell the researchers about offences which other 
people already know about (e.g. the police, my doctor, my nurse, or my social 
worker). 
 
 
 
 
I understand that if I tell the researchers about offences which no one else knows 
about then they may tell other people about them (e.g. the police, my doctor, or my 
social worker).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
I understand that people from the NHS may check the information collected by the 
researchers to make sure they are following the rules.  I agree to this. 
 
 
 
I would like to be contacted in the future to take part in other studies.  
 
 
      
Name of Participant  Date  Signature 
My address is: 
 
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________ 
 
My telephone number is: 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 
      
Name of Witness  Date  Signature 
(Key Worker/Carer/Advocate if Present) 
 
 
      
Name of Researcher     Date 
     Signature
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Appendix P: Huntercombe Healthcare Study Approval   
 
 
From: Ford, Peter [Peter.Ford@huntercombe.com] 
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2013 4:49 PM 
To: Matthew Daniel (MED) 
Subject: FW: Research Enquiry: Matthew Daniel (Trainee Clinical 
Psychologist) need to respond 
 
 
Dear Matthew, 
  
We have discussed your proposal and are happy to assist in your 
research.  Please contact me after the middle of August to make 
arrangements to proceed with data collection. 
  
Yours sincerely 
  
Peter 
Peter T. Ford 
Consultant Psychologist, Head of Psychology, Specialised 
Mental Health and Intellectual Disability Recovery Services, 
(South & East). 
E: peter.ford@huntercombe.com 
T: 01733 844385 | Mobile: 07799330642 
Kings Delph Lodge, 761 Oil Mills Road, Pondersbridge, 
Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire PE26 2TR 
The Huntercombe Group. 
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Appendix U: Correlations between Age and IQ 
 
Table 24 
Correlations between Age and IQ and the main variables in the study 
Correlation  IDO Group Spearmans Rho 
IDN Group 
Spearmans Rho 
Age and SRM-SF Global Score .08 -.00 
Age and SPSI-R-SF .17 -.03 
Age and HIT1 .06 -.06 
Age and HIT2 -.04 .06 
IQ and SRM-SF Global Score .09  .44* 
IQ and SPSI-R-SF .21 -.13 
IQ and HIT1 -.06 -.26 
IQ and HIT2 .29* -.28* 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p< .001 
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